Dynamics of Communicating Climate Change Information: Using Mixed Methods to Examine the Perspectives of Scientists, Communicators and Publics by Haddad, Hebba
  
Dynamics of Communicating Climate Change Information: 
Using mixed methods to examine the perspectives of 
scientists, communicators and publics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted by Hebba Haddad to the 
University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
April 2014 
 
 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement. 
 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified 
and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a 
degree by this or any other University. 
 
 
 
 
 
Hebba Haddad 
 i 
 
Abstract 
The communication of anthropogenic climate change presents many 
challenges, for communicators, scientists, policymakers and publics alike. Particularly 
difficult is the issue of uncertainty, which can include ambiguity around the 
phenomenon of climate change, the possible impacts of this, and the timeframe within 
which such impacts will be seen. Previous research has established that audiences are 
often averse to uncertainty, and will disregard or ignore messages that contain it. This 
raises a theoretical and practical question of how best to manage uncertainty in 
climate change communication in order to maintain audience engagement. This 
question was the focus of this PhD research.  
Specifically, the aim of this thesis was to explore the process of climate 
change communication from the perspectives of the scientists, communicators, and 
the recipient. I achieved this research goal by utilising a mixed methods design. I 
firstly interviewed the originators (i.e., scientists) and professional communicators of 
climate change information to explore the process from their side (Chapter 2). This 
revealed a number of themes connecting to the different ways scientists and 
communicators understand the process of communication (e.g., as information 
exchange versus relationship building), the challenges of climate change 
communication and uncertainty in particular, and the (appropriate) role of scientists 
when communicating with the public about climate change. Next, in a series of 
studies I experimentally explored how audiences respond to variations in the 
informational content of climate change messages (such as the level of uncertainty) 
and the role of different communicative styles in further shaping audience 
engagement (Chapter 3). Broadly, the results of these studies suggest that while 
uncertainty can undermine audience engagement with climate change 
 ii 
communications, the negative effects of uncertainty are buffered when the 
communicator is perceived to be high in morality and/ or when they use an open 
communication style. Interestingly, these effects of communication style were 
particularly evident among women, whereas men tended to react against this. 
Together, these studies show how relational factors (e.g., communication styles and 
perceptions of communication sources) can moderate the impact of informational 
content on audience responses. Finally, I ended this programme of research by 
looking in more detail at how audiences perceive a real scientific organisation 
engaged in climate change communication and the bases of their beliefs about 
organisation competence and morality (Chapter 4). This study combined qualitative 
and quantitative data to delve deeper into some of the insights gained in the 
experimental work, and to reconnect this to the real-world organisation context I 
began with. This study again showed how perceptions of communicator morality 
moderate responses to uncertainty, but also provide useful insights into the different 
origins of perceptions of morality and competence.   
Chapter 5 concludes by summarising the research presented in this thesis, 
discussing its strengths, limitations and ways forward. Here, I also consider the 
theoretical, methodological and practical implications of the thesis’ research findings. 
Briefly, it is argued that addressing the scientific uncertainties of climate change may 
not necessarily mean altering the form of information itself. Rather, modifying the 
language peripheral to the information that contains uncertainty, attending to the ways 
in which audiences perceive the sources of uncertainty, and considering variations 
amongst publics, may help to engage in effective communication around the complex 
issue of climate change. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established in 1988, is 
a world scientific body that assesses the latest scientific, technical and socio-
economic information relevant for the understanding of climate change and its 
potential global impacts. Every five to six years since 1990 the committee has 
published comprehensive reports (termed ‘assessment reports’) of the latest 
understanding of climate change. These working group reports are technical and 
detailed in their content. There is, however, a summary for policymakers, which is 
written with non-scientist experts in mind. In summing up findings on the detection 
and attribution of climate change, the most recent Summary for policymakers states, 
 
Human influence has been detected in warming 
of the atmosphere and the ocean, in changes in 
the global water cycle, in reductions in snow 
and ice, in global mean sea level rise, and in 
changes in some climate extremes […]. This 
evidence for human influence has grown since 
AR4 [Fourth Assessment Report]. It is 
extremely likely that human influence has been 
the dominant cause of the observed warming 
since the mid-20th century. 
IPCC Summary for Policymakers (2013, p.17) 
 
 For scientists, policymakers, social scientists, and publics alike, the take home 
message from the above extract is that climate change is occurring, and that it is 
“extremely likely” to be the result of human behaviour. Perhaps this inspired Barack 
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Obama’s decision to cover this topic in his State of the Union address, 28 January 
2014, saying, “the debate is settled. Climate change is a fact” (Obama, 2014). More 
recently, during a Prime Minister’s Question Time session in the House of Commons 
the UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, stated, “I believe that man-made climate 
change is one of the most serious threats that this country and this world face” (26 
February, 2014). 
 The threats, or impacts, of climate change are projected to include a global 
average temperature increase of 0.1°C to 0.4°C over the next two decades, an increase 
that goes beyond the 0.7°C increase that has already been observed since 1950. If 
humans continue producing greenhouse gas emissions at the current rate, the resulting 
changes in the climate system would be considerably more than has already been seen 
(IPCC, 2007). As a result of these temperature changes, the adverse impacts will be 
severe and irreversible. It is also projected that there will be an increase in wet and 
dry weather extremes, global sea temperature and decreases in arctic ice sheets and 
glaciers, leading to a global mean sea level rise (IPCC, 2013). Based on current 
projections, a 0.4°C rise in the global mean temperature would be irrecoverable for 
the climatic systems (IPCC, 2007). 
 Such changes will not only impact on the environment, but will also have 
consequences for all in habitants of the Earth – including humans. For example, 
droughts, crop yields, climate migration, extreme weather conditions, and so on, will 
affect us all – globally and locally. Closer to home, in the UK there is some debate 
about whether the extreme winter storms
1
 witnessed in England and Wales between 
December 2013 and February 2014, can be linked to climate change. While the UK 
                                                        
1 This series of winter storms has been exceptional in its duration, and has led to the wettest December 2013 to 
February 2014 period in the UK since records began. Events consisted of heavy rains combined with strong winds 
and high waves led to extensive flooding and coastal damage, causing significant disruption to individuals, 
businesses and infrastructure. 
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Prime Minister believes these extreme weather patterns are linked to human-induced 
climate change
2
, climate science experts cannot, and will not, definitively say whether 
there is any connection to anthropogenic climate change
3
. Writing an article in the 
Guardian
4
 (14 February 2014), however, the author of the influential 2006 report on 
the economics of climate change, Lord Nicholas Stern, stated the flooding and storms 
in the UK are a clear sign of the impacts of climate change. 
 Actions in response to climate change fall into two categories: mitigation and 
adaptation. Mitigation is generally viewed as human actions intended to reduce the 
magnitude and rate of climate change. Adaptation, in contrast, is seen as human 
actions taken to manage the impacts of global warming (IPCC – WGII, 2007).   
Effective communication of the causes and consequences of climate change is 
therefore essential to encourage behavioural response to avoid its consequences 
(Roser-Renouf, 2010).  However, there are many challenges that the communication 
of climate change information brings which may hinder effective communication on 
the issue. Such issues must be addressed so communicators, scientists and 
policymakers can engage the public in policy and behavioural remedies that will help 
avoid (and adapt to) the threat that climate change poses.  
Before moving on to research that has specifically concerned climate change 
communication I will first introduce science communication more broadly. 
 
1. Science communication 
Broadly speaking science communication presents science-related topics to 
non-experts. The traditional perspective of this is the deficit knowledge frame 
whereby information is uniformly transmitted from ‘experts’ to ‘non-experts’. In 
                                                        
2 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25656426 
3 E.g., http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25675937, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-26084625  
4 http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/feb/13/storms-floods-climate-change-upon-us-lord-stern 
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response to its critiques, an interactive model is proposed whereby contextual factors 
and audience values are considered in the process of communication. 
1.1 Deficit model. Traditionally communication of science has taken the view 
that the general the public are empty vessels waiting to be filled with knowledge 
(Gross, 1994; Ziman 1992). As such, this ‘deficit’ model is a process of transmission 
whereby communication is seen as a linear, one-way process whereby the message 
(e.g., climate information) moves straightforwardly from the source (e.g., scientists) 
to the recipients (e.g., publics). This view of communication is akin to Shannon and 
Weaver’s (1949) transmission model, also referred to as the information deficit model 
of communication (Gross, 1994; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009).  
But, this model of science communication has received a number of criticisms. 
For instance, for not taking into account the role of context and individual differences 
in shaping communication – even simply referring to lay audiences as ‘the public’ 
implies a certain homogeneity within the group (e.g., Sturgis & Allum, 2004; Burns, 
O’Connor & Stocklmayer, 2003). By conceptualising the public as deficient in 
knowledge (Wynne, 1991), the approach implies that scientific knowledge is superior 
to untrained forms of knowledge (Davies, 1998), and that any differences between lay 
and experts are caused by knowledge deficits of the public, rather than problems with 
the communicator (Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Whitmarsh, 2009). However, a meta-
analysis study has shown that science literacy (as measured by general knowledge of 
science facts) only accounts for a small fraction of the variance in how lay publics 
form opinions about controversial areas of science (Allum, Sturgis, Tabourazi, & 
Brunton-Smith, 2008). 
Research has shown that rather than science literacy, public opinion on 
(controversial) science issues derives from an individual’s ideology, political 
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preference and religious identity (Nisbet & Goidel, 2007). Furthermore, while some 
scientists believe the public’s irrational fears around new technologies are the result 
of a lack of scientific understanding; such fears around new technologies, however, 
have been shown to do with their perceptions of risk hazards as well as how the 
technology impacts upon people’s current social and cultural lives (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Nisbet & Goidel, 2007).  
As such the approach to science communication needs to recognise that 
science cannot be separated from its social and institutional contexts (Einsiedel & 
Thorne, 1999). Furthermore, audiences are not just passive recipients of information – 
they are active participants in a process of communication. The deficit model, for 
example, ignores the possibility that individuals can seek out and evaluate 
information that supports their existing views and actively ignore refuting evidence 
(Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979; Lord & Taylor, 2009).  
1.2 Interactive model. In response to such criticisms of the deficit approach, 
the ‘interactive model’ of communication has been proposed as an alternative model 
of science communication from experts to non-experts. Also known as the contextual 
model, audience beliefs and values, and social context play a central role when 
engaging in (science) communications. In writing the editorial for the special issue of 
the journal Public Understanding of Science, Einsiedel (2007) encourages scientists to 
move beyond the deficit frame, to stop thinking of public as passive, homogenous and 
deficient in knowledge, and to view “ publics as active, knowledgeable, playing 
multiple roles, receiving as well as shaping science” (Einsiedel, 2007, p.5). 
An interactive communication model is seen as an on-going process of 
sending messages and negotiating their meaning (Logan, 2001; Wynne, 1991). Such 
interactive science communication approaches can also include an informal 
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conversation style, such as using inclusive and colloquial language (Logan, 2001; 
Einsiedel & Thorne, 1999). In examining the linguistic and discursive features of the 
IPCC Summary for Policy makers, Fløttum and Dahl (2011) found that the summary 
contained no explicit use of “we” (i.e., inclusive language) and was dominated by 
impersonal language. They suggest that dominance of impersonal language in the 
IPCC may be a technique to claiming neutrality of the science and managing points of 
non-agreements between the author(s).  
Recent public opinion figures give some indication that audiences would like 
more two-way communications from scientists in general. A Public Attitudes to 
Science survey conducted by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in 
the UK (n = 2259) revealed that 58% of respondents felt that “scientists put too little 
effort into informing the public about their work”, and 69% felt that “scientists should 
listen more to what ordinary people think” (ESRC, 2014). 
 
2. Climate change communication 
 Behavioural research has studied what barriers may inhibit favourable responses 
to climate change, and what interventions may help overcome these barriers (e.g., 
Gifford, 2011; for reviews see Steg & Vlek, 2009; Swim et al., 2009). While it is 
important to better understand behavioural barriers and motivators to pro-
environmental actions, it is also vital to engage publics on the issue of climate 
change.  
 Better understanding of the forces behind engagement may help to foster public 
acceptance of environmental policies intended to help mitigate the effects of climate 
change and better understand the barriers to such acceptance (Ockwell, Whitmarsh, & 
O’Neill, 2009). Furthermore, overcoming barriers that originate in the communication 
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of the climate change science could facilitate personal behaviour change that might 
help to avert the threat of dangerous climate change (Roser-Renouf & Maibach, 
2010).  
2.1 Barriers to the communication of climate change. There are difficulties 
specific to the topic of climate change that pose their own challenges to the 
communications process. For example, Whitmarsh (2009) found that audience 
understandings of the topic varied depending on terminology used (such as climate 
change cf. global warming). As a result, different terminologies trigger different 
audience responses; for instance, ‘global warming’ evokes more concern than 
‘climate change’. Whitmarsh argues this may be because conceiving the effects of 
“global warming” is simply easier for people. For instance, the term ‘global warming’ 
term suggests an increase in the global temperature; whereas “climate change” 
conveys ambiguous consequences. She urged researchers, because of the different 
connotations the terms “climate change” and “global warming” bring, to be aware that 
the wording contained within research questionnaires may inadvertently elicit 
different participant responses, 
Another challenge presented in the communication of climate change is the 
temporal and spatial distance that is inherent in the topic (Liberman & Trope, 2008; 
Milfont, 2010). As a result of this psychological distance people will not see climate 
change as an issue that has direct personal relevance and, as a result, makes the 
communication of its occurrence, causes and subsequent behaviour change 
challenging (Spence, Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2012; Spence, Poortinga, Butler, & 
Pidgeon, 2011; CRED, 2009; Weber, 2010; Trenberth, 2012; Bord, Fisher, & 
O’Connor, 1998; Moser & Dilling, 2004). Despite this lack of direct experience of 
climate change, however, a recent UK survey revealed 78% of respondents felt 
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informed about climate change and 75% felt that human activity does has a significant 
effect on the climate (ESRC, 2014).  
In addition to the temporal and spatial challenges concerned with the topic of 
climate change, scientists are almost certain that climate change is occurring and is 
human-induced, yet at the same time there still remain a lot of uncertainties. Such an 
oxymoron, at face value, is confusing. However, there are reasons beyond the face 
value impressions why uncertainty is an obstacle in the (scientific) communications of 
global climate change information. Uncertainty within climate science takes a number 
of forms. For instance, uncertainty within climate projections can stem firstly from 
unknowns within the climate system and how these can be modelled; to the 
unknowable variables that might impact on future climate change (e.g., societal 
responses and human behaviour).  
Thus, when scientists speak about future climate change, they tend to refer to a 
range of probable outcomes based on current understandings of the climate system 
and the factors that might affect it. The IPCC specifically define uncertainty as: 
 
 A complex and multifaceted property, sometimes 
originating in a lack of information, and at other 
times from quite fundamental disagreements about what 
is known or even knowable. 
IPCC (2007, p.138)  
 
 Uncertainties around climate change have been linked to increased scepticism 
about the phenomenon (Patt, 2007). Increasing scepticism is a problem if it translates 
into inaction (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007), and research has 
indeed indicated scepticism reduces willingness to engage in action to mitigate 
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against the effects of climate change (e.g., Kortenkamp & Moore, 2006). However, 
risk-based impacts need to be communicated effectively because risk-based decisions 
are needed in the present in planning ahead for adaption (Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011). 
 
3 Uncertainty 
It is necessary to briefly describe how uncertainty has been conceptualised in 
previous research and how it will be treated within this thesis. 
 3.1 Conceptualisations. Uncertainty has been studied in a variety of disciplines, 
including economics, statistics, physical sciences, and psychology. With this varied 
research attention comes varied conceptualisations of uncertainty. Even within 
psychology there are different forms of uncertainty people encounter. For example, 
personal uncertainty is uncertainty regarding oneself and social relationships (Berger 
& Calabrese, 1975; Hogg, 2000). Informational uncertainty is where features of 
information are lacking, therefore hindering judgement making (Van den Bos & Lind, 
2010). Where informational uncertainty is concerned, further distinctions have been 
made between probabilistic uncertainty (i.e., risk) and immeasurable uncertainty (i.e., 
ambiguity over knowledge; Knight, 1921). Communication of probabilistic 
uncertainty (i.e., the topic and likelihoods around it) to stakeholders and affected 
parties is generally termed “risk communication” (Pidgeon & Butler, 2009).  
 This thesis will be focussing on the communication of informational uncertainty 
– in particular, probabilistic uncertainty: because this type of risk communication is 
typically the focus of science organisations that communicate climate change 
information (such as the IPCC and also the collaborative partner of this PhD, Met 
Office). Moreover, according to these organisations, risk-based decisions need to be 
made and implemented now to avoid and manage the dangerous impacts of climate 
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change so the effective communication of climate future impacts is vital in this 
context (Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011).  
 3.2 Uncertainty and climate change. The IPCC Fifth Assessment (2013) 
presents a technical summary accompanied with a document containing information 
on how uncertainty is to be treated within all of the reports (p.35). The IPCC advocate 
presenting levels of certainty using two metrics. Firstly, the degree of confidence is 
how confident the collective of IPCC scientists are in the validity of a particular 
finding – this expressed qualitatively using five qualifiers (very low, low, medium, 
high, and very high). The second metric is the likelihood of an event occurring - these 
are quantified and expressed probabilistically, and are also accompanied with 
calibrated language for describing quantified uncertainty. A guide of the likelihood 
outcomes and the terms assigned as used in the reporting within the IPCC are 
presented below in Table 1.1. Such projections are based on statistical analysis of 
observations or model results, or expert judgement.  
 
Table 1.1 
Likelihood Scale of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
Term Likelihood of the outcome 
Virtually certain 99–100% probability 
Very likely 90–100% probability 
Likely 66–100% probability 
About as likely as not 33–66% probability 
Unlikely 0–33% probability 
Very unlikely 0–10% probability 
Exceptionally unlikely 0–1% probability 
 
The IPCC also provide supporting material for contributing scientists on 
uncertainty communications titled ‘Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC 
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Fifth Assessment Report on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties’. Within this 
document is advice for how lead authors of the IPCC reports on how to treat 
(un)certainty, as described above with confidence and likelihood metrics. The IPCC 
also consider how audiences may respond to statements of uncertainty. Specifically, 
they say: 
 
Be aware that the way in which a statement is framed 
will have an effect on how it is interpreted (e.g., a 
10% chance of dying is interpreted more negatively 
than a 90% chance of surviving). Consider reciprocal 
statements to avoid value-laden interpretations (e.g., 
report chances both of dying and of surviving). 
Mastrandrea et al (2010), IPCC 2010  
(point number 4, p.2) 
 
The extract above makes particular reference to Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1979) work on prospect theory, a model that attempts to explain how people manage 
risk and uncertainty. With the IPCC putting a lot of effort to make probabilities 
understandable (i.e., by including qualitative descriptions), it seems that they are also 
aware that audience interpretations of probabilistic uncertainties can vary if the same 
information is framed differently. Such interpretations of information are likely to 
have consequences on perceptions of risk and behavioural responses. Indeed, public 
scepticism towards climate change can be influenced by probabilities and model-
based uncertainty (Patt, 2007). As such it is important to better see how individuals 
respond to broad situations of uncertainty and specific response to risk 
communications of probabilistic information. 
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 3.3 Responses to uncertainty. People are typically averse to information 
containing uncertainty and ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961; Camerer & Weber, 1992; 
Hogg, 2007). This raises a question about how bodies like the IPCC could present 
uncertainty to overcome such problems. The previous subsection (3.2) has illustrated 
how the IPCC currently conveys climate change uncertainty to laypeople. However, 
research has indicated that lay audiences do not necessary interpret such probabilities 
in the way intended. Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory suggests when 
individuals are presented with probabilistic alternatives of risk, decisions are made on 
quick reference judgements (heuristics) on the gains and losses of each option. 
Accordingly, attitudes towards equivalent risks, and the decisions based on these, can 
be quite different depending on whether these are framed as gains (e.g., surviving) or 
losses (e.g., dying). People tend to be loss-averse, and as such will be more 
conservative when these are fore-grounded (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
 Similarly, audience perceptual differences have been noted in the context of 
climate change. Budescu, Broomell and Por (2009) presented participants with actual 
sentences from the 2007 IPCC report and asked them to assign numerical values to 
the probability statements. Some participants were given the accompanying verbal-
numeric translation table whereas others were not. Interestingly, respondents’ 
judgments of probability varied from the IPCC guidelines, even when the respondents 
had access to these. They found that interpretations of the qualitative terms, such as 
‘likely’ and ‘very likely’, deviated somewhat from IPCC intended probabilities. 
Specifically people would underestimate the magnitude of effects. A consequence of 
this underestimation of events may lead people to perceive climate change as not an 
issue to be currently concerned about and does not need immediate action. Following 
their results, Budescu et al. (2009) recommend using both verbal and numeric 
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presentations of uncertainty, as this improved communication compared to one 
presentation of uncertainty. 
 Similarly, framing effects have also been found in comparing probability 
impacts of climate change communicated in a negative versus positive frame. Morton, 
Rabinovich, Marshall and Bretschneider (2011) compared probability statements 
regarding the impacts of climate change framed in a negative sense (i.e., likelihood of 
climate change losses occurring) versus positive framing (i.e., likelihood of losses not 
occurring). They found that positive framing (i.e., impacts not likely to occur) 
resulted in more pro-environmental behavioural intentions even under conditions of 
higher uncertainty. This suggests that while uncertainty might ordinarily be a barrier 
to communication, subtle shifts in the communication of probabilistic information 
may help overcome the negative effects of uncertainty. 
 3.4 Meanings of uncertainty to scientists and non-scientists. Typically 
uncertainty has been viewed in terms of a single dimension of probability, or degree 
of belief (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981). Though while in some respects probabilistic 
uncertainty is measureable and quantifiable (positivist in nature), it is simultaneously 
subject to individual interpretations and responses, as discussed in the previous 
subsection (3.3) (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Morton et al., 2011). As such, one 
could argue that uncertainty is a psychological (Windschitl & Wells, 1996) and social 
construct (Einsiedel & Thorne, 1999). For Einsiedel and Thorne (1999), uncertainty is 
a concept with a fluidity that spans social worlds, stating, 
 
Uncertainty is a social construction, one 
that is negotiated among actors in a social system 
that includes various publics. Seen in this light, 
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uncertainty is manifested by individuals in a 
number of different ways, for different reasons, 
and with varying outcomes.  
Einsiedel and Thorne (1999, p.44)   
 
 With this, scientists and publics do have different understandings of uncertainty 
(Zehr, 2000; Kempton, 1991). From a constructionist perspective, uncertainty is seen 
as a rhetorical tool that portrays science as objective in generating and presenting its 
‘facts’ (Dunwoody, 1999). It is argued that such discourse is constructed in particular 
situations with specific (intended) effects (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Shackley & 
Wynne, 1996), for instance to bolster legitimacy and validity in science  (Gilbert & 
Mulkay, 1984; Potter, 1996; Edler, 1996; Zanna & Darley, 1987). The use of 
uncertainty during interactions can help maintain boundaries between scientists and 
policymakers (Shackley & Wynne, 1996) and publics (Zehr, 2000). For example, 
uncertainty positions scientists as the authoritative provider of knowledge reinforcing 
the constructed social hierarchy between scientists and publics. This is not restricted 
to uncertainty, research showing that scientists often engage with the public using 
scientific language (Cook, Pieri, & Robbins, 2004). However, using such scientific 
dialect to communicate with people not familiar with it can hinder understanding of 
the topic (Bourdieu, 2000).  
Some researchers have suggested that communicating high levels of 
uncertainty may be harmful to audience perceptions of the communicator. For 
instance, to scientists uncertainty simply represents the quantifiable level margin of 
error associated with some prediction or finding. In contrast, publics sometimes 
perceive uncertainty to imply a lack of definitive evidence and as a consequence 
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increasing perceptions unreliability (Sharples, 2010). As Pollack (2003) states, “the 
uncertainties that scientists face are really not so different from the uncertainties we 
encounter in daily life … Ironically, people who are not scientists often equate 
science with certainty, rather than uncertainty” (p.6). Indeed, laypersons generally 
expect experts to be confident and precise with their information (Shanteau, 1987). 
When a range of probabilities is  communicated, audiences may infer that the source 
is unknowledgeable in their domain of expertise (Fischoff, 1995; Shome & Marx, 
2009). Conversely, however, disclosing uncertainty can signal honesty, rather than 
incompetence, at least for some people (Johnson & Slovic, 1995).  
3.5 Summary. Uncertainty presents a major challenge in the communication of 
climate change information. In part this is because climate change science is a 
complex topic in itself, consequently making its communication tricky. In part also, 
people are generally averse to information that contains uncertainty. Research has 
identified some ways in which framing uncertainty can influence different responses 
people may have to uncertainty. Research also suggests that uncertainty has different 
meanings to scientists and publics. 
Uncertainty and risk have often been strongly associated with trust (e.g., Renn 
& Levine, 1991; Kasperson, Golding & Tuler, 1992; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; 
Slovic, 1993; Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995). Indeed, it is argued that (perceived) risk is 
integral to trust; with some researchers viewing risk as a precursor to trust i.e., the 
need for trust only occurs in a risk situation (e.g., Deutsch, 1958; Giffin, 1967; 
Schlenker, Helm, & Tedeschi, 1973; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Eiser, Miles, & 
Frewer, 2002). Conversely, some researchers argue that trust is prerequisite of 
perceptions of risk and effective risk communication (e.g., Kasperson, Golding, & 
Tuler, 1992; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). Despite these differences of perceptions of 
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which is a precursor to which (discussed a little further in the section of Trust, 4.4 – 
Trust and risk communication), the intertwined relationship of trust and risk is 
evident. Because of the integral relationship between uncertainty and trust, we must 
also get a clearer picture of trust as a concept before exploring its role in 
communicating climate change information. 
 
4 Trust  
It has been said that trust is the fundamental ingredient in social interactions 
(Gambetta, 1988). Though the term ‘trust’ is often used every day, it is actually a 
complex relational feature to build, maintain, repair – and to research. 
Conceptualising trust has been attempted within a number of social science 
disciplines, notably economics, psychology and sociology. And, as with uncertainty, I 
will briefly discuss how trust has been conceived in previous research before defining 
how it will be treated in this thesis. 
4.1 Conceptualisations. Trust has been defined as a “psychological state 
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of 
the intentions or behaviour of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, 
p395). Said another way, trust involves two parties: a trusting party (trustor) and a 
party to be trusted (trustee) (Driscoll, 1978). Specifically, trust can take different 
forms depending on the situation. For example, relational trust is generally seen 
within (romantic) relationships (e.g., Lazelere & Huston, 1980), and is established 
through recurring interactions over time between actors (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & 
Camerer, 1998). In contrast, calculus-based and institutional trust is established over 
short-term interactions and expectations made in situ (Rousseau et al., 1998).   
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Some thinkers have criticised researchers of trust for complicating the 
research concept (Metlay, 1999). For example, Metlay (1999) has argued that there 
are nuances in meaning and constructs within the concept of trust that may be 
discussing the same features. This view has been echoed by Siegrist, Gutscher, and 
Earle (2010) saying, “research has also spawned a confusing variety of measures, 
constructs and theories that has frustrated progress towards a more useful 
understanding of trust” (p.3). Despite this, I will attempt to discuss research on the 
topic of trust in the following subsections. 
 4.2. Early research. Originally social research into trust was guided by the 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’ (Deutsch, 1958) framework, whereby trust was the extent to 
which someone would engage in co-operative behaviour  (Deutsch 1960). Early social 
psychology research on the characteristics of trust studied it as part of a broader 
concept of ‘credibility’. Here ‘credibility’ was comprised and affected by two factors: 
expertise and trustworthiness (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). As such, in 
measuring credibility, trust tended to be described, and manipulated for the purpose of 
experimentation, interchangeably with expertise (e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 
1953). Research over the decades continued to commonly include expertise as part of 
the make-up of trust (e.g., Griffin 1967; Deutsch, 1960; Kee & Knox, 1970).  
 Researchers have identified various attributes that lead to trust. These 
include: perceptions of fairness (e.g., Bromiley & Cummings, 1993); perceptions of 
competence (e.g., Gabarro, 1987; Sako, 1992); perceived competence and integrity 
(e.g., Lieberman, 1981); openness; (e.g., Pijawka & Mushkatel, 1991/2; Ouchi, 1981); 
predictability (e.g., Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Gambetta, 1988; Rotter, 1967). For 
Barber (1983) there are two dimensions of trust: namely, technical competence and 
expectations fulfilled. Kasperson, Golding and Tuler (1992), on the other hand, 
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identify four traits people look for when developing and maintaining trust: these are 
perceptions that the other person is committed, competent, caring and predictable.  
 Metlay (1999) took these various trait characteristics associated with trust 
(e.g., openness, reliability, integrity, credibility, fairness, caring, competence) and 
attempted to simplify the research concept of trust. Metlay proposed that trust towards 
an institution (the US Department of Energy in this specific study) was based on two 
distinct components: affective elements – these are trait perceptions based on affect, 
(e.g., caring, honesty); and the second aspect of trust is perceptions of institutional 
competence (i.e., how able the institution is). 
 Through the ‘80s and ‘90s research tended to take the view that trust (and 
trustworthiness) is inferred from perceptions of expertise and credibility (e.g., Cook & 
Wall, 1980; Kasperson, Golding, & Tuller, 1992; Metlay, 1999). Renn and Levine 
(1991) defined trust in risk communication contexts as, “Trust in communication 
refers to the generalized expectancy that a message received is true and reliable and 
that the communicator demonstrates competence and honesty by conveying accurate, 
objective, and complete information” (p.179). 
 Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) provide a comprehensive summary of 
trust antecedents. They propose three characteristics of the communicator that 
repeatedly explained trustworthiness, these were: ability, benevolence, and integrity. 
These researchers suggested that each trait contributes a unique perspective to 
consider when evaluating others in terms of their trustworthiness. This suggests that 
while ability, or competence, might be one input into trust, trust is also a composite of 
further factors. Mayers and colleagues (1995) made comparisons to Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric which suggests that a speaker’s ethos (character) is based on the listener’s 
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perception of three things: phronesis (intelligence); eunoia (goodwill intentions to 
audience); and arete (reliability, honesty). 
4.3. Recent research on person perception. Since the late 1990s, social 
psychological research has moved towards a structured view of social judgment, also 
termed as stereotype content. As with Aristotle and thinkers since, trustworthiness and 
competence have remained central components on which judgements are made 
regarding person perception. Recent researchers have shown that trustworthiness is 
theoretically and empirically distinct to other components, such as competence. 
Stereotype content models of person perception provide a framework of how 
impressions of others are formed, and with this provides a research tool to gauge how 
impressions of others may influence behaviours as a result (e.g., Leach, Ellemers, & 
Barreto, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski 1998).  
Although stereotypes can often appear quite idiosyncratic, social 
psychological research has shown that the plethora of trait perceptions which 
stereotypes embody can be grouped to represent their underlying dimensions. Most 
stereotypes contain information about the capacities of the stereotyped group (e.g., 
competence or agency) and their relational qualities (e.g., warmth and/ or morality). 
Perceived competency (e.g., perceiving groups and their members as capable, 
competent, and skilled) is a core dimension included in all theoretical perspectives of 
stereotype content. However, differences in theoretical opinion arise with regards to 
the distinctiveness of content dimensions of warmth (e.g., friendly, warm) and 
morality (e.g., trustworthy, moral). Such research is still in the spirit of Aristotle’s 
thinking towards judgements of a person’s character. Indeed, current research on 
person perception provides empirical support for three dimensions: competence, 
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warmth and morality (e.g., Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 
2007; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). 
Despite the nuances concerning warmth and morality, both the two and three-
dimensional perspectives of impression formation are broadly similar to the earlier 
mentioned character assessments discussed by Aristotle in Rhetoric, where it is 
suggested that people are assessed in terms of whether (or not) they are wise, virtuous 
and good-willed. 
Wojciszke and colleagues (e.g., Wojciszke 1994; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & 
Jaworski 1998; Wojciszke, 2005) and Fiske and colleagues (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, & 
Glick, 2007) do not distinguish between warmth and morality. For these thinkers, the 
two components are contained within the same dimension. Hence these are two-
dimensional stereotype content theories, comprising morality and competence (e.g., 
Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski 1998), and warmth and competence (e.g., Fiske, 
Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). Leach, Ellemers and Barreto (2007) have criticised this 
perspective for conflating morality with other constructs, such as warmth. They view 
warmth and morality as two distinct components – they believed “immoral 
competence is dangerous, and immoral sociability is disingenuous” (p.236). 
Accordingly they advocate a three-dimensional model of stereotype content, 
comprising of: competence, morality and sociability. Leach et al. empirically 
demonstrated three distinct dimensions that were comprised of unique traits. 
Furthermore, research has indicated that moral character is more important than 
warmth in impression formation (e.g., Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 
2011; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014). 
4.4. Trust in risk communication. Trust has been applied aplenty in the field of 
environmental and technological risk management. Research has shown that trust in 
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institutions is closely related to the perception and acceptability of various risks (e.g., 
Kasperson, Golding and Tuler, 1992; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Slovic, 1993).   
4.4.1 Cause or consequence. Despite the research consensus that the concepts 
of trust and risk are related, the direction of this relationship appears somewhat 
disputed. Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) state, “It is unclear whether risk is an 
antecedent to trust, is trust, or is an outcome of trust” (p.711). Such confusion can 
hinder research when making claims about its antecedents and its consequences 
(Metlay, 1999, p.2). 
Some theorists argue the need for trust only occurs in a risk situation (e.g., 
Deutsch, 1958; Giffin, 1967; Schlenker, Helm, & Tedeschi, 1973; Johnson-George & 
Swap, 1982). For instance, the acceptability of a risk is the determinant of trust. Eiser, 
Miles and Frewer (2002) term this the associationist model of trust. Conversely, some 
researchers argue that people only engage in risky situations if trust has already been 
established (e.g., Kasperson, Golding, & Tuler, 1992; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003).  
For instance, trust is a prerequisite of perceptions of risk; trust towards risk 
management institutions determines the level of perceived risk. Eiser, Miles and 
Frewer (2002) term this the causal model of trust. 
Poortinga and Pidgeon (2005) investigated whether trust is the cause (causal 
chain account) or the consequence (associationist view) in the context of the 
acceptability of five risk communications issues (climate change, mobile phones, 
radioactive waste, GM food, genetic testing). Their results were more supportive of 
the associationist rather than causal model of trust. 
4.4.2 Communicator characteristics and risk communication. As with early 
and broader research of trust and communication, judgements made in the context of 
risk communication and risk management were based upon trait dimensions of the 
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communicator as viewed by the recipient. For example, Pijawka and Mushkatel 
(1991/1992) found a strong negative relationship between perceptions of political 
trust and nuclear waste repository risk perceptions. 
In risk situations, as in other communication exchanges, judgements are often 
based upon perceptions of communicator competence and honesty. With the 
communication of chemical hazard risks, for example, Jungermann, Pfister and 
Fischer (1996) found that trust in information sources was based upon honesty and 
competence. Peters, Covello and McCallum (1997) also explored public opinion 
towards hazardous chemical risks and showed that perceptions of trust and credibility 
as derived from three things: perceptions of expertise; perceptions of openness and 
honesty; and perceptions of concern and caring. 
Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003) propose two dimensions of trust towards 
government policies different risk contexts (such as climate change mobile phones, 
radioactive waste, GM food, genetic testing). They firstly propose a general trust 
dimension, which encapsulates a range of trust-relevant traits, such as competence, 
fairness, care, openness. The second dimension they propose is trust as a scepticism 
component, which reflects a sceptical view of government policies. 
4.5 Summary of trust. Despite some debate surrounding the precursory nature 
of trust and risk, the intertwined relationship of trust and risk is widely supported. The 
concepts around ‘trust’ have presented subtle differences of terminology and 
meaning. Trust has been said to have a composite of traits such as credibility, 
trustworthiness, morality, warmth, competence, honesty, reliability, benevolence, and 
integrity. Distinctions between components are important to make clear because 
without doing so the differences between trust and similar constructs (such as 
expertise) are blurred. Early research has often viewed credibility, trust and expertise 
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as intertwined. With some conceptualisations of trust involving competence, more 
recently these constructs have seen studied as separate theoretical concepts – 
particularly competence as distinct from warmth/ morality. As such, trust is clearly an 
important component of communication, particularly in communications of risk and 
uncertainty.  
Renn and Levine (1991) provide a useful definition of trust used in risk 
research, where information is viewed as “true and reliable and that the communicator 
demonstrates competence and honesty”. This is in line with previous research, where 
trust is a composite of traits (such as competent, reliable, fair, benevolence, integrity). 
An appropriate framework of trust in this present research thesis therefore views 
competence and morality as component parts of trust. 
The next section will introduce two significant theories of communication in 
social psychology, and then I will move on to discuss the influence of source factors 
upon the audience in communication. 
 
5. Social psychological perspectives of communication 
Communication in social psychology is studied to explain how people receive 
and process messages. Communication as a process has been typically examined in 
the context of attitude change through persuasion. The processing of persuasive 
messages is seen to occur via one of two pathways.  
5.1 Dual process models of information processing. Two prominent examples 
of this are the Heuristic-Systematic Model (Chaiken, 1980) and the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). These two models are very similar in 
essence. For instance, the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) of information 
processing proposes that individuals process messages in one of two ways: 
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heuristically or systematically (Chaiken, 1980). The Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM), similarly proposed a distinction between a peripheral route and a central route 
to persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
According to both of these theories, the first path to information processing is 
said to occur when the individual has little or no motivation to engage with the 
information being communicated. Under these conditions, the person is not 
influenced by the message content but rather the non-content cues outside of the 
message. In such situations, information is processed heuristically (Chaiken, 1980) or 
with low elaboration (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and is called the heuristic processing 
in the HSM (Chaiken, 1980) and the peripheral route in the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). As such, the context rather than the informational content is what shapes 
message processing when motivation and/ or ability to engage in communication are 
low. Such contextual features can include the perception of expertise (Chaiken, 1980) 
or source attractiveness, likability and credibility (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
The second pathway to information processing is said to occur when an 
individual is motivated in a topic, for instance when it is a topic of high personal 
relevance. Under these conditions, the person deliberates carefully over the 
informational content and evaluates arguments contained within the message. In these 
situations, information is processed systematically (Chaiken, 1980) or with high 
elaboration according to the HSM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986); and via the central route 
according to the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
According to both the HSM and ELM mental shortcuts (i.e., ‘rules of thumb’) 
are used to assist in making (speedy) judgements of events (e.g., Kahneman  & 
Tversky, 1979; Chaiken, 1980). Such shortcuts are called heuristics, and these can 
include the stylistic features of the message peripheral to its content, such as speed of 
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presentation, use of imagery, length of message. Heuristic can also represent features 
of the message source and, as already mentioned, these can include source likeability, 
attractiveness, and credibility. As noted earlier in this chapter, a source perceived as 
credible can influence the persuasiveness of messages (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 
1953).  
Perceived personal relevance of information influences how people engage 
with and evaluate the message and/ or messenger (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). For example, Petty, Cacioppo and Goldman (1981) showed that when people 
were being informed about something of high personal relevance, they were more 
influenced by the quality of the message content (strong versus weak arguments) 
compared to when informed about something of low personal relevance. In situations 
of low personal relevance, attitudes were influenced by the expertise of the source. 
5.2 Summary. Relating these ideas and findings to the context of climate 
change communication, most people do not see this issue as one of direct personal 
relevance (e.g., Spence, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2012; Weber, 2010). Due to this, 
climate change communication is likely to be processed peripherally or heuristically 
(rather than centrally or systematically) by all but the most concerned members of the 
public. In addition to low personal relevance, climate change messages are typically 
complex and accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty. The combination of 
message complexity and high uncertainty is likely to undermine individual 
motivations to attend closely to the content of climate change messages. Therefore it 
would seem especially useful to consider in more depth the peripheral features of 
climate change messages that might enable communicators to be influential, even in 
situations of high uncertainty and reduced audience motivation. In the following 
 26 
section, I reconsider how source factors and perceptions of these might work to 
facilitate or undermine communication, particularly in the face of uncertainty. 
 
6. Communication and influence 
Having earlier introduced the concept of trust and its associated components 
and how judgements of trustworthiness are inferred and when such judgements are 
likely to be relied upon, I will now discuss what effects these may have in terms of 
the communication and its influence. 
6.1 Heuristics and influence. Early research. In earlier literature on 
persuasion, perceptions of the source of information were shown to guide audience 
responsiveness. For example, audiences who perceived the source as likeable are 
more likely to be persuaded by the message conveyed (e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 
1953; Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Perceived expertise can also 
influence communication (Wilson & Scherell, 1993), and people are generally more 
persuaded by experts than non-experts (Kelman & Hovland, 1953). Source credibility 
plays a particularly influential role in attitude change when messages are ambiguous 
(Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). Here, Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) manipulated 
source credibility by varying the source of product information, either a credible 
consumer magazine specialising in scientific testing or an information pamphlet 
prepared by a staff member of a discount retail store.  
Other research has shown that though sources that were high in credibility 
were more persuasive, this effect was only temporary. Over time there is delayed 
impact of the low credibility source on attitude change, known as the ‘sleeper effect’ 
(Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949).  
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 6.2 Person perception and influence. Later theorists have suggested the 
importance of stereotypical content judgements is that these provide cues to the 
individual about whom to approach and whom to avoid (e.g., Higgins, 1997; 
Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). Therefore, the identification of potential threats is 
crucial in the information-gathering process (Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 
1998). As such, social judgements assist in making (quick) inferences about whether a 
person will harm (someone to avoid) or help (someone to approach).  
In the context of evaluating political candidates, early research has indicated 
that competence-related qualities are what people look for in a leader (Kinder, 1986; 
Markus, 1982). Conversely, however, it is suggested that this approach-avoid 
outcome is the reason perceptions of morality (rather than competence) are the central 
dimension when evaluating whether to (not) engage with others (Abele & Wojciszke, 
2007; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). In other words the relational dimensions of 
stereotypes—that is, warmth and morality—are primary when people make decisions 
about whether and how to interact with a given target (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 
2007). In particular, people are inclined to look for signals of morality when forming 
impressions of others (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011). 
The reliance on stereotypic judgments may be especially pronounced when the 
motivation to engage in effortful message-based processing is low – as is likely the 
case with climate messages. Moreover, in the context of science communication the 
assumed level of competence of sources may be generally high, and therefore other 
traits (such as morality) may become more important as guides to engagement with 
those sources.  
Similar findings were evidenced in recent research examining influence of 
perceived of trustworthiness in the context of electoral outcomes and candidate 
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support of political leaders. Chen, Jing and Lee (2014) ran a series of studies where 
participants evaluated the personality traits of political candidates based on inferences 
from their faces. They found that perceptions of trustworthiness increased the chances 
of winning actual elections, but only for those who were judged as competent. 
6.3 Morality and uncertainty. In addition to guiding how people orient 
towards others, it is reasonable to take this further and consider whether perceptions 
of morality might have a particular role to play in situations of uncertainty. For 
instance, signals of relational features of morality convey feelings of security that is a 
means of coping with uncertainty (e.g., Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Sorrentino, Holmes, 
Hanna, & Sharp, 1995). 
van Prooijen and Jostmann (2013) experimentally examined the impact of 
perceived morality of authorities on conspiracy beliefs when in conditions of 
uncertainty. In two studies uncertainty was made salient subjectively (participants 
were asked to think about a time when they felt uncertain versus neutral, e.g., 
watching TV); and the perceived morality of authorities was manipulated (i.e., fake 
reports presenting an institution as moral or immoral). Their results showed that 
uncertainty salience shapes the effect of the perceived morality of institutions on 
belief in conspiracy theories, and they concluded that “uncertainty leads people to 
make inferences about the plausibility or implausibility of conspiracy theories by 
attending to morality information”, (p.109). They suggest that people perceive 
situations of uncertainty as threatening and therefore look for signals of morality to 
help or harm them (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002; van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013). The 
process of looking for indicators of harm or help from others, and the role of morality 
in signalling that, reflects similar reasoning to that proposed by self-regulatory theory 
(Higgins, 1997; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008).  
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6.4 Source influence in climate change. Within science communications, 
particularly controversial science issues, perceptions of source trustworthiness are 
considered to be as important as the informational content of any message they 
convey (Owens, 2000; Wynne, 1996; Sharples, 2010).  
In a review of attitudes towards climate change and travel behaviour, Anable, 
Lane and Kelay (2006) considered how the public trust information sources of climate 
change. With respect to official institutions, they found that perceptions of 
trustworthiness differed according to the source of information: National 
governments, the EU and businesses were perceived as less trustworthy than non-
governmental organisations or (government and industry independent) scientists. 
Research has indicated a relationship between perceptions of source trust and public 
support for climate change mitigation policies. For instance, increased policy support 
was associated with greater trust in environmental scientists and groups compared to 
government and industry (Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007).  
Research has shown that judgements of source credibility are made more 
difficult when experts disagree, potentially adding to the perceived uncertainty of the 
situation (e.g., Einhorn & Hogath, 1985). This is something often seen in courtrooms 
where expert testimony or competing lawyers are arguing contrasting interpretations, 
and jurors then need to weigh up the competing expert positions (Crammer & Webb, 
1992; Cooper, Bennett, & Sukel, 1996). 
 Similar source credibility dynamics are played out with competing scientific 
positions of climate change (Callaghan & Augoustinos, 2013; Boykoff & Boykoff, 
2004). Such conflicts among scientists played out in the public domain has 
contributed to the controversy over the existence, causes and impacts of climate 
change (Fischoff, 1995). Consequences of expert disagreement are increased 
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scepticism (Patt, 2007) and reduced action (O’Neill & Boykoff, 2010). 
 Related to this, equal, rather than representative, coverage in the media of the 
scientific positions of climate change, gives the impression of a balance of expert 
opinion despite the imbalance of the amount of supporting evidence (Boykoff and 
Boykoff, 2004; Dunwoody 1999; Sharples, 2010). Such falsely balanced competing 
claims have been termed a ‘conflict frame’ (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004). 
Opinionated minorities often play on and amplify the scientific uncertainties to 
maintain the status quo and to justify inaction (Dunlap & McCright, 2010; Oreskes & 
Conway, 2010).  
Such contrasting positions and the amplification of scientific uncertainty have 
the potential to fuel scepticism among the public. Research has indicated that higher 
levels of scepticism are associated with reduced inclination to take action to mitigate 
climate change (Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, Capstick, & Pidgeon, 2011). While 
uncertainty around climate change can lead to scepticism (Patt, 2007), uncertainty and 
scepticism are different constructs. While uncertainty is concerned around the science 
of climate change, scepticism is more the denial of anthropogenic climate change 
(Whitmarsh, 2011). Sources of scepticism and uncertainty include unreliable 
evidence, untrustworthy information sources (Whitmarsh, 2005).  
Research has also shown that scepticism is shaped by worldviews individuals 
hold, such as environmental values and political preferences (Whitmarsh, 2011). Such 
worldviews can influence how people interpret climate change information or 
associate it with weather events for example, extreme cold weather (Capstick & 
Pidgeon, 2013). Corner, Whitmarsh and Xenias (2012) conducted experimental work 
to test the effects of ‘biased assimilation’ (Lord & Taylor 2009; Lord, Ross, & 
Lepper, 1979). Using conflicting arguments contained in mocked-up media articles, 
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the researchers demonstrated that prior differences in environmental attitudes lead 
respondents to process the same (ambiguous) information differently. 
 
6. Summary 
Climate change is an issue of great concern and with the capacity to affect vast 
numbers of individuals all over the world. As such, effective communication is 
needed to engage the public with this topic: clear and effective communication should 
increase public belief in the phenomenon of climate change and should encourage 
individuals to support pro-environmental policies and behaviours. However, a number 
of features central to the topic of climate change make its communication a challenge. 
Key among these barriers is the issue of uncertainty. Climate change is itself an 
uncertain phenomenon: it is happening, but cannot be seen; and will affect people 
mostly in distant times and places. Climate science is also uncertain – while scientists 
generally agree about the reality of the phenomenon, there is uncertainty in the 
predictions of its extent and likely impact. Because uncertainty is inherent to climate 
change and the science behind it, it cannot simply be ignored. Therefore, finding ways 
to effectively manage uncertainty is a key issue for the communicators of climate 
change.  
Social psychology research has shown that perceptions of credibility are 
important for communication and persuasion (e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; 
Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) – particularly under situations of ambiguity 
(Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). Moreover, such qualities have been argued to be 
especially important with respect to understanding public responses to climate change 
(e.g., Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011; Whitmarsh, 2005; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; 
Anable, Lane, & Kelay, 2006).  
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Research guided by modern theories of content characteristics moves beyond 
the one-dimensional composite of credibility made up expertise and trustworthiness. 
The untangling of expertise and trustworthiness from ‘credibility’ leads towards 
content models of person perception that term these as competence and morality 
(and/or warmth, depending on theoretical perspective) (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 
2007; Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011). The separate constructs of 
morality and competence have been found to have different effects on audience 
responses depending on situations (e.g., Chen, Jing & Lee, 2014; Leach, Ellemers, & 
Barreto, 2007; Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). Trust has also been shown to be important 
in situations of risk (e.g., Deutsch, 1958; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Giffin, 
1967) and risk communication (e.g., Kramer, 1999; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). 
Finally, models of decision-making argue that when uncertainty is high, people will 
seek signals of source morality in order to make effective decisions (Van den Bos & 
Lind, 2002; van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013). Given such findings, it is reasonable to 
expect that perceptions of source morality and competence serve as an important basis 
in the evaluation of communicators of climate change and the information contained 
within, and that the importance of morality might be amplified under conditions of 
uncertainty. The connections between these concepts – communication, uncertainty, 
and trust – are the focus of the research contained in this thesis.  
 
7. Thesis aims 
The broad aims of this PhD research were to investigate how source factors, 
message contents and audience perceptions interact to produce joint effects on 
message understanding, trust, and resulting attitude and behaviour change. As is cited 
in the social psychology literature, communication does not solely reside in the 
 33 
informational content of the message. Communication is also shaped by how the 
source of a message is perceived by their audience. As such, communication is a 
dynamic process. Because of this, it is limiting to study each step of the 
communication chain (source, message, receiver) in isolation only. Thus, in the 
present research I aimed to explore the total communication sequence, including 
consideration of the interplay among the source, the informational content, and the 
recipient in the communications process.  
I achieved this by (1) interviewing sources and communicators of climate 
science information to better understand their perspective; (2) exploring 
experimentally how the content of climate change messages, and the style within 
which these are delivered, affected audiences’ responses, and; (3) exploring how 
potential audiences perceive scientific organisations, and the basis on which their 
judgements are formed. By triangulating the research to explore questions from 
different sides of the communication process I hoped to provide a more complete 
understanding that connects to the specific concerns of the actors involved in the 
challenging task of effectively communicating the science of climate change.  
 
8. Epistemology and methodology 
Before presenting the research that addressed the above aims, it is worth 
devoting some space to discuss the epistemological underpinnings and methods 
adopted in this research. Indeed, a researcher should be aware of their research 
positionality because this can influence the knowledge created through chosen 
methodology (Rose, 1997). Despite this, however, the training of psychology students 
has been criticised for tending to focus on the methods of research while neglecting 
the epistemologies and philosophical framework behind the choice of methods 
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(Darlaston-Jones, 2007). I will now discuss the epistemology and methodological 
approaches adopted in this programme of research. 
8.1 Epistemology. In short, epistemology is the study of knowledge, the nature 
of this knowledge and how we know things to be true. The study of such is guided by 
knowledge paradigms. A paradigm is regarded to be an “accepted model or pattern” 
(Kuhn, 1970, p.23). There has often been a distinction in the nature and underlying 
assumptions between positivist and constructionist paradigms (Blaikie 1991; Flick 
1992; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007).  
A positivist (or postpositivist) paradigm treats reality as tangible where 
objective facts are based on empirical observations (McEvoy & Richards, 2006; 
Ackroyd, 2004). Positivists aim to identify general laws that are based on empirical 
research. In contrast, a constructivist (or interpretative) paradigm postulates that 
reality is intangible and knowledge is constructed through social interactions (Gergen, 
1999; McEvoy & Richards, 2006; Bryman, 2004). Traditionally these two positions 
have been viewed in opposition stemming from fundamentally conflicting 
foundations (e.g., Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; 
Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; Thurmond, 2001; Creswell, 2009). 
Some theorists, however, argue for a continuum of perspectives. For these 
thinkers it is not a dichotomy of assumptions, but more a spectrum of the perspectives 
that characterise positivist and constructivist approaches to social science (e.g., 
Morgan & Smircich, 1980; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Maxcy, 2003; Guba & 
Lincoln, 2005; Creswell, 2003). The pragmatic paradigm is an alternative framework 
that allows researchers to move beyond the constraints of a “forced choice dichotomy 
between postpositivism and constructivism” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p.27).  
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Pragmatism is concerned with producing socially useful knowledge, focussing 
“solving practical problems in the “real world”” (Feilzer, 2010, p.8). Here the 
research problem is paramount and applies all study approaches to understanding that 
problem (Creswell, 2003). Within the pragmatist paradigm different kinds of 
knowledge are valid and can co-exist. There can be both factual global objective 
knowledge and also localised subjective knowledge: and both are needed to 
understand or solve practical problems.  
 When considering features around the topic of climate change, arguably it is 
shrouded in similar positivist-constructivist paradigm tensions. In one sense climate 
change, particularly the science behind it, can be viewed as following a positivist 
paradigm: seeking to establish objective laws, driven by empirical evidence. In 
contrast, it has been argued that social, political and cultural contexts define the status 
of climate change knowledge (Irwin & Wynne, 1996), thus shaping knowledge within 
a constructivist framework.  
Consider, for example, the issue of uncertainty. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter (Section 3.4), uncertainty is viewed in one sense as a quantifiable and logical 
construct used in science to express the likelihood of certain events (i.e., a positivist 
tradition). However, at the same time, uncertainty can hold different meanings to 
different groups, thus being a psychological and social construct (i.e., an interpretative 
tradition). Thus, with these two contrasting positions, the concept of uncertainty itself 
shifts from being a positivist construct in one social world (i.e., amongst scientists) to 
an interpretative concept in another (i.e., amongst non-science audiences). Thus, 
approaching the research from a pragmatist position is valuable in providing the 
flexibility of perceived realities as well as offering a diverse toolkit to explore these 
(contrasting) realities. 
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Similarly, the broader disciplines that make up ‘science communication’ – 
namely ‘science’ and ‘communication’ – can also be viewed as contrasting worlds. 
Science, as a discipline, is traditionally positivist, in that valid (scientific) knowledge 
is achieved through empirical data and scientific methods. This perspective can be 
contrasted with communication, which can be viewed as a construction of ‘reality’ 
through language.  
Thus it seems reasonable, perhaps even necessary, to approach a topic that is 
arguably located in the context of a number of pragmatic issues by employing a 
research method that accepts and utilises mixed perspectives i.e., a pragmatist 
paradigm. The epistemological framework in which this thesis is situated is therefore 
best described as pragmatism. This is a thesis trying to seek how messages of science 
and scientists (with their (post) positivist traditions) reach the public (with a need to 
respect diversity and subjectivity, where a more interpretavist account is needed). 
8.2 Mixed methods. In order to collect both relatively factual and tacit 
knowledge, encompassing both traditionally positivist and constructivist questions of 
research, this thesis has employed a mixed methodology. Some researchers view the 
mixing of qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches as incompatible 
because they perceive this to violate the contrasting epistemological assumptions. As 
discussed in the earlier (Section 8.1), the epistemological underpinnings of positivist 
(often used within quantitative research methods) and constructivist (often used 
within qualitative research methods) approaches are often viewed as so incompatible 
that to use these together is perceived as fundamentally incorrect (Thurmond, 2001; 
Creswell, 2009).  
Often research studies that adopt a mixed methodology are underpinned by the 
pragmatist epistemology (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003; Feilzer 2010; Johnson & 
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Onwuegbuzie 2004). While some argue that the blending of epistemological 
paradigms and methodological methods are unfeasible, Creswell (2007) praises mixed 
methods for encouraging the researcher to draw upon multiple worldviews (i.e., a 
pragmatist paradigm). 
Indeed, being aware of the differences between methodological approaches 
can be an advantage (Thurmond, 2001). Approaching the object of research through 
different methodological lenses enables the social scientist to gain a broader and 
deeper understanding, as well as a clearer picture of the issues of study. Arguably, a 
mixed-methods approach is one that avoids the constraints and weaknesses that often 
occur when attaching oneself to one particular method. In comparison, the use of 
multiple research strategies enhances construct validity, by 
 
increasing confidence in research data, creating 
innovative ways of understanding a phenomenon, 
revealing unique findings, challenging or 
integrating theories, and providing a clearer 
understanding of the problem. 
Thurmond (2001, p.254) 
 
A mixed design approach can sometimes be more beneficial than a single 
approach design (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). Indeed, 
attempts have been made to reconcile different methodological approaches, and to 
find ways that effectively blend qualitative and quantitative research. For example, 
Lee (1991) proposed an integrative framework of research, whereby both 
interpretative and positivist methods are seen as legitimate and can be used in 
collaborative ways to advance research inquiry. Snape and Spence (2003) concur, 
viewing methods as a research toolkit that consists of qualitative and quantitative 
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techniques, and each tool can be used as appropriate in different research contexts and 
to address different research questions.  
Another strength of applying a mixed research design over a mono-method 
design is that the findings from one method can help develop or inform the other 
method(s) that may follow (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989; Yardley & Bishop, 
2008). The research undertaken as part of this thesis adopted such an iterative 
approach, where one stage informed the next. As such, having the flexibility and 
diversity of mixed research methods, the foci of research evolved organically so when 
issues emerged as interesting and important, they were later explored by whatever 
means suited their further inquiry.  
While a number of advantages come with applying a mixed method research 
design, Creswell (2003) cautions researchers to be clear on why quantitative and 
qualitative data need to be mixed before commencing the research.  
It was important to present the research from a multi-stakeholder perspective 
including the views of the communicator, the message itself and the audiences, so it 
would have been potentially limiting to be constrained by a single methodology. 
Given the cross-disciplinary spread of the research within this thesis, and the dual 
theoretical and practical aims, a mixture of methodological approaches was deemed 
most suitable. The mixed methods design in this thesis thus allowed me to approach 
the communication of climate change information in different yet complementary 
ways. Climate scientist and communicator perspectives were achieved through semi-
structured interviews: this gained depth and intricacies into the process of 
communicating climate change science through the articulation of the key actors 
directly. This was contrasted by the experimental methodology that allowed the 
examination of the cause and effects relationship. This was contrasted again with a 
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survey methodology, which provides greater ecological validity than an experimental 
method. 
 
9. Thesis structure and chapter outlines 
The thesis presents an iterative triangulation of research methods and 
perspectives on the dynamics of communicating climate change information. The 
starting point of this investigation was to speak with those who create and 
communicate climate science – that is, the scientists and professional science 
communicators. The aim of this first phase of the work was to get a better 
understanding of how these central actors in the communication chains understand the 
communicative activity they are engaged in. Chapter 2 reports the findings from a 
series of interviews with climate change scientists and professional communicators in 
which they discussed the challenges and opportunities of climate change 
communication and their own understandings of the process of communication. The 
key insight from these interviews was that scientists and communicators employed 
two different communication styles when engaging with publics. These are akin to the 
previously described informational deficit and interactive models of communications 
– something I refer to as informational versus relational communication styles 
respectively. Scientists also expressed some reservations about their role in the 
communication process – specifically the degree to which the provision of advice was 
appropriate and how this might affect audience perceptions of their credibility – and 
both scientists and communicators talked about the issue of uncertainty as it relates to 
science and communication.  
Each of the themes identified in the qualitative work – communication styles, 
uncertainty, and advice provision – were picked up and developed in the following 
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quantitative work on audience responses. Specifically, Chapter 3 presents a series of 
experimental studies in which I explored how different communication styles such as 
variations in language (Pilot study), informational content such as uncertainty 
(Experiments 1 and 2) and advice provision (Experiment 3) in combination affected 
audience engagement with the message, belief in climate change, and willingness to 
act in pro-environmental ways. These studies collectively revealed how information 
and relational processes converge and shape responses to uncertainty. 
The final piece of empirical work, contained in Chapter 4, used a survey to 
explore in more detail public perceptions of a real (rather than fictitious) scientific 
organisation to further unpick the origins and consequences of these perceptions. 
Specifically, the quantitative data generated by this survey allowed me to again test 
how organisational perceptions (e.g., of morality and competence) interacted with 
uncertainty to predict climate change responses. The qualitative data obtained in this 
survey provided some deeper insights into the origins of organisational perceptions 
beyond variations in communication style that was the focus of the prior experimental 
work. These data suggested that while perceptions of morality and competence are 
often inferred on the basis of similar criteria, the manner in which they are inferred 
might be different. Specifically, while competence is a concrete property inferred 
from specific measurable criteria, morality seems more diffuse and implicit, though 
no less important on the basis of the quantitative data.  
In the final chapter, the findings of the empirical work are brought together 
and summarised. I present key conclusions around the dynamics of communication 
processes in shaping responses to uncertainty in climate change communication. The 
research strengths and limitations are identified and the theoretical and practical 
implications of the research findings are discussed (Chapter 5). 
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Chapter 2 
How to communicate climate change information:  
A qualitative investigation of the perceptions of climate scientists 
 and professional communicators 
 
The time to act is upon us. But all too often the issues 
surrounding climate change are shrouded in uncertainty and 
poor understanding. To a large extent, the challenge it’s 
presented us with has been complicated by the language used 
to describe it 
Climate Science and Weather Organisation, Chief Executive, Public Speech, 2009 
 
Introduction 
The above text is an extract from a public talk (Six Degrees — Our Future in a 
Warmer World, 2009) by the then Chief Executive of a climate science and weather 
organisation based in the UK. The speech starts by establishing the reality of climate 
change, describing it as a “geophysical phenomenon that has been meticulously 
observed and scientifically quantified for many years”. The speaker then goes on to 
talk of the urgency of responding to the changing climate. In this particular extract, 
the speaker proposes that a major challenge around the communication of climate 
change is complicated by the language used – particularly the uncertainties around 
climate change. 
In the second chapter of this thesis, I will explore some of the key issues that 
were raised in this speech, particularly that touched upon in the quoted text – 
uncertainty, language, and communication. Accordingly, I wanted to better 
understand the process of climate change communications from the perspective of 
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those who communicated on this topic. And what challenges are perceived in 
particular, and how such challenges may be managed. 
Aims  
A modified grounded theory framework was employed as suitable in this 
situation. Such a framework is deemed appropriate when a researcher wishes to 
generate and develop knowledge and meaning from data that contain a wide variety of 
opinions and attitudes, without doing an injustice to their diversity and depth. Strauss 
and Corbin (1998) describe grounded theory as a theory “derived from the data, 
systematically gathered and analysed through the research process [where] method, 
data collection, analysis, and eventual theory stand in close relationship to one 
another” (p.12). Therefore in this situation, a literature review is not needed until after 
data collection. 
A researcher therefore does not begin with a preconceived theory in mind, but 
rather s/he construct theory from the rich collection of knowledge, the aim of which is 
to explain the knowledge conceptually and contextually (Glaser, 2001). It is not a 
research method per se, but rather a framework within the larger family of qualitative 
methods. The intention when applying this approach is to establish hypotheses after 
knowledge gathering and analysis, not before data gathering and analysis. In 
approaching the research programme open to using mixed-methods, and in the 
absence of a pre-data collection literature review, grounded theory seemed 
appropriate in this instance. Furthermore, I would suggest this approach also brings 
benefits when initially addressing a project such as this about perceptions and 
experiences, since a positivist approach would focus on a small area of data, rather 
than creating a large knowledge base. The broad aim of starting with interviews was 
to get a better understanding of what communicators of climate science do and how 
 43 
they see their role in the communication of climate change. In particular the aim was 
to conduct a series of face-to-face interviews with climate scientists and climate 
science communicators. 
Procedure 
Agreement with a major meteorological organisation based in the UK was 
secured. This facilitated access to potential participants from across its workforce and 
thus across a range of different job types and levels. It must be acknowledged that the 
focus on a single employer in a specific geographic location has a likelihood of 
rendering the findings somewhat context specific. Nevertheless, the aim of the 
research was to deepen understanding of communication practices. There were of 
course logistical advantages in conducting the research because of the specific 
context. It could also be argued that with research focused towards a common 
employer it was easier to gather, synthesise and interpret the qualitative data across 
the interviews. 
Two approaches were used in recruiting participants for this piece of research.  
Firstly, because I initially wanted to ensure specific types of workers, ranging in age 
and seniority within the organisation, as well as a gender balance, I developed a 
screening questionnaire. I utilised a list of the contact details of 194 climate scientists 
within the organisation – 141 (73%) of these were male, 53 (27%) were female. Using 
this list I sent out an internal email containing an invitation letter (see Appendix 2.1) 
inviting people to take part in the interviews. The email was accompanied with an 
information sheet about the research and a short screening questionnaire that was used 
to ensure that participants varied in terms of their seniority, age, gender, and topic of 
work (Appendix 2.2). Only eight responses indicating willingness to participate were 
received via this method. The second approach consisted of word-of-mouth 
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recruitment within the same scientific organisation. Due to the communications team 
being much smaller (n = approximately 20), the word-of-mouth approach was used 
from the outset. Within this department the gender balance leans more towards 
females, but I tried to get an equal male-female balance for the interviews. 
In total, qualitative interviews were carried out with fourteen participants (7 
were male and 7 female). Of the fourteen interviewees, nine were climate scientists (5 
males, 4 females); and five were communicators (2 males, 3 females). The 
participants were of varying levels of seniority (including non-management and 
management levels) within their specialist area (either climate science or 
communications). The interviews were carried out at a mutually convenient time and 
location in Exeter, UK, and lasted between 35 minutes to 90 minutes.  
Informed consent was obtained at the start of all interviews (Appendix 2.3) 
and each interviewee was provided with an information sheet about the research 
project at the end (Appendix 2.4). With the participants’ consent, interviews were 
digitally recorded and subsequently transcribed to aid analysis. 
A semi-structured interview schedule was prepared to assist myself when 
interviewing participants (Appendix 2.5). Interviews started with participants freely 
talking about their job, and what their role consisted of. Discussion then explored 
people’s perceptions of audiences, and how they perceived to be seen by audiences. 
Discussion topics evolved to cover concepts such as, process of communications and 
what challenges/ barriers occur during such processes, uncertainty, trust, forms of 
communication, effective communication, and message understanding. Questions 
were developed based on the research project aims and interview objectives (these are 
summarised in the information sheet provided to interviewees, Appendix 2.4). 
Questions were asked in a broad manner, commensurate with a grounded theory and 
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the semi-structured approach to allow the participants to describe the characteristics 
and perceptions from their own viewpoints. 
Analytic strategy and process 
Data analysis ran alongside data collection to aid the iterative process of this 
research. Notes made during the interviews were combined with audio and 
transcriptions of the interviews. My analytic approach for the interview data was 
framed by three broad stages.  
a) Descriptive: The first stage of analysis was descriptive in its nature. Though 
this may seem basic, it is an essential starting point with any data analysis. 
b) Thematic: The second step of my analysis involved drawing out and 
clustering themes, interlinking these groups thematically. 
c) Interpretative: Finally, I scrutinised the data again, and interpreted themes 
to get meaning. Here, I move beyond descriptions by scientists and 
communicators, and aimed for a more in-depth perspective on the 
communication processes and how scientists and communicators construct 
their experiences. 
Earlier in this chapter, I discussed how an inductive method of data collection 
and analysis was used, whereby the prominent themes come from the data itself, 
rather than imposing or searching for pre-defined themes. As advocated within 
grounded theory the process of such is “the generation of emergent conceptualised 
integrated patterns, which are denoted by categories and their properties” (Glaser 
2001, p.9). This technique is similar to thematic analysis that, broadly speaking, 
involves identifying, analysing and reporting patterns in the data (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). One benefit of following a thematic analysis framework is the flexibility this 
gives the analysis, due to its detachment from one of the two dominant 
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epistemological frameworks (i.e., positivism and constructivism) - this allows for 
pragmatist ideas to be applied to the data and interpretation. Braun and Clarke (2006) 
term this thematic discourse analysis. Despite this approach, I acknowledge that in 
the drafting of an interview topic guide may, at some level, influence the existence 
and prominence of themes. 
Analysis involved reading and re-reading of the interview transcripts, 
becoming familiar with the verbatim statements and the context in which these sat. 
Re-readings were again carried out with line numbers and further annotation coding 
items in the text with line-by-line (Willig, 2008).  I labelled these individual items, 
this process later allowing for patterns of themes to be sought. I then got to a point 
where new readings of the verbatim would fit determined concepts without creating 
new (sub)themes. Topics that emerged from the data were grouped together – 
providing the overarching broad themes. Subthemes, which made up the broader 
themes, were created bringing together strands of ideas and/ or experiences. Such 
components can be meaningless when viewed alone, but qualitative analysis, in 
essence, is the evaluation of how the ideas fit together in a meaningful way (Glaser 
2001; Leininger, 1985). For each interview, a thematic map (using pen and paper) 
was devised showing the themes and subthemes, and their inter-linkages (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). To assist further with analysis, the (sub)themes and key points were 
entered into an Excel spread-sheet with individual interviewees on the vertical; this 
matrix mapping approach assisted in assessing commonalities and differences 
between interviewees among the sample. The matrix mapping approach has 
previously been adopted in order to aid category sorting (e.g., Musselwhite, Avineri, 
& Susilo, 2014; Lyons & Haddad, 2009).  
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Analysis and discussion 
Themes and subthemes were chosen on the basis of addressing the broad aim 
of the interviews: better understanding the roles and processes involved in 
communications. In line with matrix mapping, topics that did not directly align with 
the overarching aim, yet contributed to it, created sub-themes. Other points of interest 
that related to the literature but did not contribute to the overall aim were also 
collected and reported where appropriate. 
The analysis that follows presents three general themes identified within the 
interview data: 1) Communication Process(es); 2) Communication Challenges; and 3) 
(Conflicting) Roles of Climate Scientists. Each of these themes consisted of a number 
of subthemes. Conceptually, the three themes evolved from being descriptive to 
interpretative over the course of the analysis, though they are not fully separate. 
Instead there is overlap and linkage both within and between the broader themes. In 
presenting the analysis, I tried to articulate these linkages as clearly as possible, 
giving examples of actual verbatim transcripts from the interviews; interpreting these 
and structuring them into some kind of narrative. The recurring themes across 
participants are presented below in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1. Summary of themes and sub-themes identified within interviews 
Themes Sub-themes 
One. Communication process(es) – Perceived audiences 
– Message production 
– Effective communication 
 
Two. Challenges – Subject matter (e.g., uncertainty) 
– People relations 
 
Three. (Conflicting) Roles of 
climate scientists 
– To provide objective information 
– Professional roles vs. personal goals 
 
 48 
 To assure organisation anonymity, the organisation name has been excluded 
and replaced with ORGANISATION. “Comms” or “comms team” is a term commonly 
referred to within the organisation to mean communications team, and is often used 
within the verbatim extracts. 
Some details accompanying transcript extracts within this chapter indicate the 
following. Italicised Scientist or Communicator indicates the group the interviewee 
belongs to; P followed by a number is the participant number they have been 
assigned
5
. Where extracts include exchanges of dialogue, the letter I represents 
Interviewer, with P representing Participant. The numbers in the left-hand margin 
alongside the verbatim extracts are the specific lines numbers within the interview 
transcription for that specific interview. 
 I will now go on and present the three broader themes I identified within this 
qualitative data, and describe each theme whilst elaborating on the sub-themes that 
constitute it. 
 
1. Theme One. Communication process(es) 
The first theme concerned how the key actors (climate scientists and 
communicators) engaged in the process of scientific communication. This theme 
starts fairly descriptive, providing insights of whom interviewees see as their 
audiences, how they perceive the process of communication and how this is 
performed in practice and what they see to be effective communication. Within 
certain subthemes I hope to show how perceptions move beyond the descriptive to a 
discursive nature of constructing their distinct worlds. For example, with the first 
                                                        
5 The participant number does not necessary represent the order the participants were interviewed in. 
 49 
subtheme of perceived audiences, it can be seen how scientists construct and validate 
their perceptions of the non-science publics with whom they communicate. 
1.1 Perceived audiences. This subtheme describes whom scientists and 
communicators see as the audience(s). This is important as it plays a role in 
determining how communications are presented and delivered. There was, of course, 
some individual variation in terms of the specific audiences that were focussed on by 
interviewees, but overall, a wide range of audiences were identified: policymakers, 
businesses, other scientists, utility companies, and publics. Broadly speaking, 
scientists saw publics as secondary to the other audiences with whom they 
communicate. For communicators, however, the general public was seen to be their 
primary audience. Extracts 1 and 2, below, reveal interviewee perceptions of who is 
seen as their main audience, and how this differs for communicators and scientists:  
 
Extract 1 
Oh, there are a whole range of people. So… which is one of the 35 
tricky things about it because you’ve got anywhere from policy 36 
makers, who kind of just want one pithy statement; through to 37 
local government workers who have got a problem that they’ve 38 
got to make a decision with people in their different sectors, 39 
like water, infrastructure, transport. People like that. A lot 40 
of these people are government or local government. But also 41 
businesses can use it. Private companies can use it and it 42 
would also then. The other extreme would be the impact 43 
scientists, so the actual people who take climate change 44 
information and feed it into their impacts model and also turn 45 
the climate change information into something that’s relevant 46 
to people like crop yield or how much run-off you get, how much 47 
river flow you get. Something like that. So it’s a whole range 48 
of people from academic scientists all the way up to… all the 49 
way over. Not up. (laughs) Down to policymakers.50 
Scientist, P5 
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Extract 2 
P3: Main audience. The general public. 215 
Communicator, P3 
The perspectives offered in the above extracts were broadly representative of 
comments given by the interviewees. Scientists tended to see their audience as 
specialist and narrow, comprising other scientists, governments and industry. 
Whereas communicators tended to see their audience as broader and more varied than 
scientists: businesses, government, and other science organisations – though the 
emphasis was communicating with publics.  
I would also note that towards the end of Extract 1 (49-50), this scientist gives 
an insight into how they may see their position in relation to one particular portion of 
their audience. In saying, “Not up […] down to policymakers” (50) implies that this 
scientist is situating himself or herself as having higher social or intellectual status 
than policymakers. Such (perceived) status imbalance perceptions could have 
negative consequences when communicating to such persons. For example, holding 
such perceptions of their audience a scientist may inadvertently, through their 
language and actions, increase social distance between themselves and their audience. 
This can potentially result in audience disengagement with the speaker. Indeed, 
Shackley and Wynne (1996) suggest that within scientist-policymaker interactions, 
scientists use discursive tools (such as scientific uncertainty) as a ‘boundary-ordering 
device’. With this, the researchers suggest that the purpose of uncertainty (and its 
construction within particular discourse) is to maintain authority of science and the 
social order between scientists and policymakers. Specifically, scientists have 
particular ways to interpret uncertainty, as such policy makers may struggle to 
interpret uncertainty for themselves; therefore needing to work in collaboration with 
scientists (Shackley & Wynne, 1996). That said, while I do acknowledge that in some 
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ways uncertainty enhances scientific authority, it can also act to undermine such 
authority (Campbell, 1985; Zehr, 1999).    
I have just established that scientists and communicators hold a perception of 
their audiences. The interview data also indicated that scientists also hold a view of 
how audiences perceive them as individual professionals. Such beliefs of how others 
may perceive us are known as meta-perceptions (Laing, Phillipson, & Lee, 1966). 
Given these are group-based judgments the term meta-stereotypes is more appropriate 
i.e., your own view of how outsiders perceive members of your group (Vorauer, 
Main, & O’Connell, 1998). Extract 3, below, illustrates how this particular scientist 
perceives their audience to view them as an organisation. 
 
Extract 3 
There’s been quite a lot done on this because obviously 546 
there’ve been a lot of studies that the ORGANISATION has 547 
commissioned or been involved with. And it’s, we’re told, it’s 548 
[trust] very high and largely because of the science element, 549 
because scientists are generally regarded quite highly and I 550 
guess that’s because they’re regarded as knowing a lot of 551 
information about that particular area because they’ve focused 552 
on that area and I would guess that’s the reason why they’re 553 
regarded more highly. Or we’re [emphasis on word] regarded more 554 
highly.555 
Scientist, P1 
 
Notice when the above scientist was asked to give their opinion on how they 
thought the public perceived them as scientists and a science organisation, they start 
by saying “there’s been quite a lot done on this” (546) and “we’re told” (548). This 
implies that initially this person was not articulating their personal opinion but was 
drawing upon on a formal opinion (e.g., as established by research). This may be 
because external sources are the main source of this particular information. Looked at 
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differently this could also suggest that external sources of information carry more 
weight in terms of validity. This may have indeed been the speaker’s personal 
opinion, but representing the information as externally sourced can give the 
impression of objective validation and ‘fact’. 
I would propose that this type of objective articulation is akin to Gilbert and 
Mulkay’s (1984) empiricist repertoire. These two sociologists studied formal and 
informal discourses of their own and colleagues’ scientific work among biochemists. 
Gilbert and Mulkay suggest that scientists employ two contrasting repertoires that are 
used interchangeably depending on the social function intended. The first and most 
explicit in science discourse is the empiricist repertoire. This discursive style is 
objective in its nature, signalling intelligence, legitimacy of opinion and status; the 
gathering and presenting of ‘facts’ is seen as sufficient in and of itself. In contrast, the 
contingent repertoire is more subjective, using less formal language, often used when 
things went wrong, and often used when talking about ‘other’ scientists. Gilbert and 
Mulkay suggest the use of both repertoires performs a function of defending own 
actions and beliefs (empiricist), while simultaneously discrediting others (contingent). 
Used interchangeably, the purpose of these repertoires, Gilbert and Mulkay suggest, is 
to maintain the idea and status of science.  
In Extract 3, the respondent is verbalising in the style of the empiricist 
repertoire – using a distant grammatical style (such as third person), thus portraying 
their opinion as empirically based facts. So, in this extract, when asked to give an 
opinion about their perceptions of how the public views them, even if it is not 
necessarily the scientific topic of focus, this objectively presented opinion is used, 
maybe because it is their default style of opinion sharing. 
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Moreover, the speaker then switches between talking about (their perceptions 
of) audience perceptions of scientists/the organisation as an outside group, using 
words such as “they’re” (551, 553), “they’ve” (553), to then including themselves in 
the category (by using “we’re”). The interviewee was conscious of these 
inconsistencies to the extent they felt an explicit correction in their own statement at 
the end of the extract was deserved. One example for this clarification of group 
identification, the speaker is referring to (i.e., scientists) as being evaluated positively 
(e.g., “regarded highly”). One could speculate here that if the speaker was talking in 
a way where perceptions of scientists were negative (such as untrustworthy), then the 
inclusion of oneself in that category of scientist may not have occurred. 
The quote (Extract 3) also captured the more general meta-stereotype 
scientists have about their audience. In this instance, the perception is specifically in 
relation to trust. While this presented trust as emerging from their concrete 
knowledge/ information, at other times the scientists portrayed trust as emerging from 
the caveats they placed on their knowledge/ information i.e., scientific uncertainties. 
Indeed, when the above interviewee continued (Extract 4, below), this alternative 
view of trust as a result of presenting the uncertainties was also evident i.e., trust 
deriving from the scientific uncertainties, which is actually part of the work of 
science. 
 
Extract 4 
I think that’s [including detailed caveats] why scientists are 692 
regarded so highly, is the whole… I think people do understand 693 
that science is about trying to get the truth and trying to 694 
represent … and trying to be as objective as possible and 695 
that’s the training you get as a scientist. You’re really, 696 
really uncomfortable if you’re not giving all of the detail and 697 
all of the caveats. And I expect you probably realise this 698 
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talking with people. (laughs) If you talk with the comms team, 692 
this is the really hard bit about trying to get a message from 693 
science out to a paper or a media because it’s got to be a very 694 
simple message, short and scientists will always try to put as 695 
many caveats and as many, “oh, but then there’s this problem 696 
and then there’s this problem and then there are these 697 
uncertainties”. So scientists’ training is all about taking 698 
into account all of the uncertainties and trying to be as clear 699 
about those as possible. 700 
Scientist, P1 
 
Such trust status may indeed be dependent on the context within it and those 
actors within it. For instance, uncertainty may be used as a boundary device (Shackley 
& Wynne, 1996), though the same concepts can also undermine science status.  
The starting point for scientists, however, is that they are viewed as 
trustworthy by the public. Research has shown that scientists are considered 
independent and therefore trustworthy (e.g., Whitmarsh, Kean, Russell, Peacock, & 
Haste, 2005). I could relate this position of scientists holding inherent trust to the 
notion of values as truisms (e.g., McGuire, 1964; Maio & Olson, 1998), a concept that 
suggests that values are widely accepted beliefs and lack supportive evidence and 
cognitive effort. Thus, beyond the repertoires used in science, scientists hold an 
inherent honour of trustworthiness. This may originate from lay perceptions of 
organised scepticism (Merton, 1944/73), where the scientific method employed by 
scientists is trusted, and this translates itself as trust towards scientists. 
The authority scientists hold may be reason enough for some people to trust 
them. Using this perspective draws on the argument from authority/ appeal to 
authority (Goodwin, 2011). This means if a person/ group is seen as an authority on a 
topic, any claims they then make about said topic are probably correct.  Such expert 
claims are generally accepted because non-experts, by definition, are unable to assess 
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claims made by experts (Collins & Evans, 2002). Walton (2010) suggests that 
scientists (as experts of science) are a modern day authoritarianism, whereby expert 
scientific opinion is valued in society. However, this can lead to errors of logical 
fallacies (i.e., invalid reasoning) that come with assumed authority (Goodwin, 2011). 
Research from the field of studies in expertise and experience (SEE) suggests that 
purported experts are formally credentialed and dependent on social processes. In a 
sense, because these are attributed or socially constructed and is also real (e.g., 
Collins & Evans 2002; Goodwin & Evans, 2007). 
An example of such can be seen in Extract 4 (699), where providing 
information regarding “scientists’ training” appears to be appeal to authority strategy. 
Researchers have suggested that climate science experts involved with the IPCC 
assessment attempt to strengthen their appeal to authority by claiming that the IPCC 
report expressed a “consensus” view of all the relevant scientists (Goodwin 2009; 
Rehg, 2011). Such as strategy is termed by Shackley (1996) as a “consensus claim”.  
Instead of stressing the consensus that backs their statements, it may provide a 
stronger reason for trust if they openly made themselves vulnerable to criticism for 
any mistakes they may make (Goodwin & Dahlstrom, 2011).  
It should also be acknowledged that, although scientists are aware of the 
public and the communication the organisation has with the public, they rarely 
communicate with them directly; their messages are usually mediated through other 
actors in a chain of communication (such as professional communicators, media). 
This chain of communication is the focus of the next subtheme, message production. 
1.2 Message production. The process of how the information becomes ‘a 
message’ can be complex and elongated. The process is initially determined by whom 
the communication is with. For instance, scientist-to-scientist interactions do not 
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involve communication professionals. However, organisation-to-organisation 
interactions, or organisation/individual interactions with the public are different. Here 
there is a (co)production in translating the information to a message between 
scientists and clients/communicators. Commonly discussed was the iterative nature of 
this specific process. From a scientist perspective, creating a message for their 
clientele is done mainly through the process of iteration and agreement. Such 
negotiations suggest that this process of message construction is producing an end 
product with the recipient rather than simply for them. 
 
Extract 5 
P: We’d normally, with standard projects, we would have 2 or 3 216 
reviewers internally to make sure that… to go over the draft, 217 
checking for problems or highlight any issues and make 218 
corrections. We’d have another draft and again, any last final 219 
points and then it would go to the customer for comment and so 220 
they would be involved in that process. Not with the very first 221 
draft, because we want to make sure the science and the 222 
technical details are right but they would be involved in the 223 
review process because it’s finalised.224 
Scientist, P1 
 
Extract 6, below, points to how scientists can also consider any implicit 
audiences that may be in receipt of their transmitted message (line 56). So, while 
providing information (e.g., a report) to their primary audience (e.g., local councils, 
utility companies) there is also an awareness of who these secondary audiences are 
(e.g., the public). 
 
Extract 6
You may think it’s for the government customer like the policy 55 
maker but actually what they’re interested in is the wider 56 
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audience and how that message is received by the general public 55 
and other governments. 56 
Scientist, P1 
 
Research by Shackley and Wynne (1996) suggest that when scientists share 
their work with policymakers, they feel no longer in full control of how their 
information (particularly the scientific uncertainty) is presented to publics. Therefore, 
scientists are particularly attentive when constructing and negotiating messages with 
policymakers. Jasansoff (1987) suggests this is because scientists believe the 
knowledge they produced will be ‘deconstructed’ when applied in policymaking, and 
this can result in the (perceived) weakening of science authority in the public domain. 
When producing a message primarily intended for publics (rather than clients), 
again there is an iterative process, though this is internal between scientists and 
communicators. The basic procedure for in-house message construction starts with an 
initial message (either formed by a communicator or scientist); moving to iterations, 
negotiations, compromise, agreement and finally the outgoing message.  
This procedure is evidenced in Extract 7, below. This extract also 
demonstrates how this particular scientist sets out the purpose of the organisation 
(namely climate science), and what they see as the appropriate role for each actor 
within these parameters. This seems to be pointing towards a hierarchy within the 
organisation; and scientists and the science they bring with them are positioned at the 
top of this. 
 
Extract 7 
P: Sometimes it works in exactly the opposite direction than it 623 
should do. 624 
I: What do you mean? 625 
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P: Um, well have you heard the expression ‘The tail wagging the 626 
dog’? The dog wags his own tail, but when the tail starts 627 
wagging the dog you have got a bit of a problem there. What I 628 
mean by that is basically we are a Science organisation, 629 
Science is our bread and butter so Climate Science, actually 630 
first and foremost the weather forecasting is our bread and 631 
butter, and it’s what we are known for, and the ORGANISTION, and 632 
now climate change has been, its status as far as ORGANISATION is 633 
concerned is up there with weather forecasting as well, but 634 
ultimately we are a Science organisation um, and what I think 635 
Comms should be doing is tapping into the Science, they 636 
shouldn’t be leading the Science messages that go out. We do 637 
the Science and they should be reporting that Science and 638 
getting that Science out to the wider world, but often what 639 
they do, it works the other way around where they decide what 640 
Science messages should go out and then they get us to check 641 
them but it is completely, 180 degrees out from what it should 642 
be. 643 
I: The content do you mean? 644 
P: No, it’s the process. 645 
I: The process. 646 
P: The process is 180 degrees out. 647 
I: Why do you think that is? Why do you think that process is 648 
as it is? 649 
P: I don’t know why it is the way it is. First and foremost it 650 
is clearly a lack of internal communication about what the role 651 
of communications should be in an organisation like this one. 652 
They should, really a communication team should be serving the 653 
interests of the Science and the Science not serving the 654 
interests of Comms – because the organisation without Science 655 
is nothing. 656 
Scientist, P8 
 
The scientist’s view in Extract 5 illustrate the iterative process of message 
construction between the client and the organisation. However, as it can be seen in 
Extract 7, this iterative process came become problematic when constructing a 
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message intended for publics. In this scenario, the scientists seem to be resistant to 
tailoring their message and think the process should be linear (driven by them and 
their science) rather than iterative. Alternatively, this could be interpreted in a 
different sense. That is, from the perspective of this scientist, it is initially the 
communicators who want to get a message out to the public and they go to the 
scientists asking for evidence to back the message (627, 638). However, this conflicts 
with the scientists’ way of working, as they are trained to think the other way round, 
in that evidence is found first and foremost and then it is transmitted to the public 
(639).  
When considering the process of a message for public consumption, the 
informational content and communications style is often done in tandem or iteratively 
internally between scientists and communicators.  
Extract 8 
Sometimes that process can take quite a lot of time, so you 370 
will have lots of um, ah, toing and froing in terms of 371 
trying to distil the message you are wanting to get, so you 372 
will have a Scientific message and um it will be, it will be 373 
um, distilled into a communications message, then as you 374 
said that would go back upstairs and be checked by the 375 
Scientist who go ‘No, you have knocked out that nuance which 376 
is important, you need to put that one back in’ It will come 377 
to us, we will try and again and it will go round in a, so 378 
it is a kind of iterative process and we will get there 379 
eventually, um, but sometimes the news media cannot wait for 380 
that kind of iterative process because it is very here and 381 
now. That kind of works on planned activities that you can 382 
have that iterative process. 383 
Communicator, P9 
 
1.3 Effective communication. In addition to describing audiences and the 
process of communications, the effectiveness of communications was also discussed 
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by both communicators and scientists. Interviewees seemed to have different ideas 
about what constitutes effective communication, and it seems to be vary depending on 
the specific circumstances under which communication was taking place. For 
example, when scientists interacted with policymakers or clients (e.g., businesses, 
utility companies), ‘effective’ communication was seen as reaching agreement about 
the content and language of the message. Though this is perhaps more of a negotiation 
of content, the success of communication was this agreement between the groups. The 
importance of such negotiations between scientists and policymakers has been seen in 
previous research (Shackley & Wynne, 1996; Jasanoff, 1996). 
Beyond this scenario, scientists and professional communicators, perceived 
effective communication of climate science as the message being understood. The 
focus on (mutual) understanding was representative of the views on effective 
communication. This is illustrated Extracts 9 and 10, below:   
 
Extract 9 
I: What you would see as effective communication of climate 87 
change information? 88 
P: Effective communication of climate change information would 89 
be to create an acceptable degree of understanding of the 90 
science and what it means for a number of different audiences 91 
and by acceptable… the point I’m trying to get across is what 92 
you would reasonably expect someone in that particular audience 93 
to understand. And that’s to know enough about the science, the 94 
issues, to make a decision for themselves about what it means 95 
to themselves. 96 
Communicator, P6 
Extract 10
I: So when you say… when you think about effective 106 
communication, do you mean where the communication has 107 
influenced behaviour or people have understood the message? 108 
 61 
P: Both. Yes. Both. You could argue that getting somebody to 106 
understand your messages is, in itself, influencing behaviour, 107 
because there’s an action involved. Yes. I think they’re both 108 
equally important. 109 
Communicator, P3 
 
Although ‘understanding’ the science was consistently reported as being an 
indicator of effective communication, there were no guidelines in place to gauge 
whether or not the audience had understood the message as they intended. Thus, on 
the one hand interviewees said it was important to arrive at mutual understanding 
transmitted information; however, for most interviewees, it was unclear how this 
would be assessed. This was evident when interviewees were explicitly asked how 
they determine whether some communication was effective. For example, as 
indicated within Extract 11: 
 
Extract 11 
P: I think that you have successfully communicated if someone 108 
can erm, respond with a question or comment that makes sense 109 
within the framework you’ve been using. So if I am talking to 110 
the public and the public asks me how does carbon dioxide, why 111 
is carbon dioxide such a big effect when it’s a small part of 112 
the atmosphere, and if I can come up with an answer which is 113 
erm, a very, acknowledge they understand then I’ve achieved the 114 
goal of communicating that subject. So I think it’s imparting 115 
understanding, it’s the law of communicating.  116 
Scientist, P10 
 
Extract 11, articulates how a scientist makes a judgement on whether the 
message has been communicated as intended. Such discourse points the deficit model 
of communication being applied, e.g., “within the framework you’re using” (110). 
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Such discourse also implies that this scientist seems to expect that a non-science 
audience will receive the information within the framework of science. Indeed, 
scientists do often engage with the public using their own language (Cook, Pieri, & 
Robbins, 2004). Bourdieu (2000) calls these ‘puffed-up words’ and argues that using 
scientific dialect in contexts where people are not familiar with such can hinder 
understanding of the topic. Further to this, when assessing public understanding of 
science, the focus is on whether publics understand science in the same way as 
scientists. Some thinkers question whether the public even should (or could) 
understand science in this way (Zehr, 2000). I would add here that the information 
exchange from a science to non-science audience does not simply reflect your own 
goals as a communicator, but also the relationship you are building with your 
intended audience. 
Beyond this, while frames of reference for scientists and non-scientists 
overlap, their perceptions are distinct and can lead to mutual misunderstandings 
(Weber & Word, 2001). Moreover, scientists tend to assume that non-scientists make 
evaluations of science based on standards familiar to themselves as scientists (Weber 
& Word, 2001).  
As shown in the quote below, Extract 12, communicators who are working 
with scientists see this tendency. 
 
Extract 12 
P: they don’t actually understand that most people don’t look 176 
at something in the same intellectual way as they do, that they 177 
will look at it in a completely different way. And therefore, 178 
because we have to apply that intellect to actually come up 179 
with the results doesn’t mean the same intellect in the way 180 
that you communicate them. And that’s what I was trying to get 181 
at when you talk about reasonable, because there will be 182 
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different tiers in society who will actually need the message 183 
communicated in slightly different ways.184 
Communicator, P6 
 
In the absence of formal processes to measure communication effectiveness, 
personal judgments tended to be used to gauge whether the communications were 
‘effective’. With this, a clear recognition, particularly from communicators, that some 
kind of measure of success regarding whether the message was effectively 
communicated was needed. See Extract 13, below. 
 
Extract 13 
I: Do you have some kind of measures of success to an effective 86 
communication? 87 
P: We don’t, actually. And it’s… it’s quite interesting, isn't 88 
it? Because in comms we think of output as being the product at 89 
the end of the day, when actually we should be measuring 90 
outcomes, and the two are quite different. We don’t even 91 
measure when we do do campaigns – and we’ve done several for 92 
the effect of weather on health working through PCTs – primary 93 
care trusts – to get information into GPs’ surgeries. The end 94 
point for us in comms has been the distribution of that 95 
material. We haven’t been back and said to GPs how effective 96 
has it been? How much take-up has there been in the service? 97 
What was your perception of it? So we tend to get as far as the 98 
physical communication and we very rarely do any kind of 99 
follow-up. And I think we probably ought to be better at doing 100 
that. 101 
Communicator, P3 
 
Another interesting point that emerged from the interviews was the degree to 
which effective communication could or should extend to something beyond simply 
‘understanding’. Extract 14, below, suggests that communication effectiveness might 
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extend to acting in line with a given message i.e., behaviour change. However, this 
perspective was not the majority position. Indeed, to the contrary, most interviewees 
were of the opinion that behaviour was not a concern for this particular organisation, 
and therefore not a measure of communication effectiveness. For example, consider 
Extract 14:  
 
Extract 14
I: So what do you want them to do with the information? 362 
P: I don't know. It’s not… I don't think it’s the public’s 363 
problem. It’s the climate scientists’ problem. I would like us 364 
to present the message in a way that is more robust. So that… 365 
so that when a cold winter does happen, when you know, as long 366 
as it’s not like 5 cold winters on the trot that happen, but 367 
it’s sort of managing expectations. Cold winters can still 368 
happen. So what I don't want them [the public] to do is 369 
overreact to a cold winter and say that means global warming is 370 
not happening. Because what they’re doing is responding to what 371 
happens in the UK when, actually, even when we’re having a 372 
freezing cold winter here, you know, like on average the whole 373 
globe is warming up. 374 
Scientist, P5 
 
What is interesting about Extract 14, above, is that when asked what they 
would like people to do with the information they are communicating, the 
respondent—either intentionally or unintentionally—does not actually answer the 
question. Instead, this scientist re-focuses the discourse on the struggles that scientists 
have in their science, with the wish to present “in a way that is more robust” (365). 
This can again be viewed as employing a discursive tool within the empiricist 
repertoire – ‘robust’ and empirical objectivity is seen as legitimate, with the 
alternative as irrelevant (Potter, 1996; Eder & Ritter, 1996). 
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Indeed, the broader tension this exchange alludes to, between understanding 
science and creating action (or not), is something I will return to later in this Chapter 
in Theme Three, the role of scientists. 
Summary of theme one: Communications process. Interviewees identified a 
wide range of audiences, including policymakers, businesses, other scientists, utility 
companies, and publics. Scientists generally saw publics as secondary to other 
audiences (such as other scientists, academics, and policymakers). Communicators, 
on the other hand, viewed the general public as their main audience. Even though 
scientists did not immediately think of the public as their main audience, it is clear 
that they do think about this segment of audience and about how this audience 
perceives them. While there was a lot of discourse concerning effective 
communication, it seemed vague in its meaning and measure. For both scientists and 
communicators, effective communication was seen as the audience understanding 
information and not direct behaviour change (although it was mentioned, see Theme 
Three). There did not appear to be a ‘best practice’ guide on how to conduct internal 
or external communications. While clear ideas were expressed throughout the 
organisation about what constitutes effective communication, significantly there were 
no formal measures of communication success. Instead, the various actors tended to 
rely on their own intuitions and asking colleagues about when communication had 
‘succeeded’ or ‘failed’. 
 
2. Theme Two. Challenges 
The second broad theme identified within this data relates to perceived 
challenges when communicating with others. Challenges came in many forms and 
were articulated in both similar and different ways by the two actors within this 
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context (i.e., scientists and communicators). To facilitate depiction of these 
challenges, I present two broad subthemes within this broader theme: the first being a 
challenge within the subject itself, namely complexities within climate science, 
including scientific uncertainties; the second strand of challenges concerns people 
involved in communications, both internally and externally to the organisation. While 
challenges of the subject and people are distinct the two do inevitably overlap. 
 2.1 Subject. Scientists and professional communicators acknowledged that 
there are certain features inherent to climate science that presents a challenge when 
communicating to various non-science audiences. These challenges include the 
complexities within the subject matter, the use of technical language, the amount and 
saturation of information around climate change, and the temporal and spatial 
distance of the topic. Principal among these was the challenge of uncertainty, of 
which there are a number of forms e.g., uncertainties within climate models; 
uncertainties within the climate system; uncertainties of impacts; and uncertainties in 
human behaviour and its influence within the climate system. Uncertainty frequently 
came up as a challenge amongst both scientists and science communicators, so I 
examined this particular challenge by looking at how it is perceived, portrayed and 
used. 
2.1.1 Uncertainty. For both scientists and communicators, uncertainty 
repeatedly surfaced as one of the main challenges of communication of climate 
change science, particularly with respect to communicating with publics and other 
non-scientific audiences. While there were some divergences in how the challenge of 
uncertainty was viewed, there was also some agreement in how this challenge was 
understood for scientists and communicators. For instance, both groups talked about 
how uncertainty is contextually defined, meaning that uncertainty has a different 
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meaning for scientists and non-scientists. As such, both groups perceived negative 
effects of uncertainty on publics, particularly because uncertainty was likely to be 
interpreted by publics in terms of scientific (in)competence, with further implications 
for trust, belief in climate change and the science behind it.  
Notwithstanding this, each group saw the precise challenge of uncertainty in 
slightly different ways. For scientists, it was the ability to communicate the scientific 
uncertainties to non-science audiences. For communicators, however, it was the need 
to communicate the uncertainties. These divergences of opinion are illustrated in the 
following two extracts below, Extracts 15 and 16: 
  
Extract 15 
P: It’s very difficult to make a clear message from a very 226 
technical aspect or subject or result…that’s very difficult to 227 
explain, because there are so many different aspects. So that’s 228 
where the communicating the uncertainty side has been quite 229 
challenging, to do it in a very simple and clear way, but also 230 
to make sure that we’re not ignoring or missing out any 231 
important details that need to be included in the message. 232 
Scientist, P1 
 
Extract 16 
P: There is a 50% chance plus or minus 10% that our summers 330 
could be wetter if you take into account x, y and z and you 331 
only look at this small proportion of the country.  However if 332 
you look at this portion of the country there is a 25% chance 333 
plus or minus seven and a half point three. That it could be 334 
wetter in this part of the country but only in June because it 335 
is dryer in July and August’” […]..I am making it up for effect 336 
because I’m like that. It is incomprehensible: scientifically 337 
accurate, completely robust scientifically, but if you provided 338 
that in the public domain it is perceived as complete and utter 339 
gobbledygook and perceived as we don’t know: and that’s fine, 340 
we might not know, but if we don’t know let’s say there is no 341 
answer for that yet, we need further research. 342 
Communicator, P9 
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2.1.2 Overcoming uncertainty. Uncertainty is considered a key barrier in the 
communication of climate change information, yet scientists and communicators 
fundamentally perceived it differently. With this, strategies employed to overcome the 
challenge of uncertainty are also different. For example, taking the following 
discourse, Extract 17, as typical of how a scientist may overcome the issue of 
uncertainty: 
 
Extract 17
I: Uncertainties and communicating uncertainties. How do you 374 
perceive that as part of the communications? 375 
P: Well, it’s extremely important to do this, and really, the 376 
basic uncertainty for projecting climate change has not changed 377 
since 1990. The early estimates were that most of the range 378 
was, globally, this is globally first of all, was contained 379 
within a range of 1.5° to 4.5° centigrade of global warming for 380 
a doubling of CO2, though of course it would be more than that 381 
if it… if CO2 more than doubles, and we’re well on the way to 382 
more than doubling. The other problem is regional. You can have 383 
so much climate change globally, and you can show this 384 
uncertainty. It’s a very simple thing to do. It’s just a graph 385 
of rising temperature, and you can have two lines on either 386 
side and you shade them in. And that shows the uncertainties. 387 
It’s a very simple thing to show. 388 
I: And that’s what you would show to the public. 389 
P: Oh, I would show that to the public. Absolutely. Absolutely 390 
show that to the public. 391 
I: And do you think they… They’d get that? 392 
P: Oh, they’d get that. They would get that.  393 
Scientist, P14 
 
The quote above (Extract 17) demonstrates how scientists may attempt to 
modify communication to non-science audiences. I note that the scientist here still 
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uses scientific language in accommodating a lay audience, working within the science 
frame of reference, and assuming that non-scientists will understand this. This is the 
deficit approach to communicating science: a one-way information model of 
communicating science which conceptualises the public as deficient in knowledge 
whilst also implying that scientific knowledge is someway superior to untrained forms 
of knowledge (Davies, 1998).  
As such, it has been suggested that scientific writing contains two important 
features called ‘passivation’ and ‘nominalization’, not usually seen outside of science 
and academia (Halliday, 2004; Halliday & Martin, 1993). That is, science writing 
uses more verbs in a passive voice, as well as more nouns. While there are advantages 
in using traditional science writing (e.g., avoidance of personal characteristics), such 
voices may be off-putting to those not trained in such writing style. Callaghan and 
Augoustinos (2013) suggest that scientists’ information deficit to communication may 
isolate certain sectors of the public, especially if there are alternative and more 
accessible discourses available in the public domain i.e., sceptical voices in contrast to 
the dominant (consensual) narrative. 
For communicators, however, the challenge of communicating uncertainty is 
approached differently. Extract 18, below, describes how communicating 
uncertainties may not necessarily mean the message modification deals with the 
uncertainty itself. 
 
Extract 18 
P: How we sound in them [communications], so what’s the 22 
tone of voice that we use, and we try and adopt quite a 23 
friendly conversational tone of voice when we write, 24 
because we are seen as being quite an authoritative 25 
organisation and quite a kind of scientific kind of, 26 
distant organisation and so we need to, if we are talking 27 
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about science we try and talk in a more conversational, 28 
warmer way, so we would say ‘we’ and ‘our’.  29 
Communicator, P4 
 
In relation to the language use mentioned in the above extract, 18, research has 
shown that the IPCC Summary for Policy makers of 2007 was dominated by 
impersonal language and contained no explicit use of “we” (Fløttum & Dahl, 2011). 
They suggest that impersonal language may be a means of claiming neutrality of and 
a way of managing any disagreements between the author(s). However, such a 
passive style of writing is also likely to be a rhetorical product of traditional science 
convention (Billig, 2011; Halliday, 2004; Halliday & Martin, 1993; Gilbert & 
Mulkay, 1984; Potter, 1996; Edler & Ritter, 1996; Zanna & Darley, 1987).  
The communication approach from the extract above is akin to the perspective 
endorsed by communication theorists, whereby interactive science approaches can 
also include an informal conversation style, and this can be using inclusive and 
colloquial language (Logan, 2001; Einsiedel & Thorne, 1999). Unlike the one-way 
transmission of information (deficit model) which tends to assume public as deficient 
in knowledge (e.g., Sturgis & Allum, 2004; Wynne, 1991; Irwin & Wynne, 1996; 
Whitmarsh, 2009), the interactive-relational communication is seen as an on-going 
process of sending messages and negotiating their meaning (Logan, 2001; Wynne, 
1991. This helps overcome misunderstandings between actors working within 
different frames of reference (Kellerman 1992; Craig 1999). Further, it has been 
argued that scientists and non-scientists would benefit by seeing science 
communications as a process as well as a product (Weber & Word, 2001) – indeed, 
this appears to be more the style adopted by communicators as indicated by how they 
talk about and communicate with their audiences. 
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2.1.3 Purpose of uncertainty. If uncertainty is seen to undermine the 
information being conveyed to non-science audiences, this raises an obvious question: 
why include it? For scientists, they feel they want to portray the information as 
accurately as possible. They commonly cite that uncertainty is inherent in scientific 
practice and presenting the uncertainties is rooted in them from their training as a 
scientist. Therefore, there is an apparent professional role of uncertainty in science.  
From a constructionist perspective, however, uncertainty discourse is 
constructed in certain situations with specific (intended) effects (Gilbert & Mulkay, 
1984; Shackley & Wynne, 1996). Furthermore, uncertainty can also serve as a way to 
legitimate more research and therefore generate further funding (Shackley & Wynne, 
1996; Zehr, 2000). Further, thinking back to Theme One (subtheme perceived 
audiences), uncertainty is used as a ‘boundary ordering device’ between scientists and 
policy makers, to bring social order between these two actors (Shackley & Wynne, 
1996). It has been suggested that for scientific topics of controversy science, 
competing positions may actually use uncertainty as a rhetorical tool (Dunwoody 
1999). 
Zehr (2000) has posited that uncertainty is often portrayed in the media 
through direct quotations from scientists or scientific reports. This relationship was 
managed in such a way (via the media) that science remained an authoritative 
provider of knowledge reinforcing the positions within a constructed social hierarchy 
between scientists and publics – and such rhetorical boundaries between scientists and 
the public reinforced identities of the scientist experts and the misinformed public 
(Zehr, 2000; Hilgartner, 1990). 
As discussed earlier, the empiricist repertoire is a discourse amongst scientists 
to bolster the impression of ‘fact’. With this in mind, as discussed earlier under Theme 
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One, Perceived audiences (p.49), some researchers see uncertainty as a discursive 
tool within the empiricist repertoire (e.g., Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter, 1996; 
Edler, 1996; Zanna & Darley, 1987). Among publics this increases perceptions of 
scientists’ authority rather than lessens it (Zehr, 2000). Particularly within scientific 
controversy, scientists may use uncertainty (and other devices) to attack and construct 
uncertainty about opponents’ claims (Mazur, 1981; Zehr, 2000).   
Though this style of communications is not appropriate for interactions with 
the public, it may be used in this arena because scientists think the communications 
will (indirectly) be viewed, and judged, to their peers. Scientists do indeed have the 
perceptions that public engagement will lead to their peers to judge them negatively 
(Royal Society, 2006; Mooney, 2010). In relation to this, the below extract (Extract 
19) illustrates this from a communicator perspective: 
 
Extract 19 
I: Why is it so important to communicate the science with all 570 
the uncertainties and probabilities? 571 
P: Because that protects… it frankly protects your personal 572 
integrity. Because that could, what you’re doing, in doing it 573 
that way you’re actually communicating from your own shoes, not 574 
from the other person’s shoes. You’re doing it… “I want to show 575 
how good I am at this science. And I want to show you, you 576 
know, I’m a really, really good scientist because I’ve done 577 
this, this and this. And I also want you to, you know, trust me 578 
because I’m not telling you this is certain; what I’m telling 579 
you is because I’ve done all this really, really good work, 580 
this is the most likely scenario that’s an uncertain der, der, 581 
der, der, der”, and that is a basic mistake of communication.  582 
Communicator, P6 
 
While both scientists and communicators talked about uncertainty as a key 
barrier to effectively communicating climate change information, agreeing on the 
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negative implications in the communications - they talked about it and saw its role in 
different ways. 
2.2. People. With challenges brought about by people, although these were 
vast, there was some agreement between scientists and communicators about who 
presented obstacles when communicating in this domain. This included politicians, 
scientist sceptics, media outlets and NGOs (non-governmental organisations). There 
were, however, some important differences between scientists and communicators in 
who was seen to be a particular challenge and the stated reasons for why they 
presented such a challenge.  
 The below extract (Extract 20) extends the scientist view that the public’s 
knowledge of science is deficient. It also suggests they believe publics can be subject 
to bias and personal interests that are ideological/ emotional more than rational 
judgments based on the scientific information. This perspective among scientists has 
been noted in previous research. For example, in their paper ‘The Scientists Think and 
The Public Feels’, Cook, Pieri and Robbins (2004) propose that scientists, by way of 
discursive features, construct themselves in an active role and rational actors (i.e., 
they think). In contrast, scientists would talk about the public in passive terms, and 
when used agentive terms, the public were swayed by emotion and ideology (i.e., they 
‘feel’). The extract below, Extract 20, points to how this scientist perceives ideology, 
the politicisation and controversy associated with climate change: 
 
Extract 20 
I: How do you see effective communication? 65 
P: Okay. I think it’s very difficult. IPCC was very successful 66 
until recently, and two things, of course, have conspired to 67 
make life more difficult – the rise in America of very strong 68 
right-wing ideology, which is totally against doing anything 69 
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about climate change, mainly because of the desire for 70 
government to be small, and I’ve come across people in America 71 
and had very interesting discussions, actually, with people 72 
from the wild woods of Oregon who regard the American 73 
government as their greatest enemy, and the Right wing of the 74 
Conse… of the Republican Party isn’t quite as extreme as that, 75 
But it’s on the way, and the Tea Party represent that. The 76 
other problem of course we’ve had is climategate…  77 
Scientist, P14 
 
This scientist then goes on talking about “climategate”6 for a considerable 
amount of time. Even before the events surrounding climategate, climate change was 
a controversial topic. Climategate made it more so at the height of the affair. Burchell 
(2007) conducted interviews with eighteen crop genetic scientists who were working 
with GM crops, and at the time, working within conditions of controversy. Following 
discourse analysis of these scientists, Burchell suggested that scientists employed the 
empiricist repertoire when talking around a controversial science issue (i.e., GM 
crops), whereas non-controversial topics would draw upon a contingent repertoire. 
Burchell proposed this is an approach by scientists to reduce the negative effects of 
the ‘controversy’ by legitimating their own beliefs and, in the view of scientists, this 
is best done through employing an objective repertoire. This is less necessary when 
the topic is not controversial. Scientists tended to describe groups with opposing 
views to their own as contingent ‘others’. This is similar to the contingent repertoire 
proposed by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), where a ‘lesser science’ is constructed, 
implying that the alternative side lacks knowledge, is subjective and personal, thus 
bolstering their own position. Despite this preference for empiricist over contingent 
                                                        
6 Climagetate is the term that was attached to the email hacking controversy at the University of East Anglia in late 
2009/early 2010, where over 1,000 private emails between climate change scientists were stolen and published 
online – the accusation of which included manipulating the data and misleading the public about the extent of 
climate change. 
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repertoire styles, Waterton, Wynne, Grove-White and Mansfield (2001) suggest that a 
more contingent repertoire approach with the public may result in less alienation and 
resistance by public. However, when communicating science with the public, 
particularly with areas of controversy, scientists are less likely to use contingent 
repertoire (Burchell, 2007).  
What is also interesting with Extract 19 is that when this scientist was initially 
asked about their perception of effective communication, and they very quickly went 
on to talk about sceptics, and how scepticism is related to political ideology. By 
framing scepticism as an ideological position it simultaneously placed the science 
outside of ideology by comparison, which casts scepticism as less scientific. That 
said, organised scepticism and challenging established theories is a normative 
tradition within the sciences (Storer, 1966).  
For communicators, scientists’ (lack of) understanding of public and the role 
of communicators was seen as problematic. Research has indicated that scientists do 
not seem to understand the public and do not think highly of them – often perceiving 
the public as incompetent, scientifically illiterate and emotional (Pew Research, 2009; 
Mooney, 2011). Scientists also viewed publics as lacking an understanding of risk 
(Cook, Pieri, & Robbins, 2004), and as viewing a binary definition of certainty and 
uncertainty. However, studies have shown that lay people are indeed scientifically 
literate, and do understand that nothing is risk free and are able to live with 
uncertainty and the lack of control that comes with it (e.g., Wynne, 2002). 
Furthermore, lay people have different understandings of certain knowledge, and are 
influenced by social, political and cultural contexts (Irwin & Wynne, 1996). 
The challenge concerning ‘people’ extends further to those people who are 
located within the organisation and therefore able to directly influence the 
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communications process. While (competing) audiences may have been the most 
obvious ‘people’ barrier to the climate change message, other human entities were 
also identified. There was evidence in the interviews of internal divisions within the 
organisation, and these were seen to be a significant barrier to effective 
communication - in that it can elongate the message production process. More 
specifically, there was a strong tension between scientists and communicators of 
climate science. This tension was particularly salient to the professional 
communicators, who often brought it up without the need for specific prompting. This 
was initially brought up in the context of co-producing a complex message, 
containing uncertainty, and discussion of a wider conflict evolved. Scientists also 
recognised the tension if it came up in interview, but were less inclined to mention 
this spontaneously. Even when internal divisions were recognised, the two groups 
talked about this in different ways. In particular, communicators talked about this 
issue with more emotion, and were more inclined to construe it in “us and them” 
terms than scientists were. This may in part reflect an outward conflict in roles and 
stereotypes of each other, creating a deeper conflict between the two groups. Perhaps 
this is a consequence of the boundaries uncertainty discourse creates: a constructed 
social hierarchy between scientists and non-scientists (Zehr, 2000). 
To illustrate this setting, let us consider the earlier mentioned process of 
iteration between scientists and communicators (Theme 1.2, message production). As 
previously noted, conflict tends to appear when communicators and scientists discuss 
and try to agree on a message. Bones of contention include the level of technical 
information and issues of uncertainty. While the conflict can manifest and erupt in a 
specific situation, it is not always the case; yet there remains a broader underlying 
tension. For example, consider the following extract, 21: 
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Extract 21 
P: Comms say that they [scientists] consider themselves the 189 
intelligencia of the ORGANISATION and they kind of throw their 190 
weight around and not by nature perhaps, I can’t believe I am 191 
saying this, but um, perhaps a little bit introverted and not 192 
necessarily so, um, adept at the people skills, um, that is a 193 
big generalisation, um, and therefore I think there have been 194 
clashes between Comms and Scientists because things just 195 
haven’t been handled particularly sensitively. 196 
Communicator, P4 
 
As also noted earlier, members of the communications team were more likely 
to discuss conflict openly and in these more general terms. Among communicators 
there is also a perception that conflict is unavoidable whenever communicators and 
scientists are working together because it stems from a broader relationship, Extract 
22: 
 
Extract 22 
P: I think it boils down to a clash of culture between comms 366 
and science. And never the two ends shall meet. 367 
Communicator, P3 
 
The conflict between the scientists and communicators might be partly 
exacerbated by the perception that one of these groups (science) is more central to the 
organisation than the other. Indicative of their centrality, when asked about how the 
public perceives the organisation, one scientist answered exclusively with respect to 
their own subgroup (scientist), rather than the organisation and their services as a 
whole. While this barrier may reflect a broader conflict between the organisational 
subgroups, it also, in some sense stems from the different perspectives each takes on 
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communication and what each group sees as the goal of this activity. This divergence 
of perspective affects both groups. Perhaps because of the presumed higher status of 
scientists (Extract 21) the divergence is more keenly experienced by communicators 
within the organisation because they may be left with a feeling that their expertise in 
communication is being overlooked or ignored for other reasons and in ways that 
compromise the job with which they have been tasked. As an indication of this, 
consider the following extracts: 
 
Extract 23 
I: Just going back to the relationship between Comms and 165 
Scientists, do you think that has an impact on, obviously that 166 
is an internal communication issue, do you think that also has 167 
an impact on the effectiveness and the message that goes out? 168 
P: Definitely yes, because I think it gets diluted. Um, I think 169 
stuff goes out that is so full of caveats that it doesn’t 170 
really make sense to you anymore. You know, it is not a clear 171 
piece of writing because it is so full of this might happen, 172 
and there may be a chance that there will be a likelihood of 173 
rain kind of thing and so you don’t get clear and concise 174 
writing when you are trying to express scientific things. 175 
Communicator, P4 
 
Extract 24 
P: Difficult because you can get a bit worn down because you 478 
think to yourself, okay… There are two ways of looking at it. 479 
Okay. I can have an easy life and I can just say, right, if 480 
you’re happy with that, I’ll put it out. And then I’m thinking, 481 
so yes, actually, I’m not really helping the people that these 482 
messages were designed for; they were not designed to 483 
communicate your science to other scientists. 484 
Communicator, P6 
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Both scientists and communicators are, in the end, engaged with the same 
goal, and these groups broadly agree on what has to be communicated. Where they 
differ is in their understanding of how this goal should be attained—that is, about the 
best process for communication.  
Perhaps this also points to a wider conflict, as suggested by one communicator 
in Extracts 21 and 8: a conflict between the disciplines and epistemologies and how 
each actor sees the world, and how to communicate within it. The scientist perceives 
the world from a positivist tradition. Whereas communicators may be viewing the 
world as interpretivist or socially constructed, and in viewing the world differently, 
they feel messages, as scientists would construct, would not be understood in a non-
science domain. Such differences are reflected in their respective communicative 
styles. This is a fundamental issue that never gets resolved. In one sense, one could 
speculate if that communicators within this context (i.e., a science organisation) 
talked about theories they were applying to underpin their communications, then they 
may gain increased respect from scientists. 
2.3 Summary of Theme Two: Challenges. A number of challenges to the 
communications of climate change information were apparent, both with the subject 
of climate change communications and with various social actors within climate 
change communications. Uncertainty was presented consistently as a challenge in this 
domain. Whilst there was some similarity across the two groups, uncertainty was also 
perceived differently. For scientists, it was the ability to communicate the scientific 
uncertainties to non-science audiences that was seen as the main challenge. For 
communicators, however, it was the need to communicate uncertainties and the use of 
scientific language that was seen as most problematic. In other words, the difficulties 
of communicating uncertainty in climate change differed for scientists and 
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communicators. Different perspectives of uncertainty led to different methods to 
overcome the issue of uncertainty. Scientists tended to continue using their own frame 
of understanding and science language. Communicators, however, would modify the 
language peripheral to the informational content of uncertainty, by changing their 
tone of voice.  
I would interpret these different perspectives and approaches towards 
uncertainty to indicate two fundamentally different ways scientists and 
communicators approach communications with non-scientists. The scientists 
approach communication as a one-way information model of communicating science 
(deficit model), whereby transferring information is fundamental i.e., informational 
model of communications. Communicators, however, modify their message by the 
language peripheral to the informational content to engage publics i.e., relational 
approach to communications. 
We also propose that the two groups constructed uncertainty differently: 
scientists constructing the professional role which demands it; communicators aware 
of the additional functions (e.g., status, boundaries, peers) that accompany uncertainty 
discourse. This had implications on relations between these two groups and the 
efficiency of message production. 
I would like to mention here that temporal and spatial distance can be seen as 
a challenge that is associated with both the subject of the communication and the 
people involved. In one sense it is a challenge within the subject, because it concerns 
the nature of climate change. On the other hand, the time and space nature of climate 
change requires people in the here and now to establish perceptions of climate change 
that are temporally and spatially distant. These psychological distance features came 
up during the course of interviews, though in this study did not necessarily constitute 
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a broad or sub-theme. Rather than a theme in and of itself, the temporal and spatial 
distance was more seen as a challenge (barrier) when communicating, something that 
compromises the uncertainty being presented, because the projections are so removed 
in time and space.  
 
3. Theme Three. (Conflicting) Roles of Climate Scientists 
Both climate scientists and communicators explicitly articulated that the role 
of the science organisation and scientists is to provide robust climate science 
information. They felt the information communicated is based on the science, and 
includes all uncertainties. Scientists believe that such information helps audiences 
make (rational) decisions. The information exchange is seen to be policy-relevant and 
certainly not policy prescriptive. The information communicated must be viewed as 
objective, and providing behavioural advice was seen as damaging to (perceived) 
objectivity. As such, scientists (and organisational policy) are of the view they should 
provide no information on how people can change their behaviour to address climate 
change.  
In line with this, when interviewees (scientist or communicator) were directly 
asked about providing information/advice on behaviour, the ‘provision of behavioural 
information’ was always interpreted as ‘policy advice’, and was viewed as the 
antithesis of providing objective information. However their response always 
indicates that ‘advice’ (at an individual behavioural level e.g., cycling more, using the 
car less) on behaviour means ‘policy’, and they try to maintain distance from policy/ 
politics – and this is part of their frame of reference. Advice on behaviour 
modification is ‘telling people what to do’ — ‘we don’t do that, it’s up to 
policymakers to do that’. Is it that ‘policy talk’ (which includes information on 
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behaviour) is often accompanied/associated with ‘political rhetoric’ to persuade 
audiences to believe/do something? In contrast, scientists may perceive themselves as 
not needing rhetorical tools because their work is ‘empirical’ and thus ‘speaks for 
itself’. Let us consider some verbatim extracts with these ‘roles’ in mind. 
 
Extract 25 
I: Do you expect them [audiences] to consider your behaviour 273 
when you’re talking about climate science? In terms of how they 274 
can change their behaviour? 275 
P: As far as I'm concerned, as a climate scientist, I study 276 
work which is policy-relevant but not policy-prescriptive. It’s 277 
not up to me as a civil servant to tell the government what to 278 
do.  […] That’s not appropriate. It’s not appropriate for the 279 
IPCC either. I have to be policy-relevant and relatively 280 
neutral when it comes to… obviously you can’t be completely 281 
neutral, but as neutral as possible when it comes to people’s 282 
behaviours, so it’s up to them to react as they think fit.283 
Scientist, P14 
 
The above Extract, 25, indicates that scientists saw the provision of advice as 
interfering with their perceived objectivity, and may lead the public to view them as 
persuaders rather than informers. However, Weber and Word (2001) ran a series of 
focus groups among non-scientists where participants discussed a factsheet on 
biodiversity. This factsheet was especially prepared for the study by a group of 
scientists, they perceived it to be objective and as intended to inform rather than 
persuade audiences. Focus group participants, in contrast, said that they did not know 
whether the content was intended to inform or persuade (Weber & Word, 2001). Once 
again this points to divergences in the frame of reference used by scientists and non-
scientists; while scientists may write and perceive information to be neutral, they are 
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making these judgements based on their own reference frames, and assume that non-
science audiences will be doing the same. Just as reference frames are important when 
employing empiricist and technical language, it is also the same principle when 
judging intent of information. 
Within these interviews, I found scientists would explicitly situate themselves 
as objective and impartial actors within the climate change communications culture. 
Implicitly, however, their discourse can indicate they hold expectations of their 
audiences and have personal goals. In the below extract, Extract 26, the scientist is 
asked about uncertainty and its role in the communications process. They start off by 
talking about uncertainty but digress to talk about different actors’ agendas within 
climate change communications. 
 
Extract 26
In real life people often have to deal with uncertainty anyway, 271 
even if very often they don’t want to. So I think it can… it 272 
can be a difficulty, and I think part of the problem is that 273 
it’s possibly unique to climate science is because it’s so 274 
political, there’s perhaps a reluctance sometimes to really be 275 
up-front about uncertainty because it’s seen as they’re 276 
exposing yourself to being, you know, misinterpreted or your 277 
research misused or something, and there are… there’s a certain 278 
branch of climate science communicators, if you like, who 279 
deliberately want to downplay the uncertainty. They don’t like 280 
it. They think it’s unhelpful. They just want things focused on 281 
their key message. And I suppose that’s fair enough if… It 282 
depends on the purpose behind your communication. If you’re a… 283 
a campaigner with a particular agenda, then clearly if there’s 284 
a whole range of uncertain information, you want to pick the 285 
bits that fit your agenda, and you’re going to do that, whereas 286 
from my perspective I come from the, you know, the science 287 
side. I don't really have a political agenda. My agenda if I 288 
had one would be to make sure the science is valued and 289 
understood properly. I don't want to second-guess what people 290 
 84 
are going to do with the information that I’m giving them. So 291 
if I give them just one bit of it, then that may not be the bit 292 
that they are, I suppose, useful to them. They… they need to 293 
understand that there’s a range of possibilities, so then they 294 
can make an informed decision. But clearly that’s… that can be 295 
complicated because if there’s… some people don’t like having 296 
too much information so it’s a way… again, there can be 297 
challenges in communicating the fact that there is uncertainty 298 
without just giving them too much information or no information 299 
at all. (laughs)300 
Scientist, P14 
This scientist in Extract 26 starts off by saying they (as a scientist) distance 
themselves from someone with an agenda (such as “campaigner with a particular 
agenda”, 169). They then go on to talk about not having a political agenda – and any 
agenda they may have is one of science (“to make sure the science is valued and 
understood properly”, 174). Yet, it could be argued that persuading people to value 
your work is an agenda in itself. This scientist then seems to acknowledge that people 
will want to do something with the information that scientists provide in decision-
making (“they need to understand that there’s a range of possibilities, so then they can 
make an informed decision”, 179). Thus, while the discourse explicitly discourages 
the use of information provision to inform decision-making, deeper consideration of 
the discourse indicates that scientists do expect the information they provide (though 
it may not be specifically concerning behavioural advice) will be evaluated and taken 
into account in the decision making process (with the consequence of potentially 
changing behaviour). 
These inconsistencies with scientists’ implicit/ explicit attitudes towards 
information provision are not uncommon. Extract 27, below, illustrates more 
explicitly that there is some hint towards people acting on the message, and the 
uncertainty in climate science is used to justify not taking any action. 
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Extract 27
I think if, um, people use the fact that we use the word 449 
‘uncertainty’ as a reason for not acting, so they think that, 450 
some people think it is not until you are 100% certain that you 451 
should take any action, but you are never really going to be 452 
100% certain with many aspects of Science anyway.453 
Scientist, P8 
An alternative method to engage people with climate change proposed by 
communicators is relating the topic of climate change to everyday lives i.e., reducing 
the spatial and temporal distance. See Extract 28, for example. 
 
Extract 28
P: I see that we have to present evidence and let people make up 262 
their own minds and I see that it’s very much an uphill struggle 263 
in the developed world to get people to recognise that, A, the 264 
climate is warming – I mean who would think it on a day like 265 
today?, and B, that actually, it will… well, it could 266 
potentially, let’s say, impact their health and their social 267 
wellbeing. Err… sorry. Their financial wellbeing. Because those 268 
are the two biggies for people in the developed world. You know? 269 
We may accept that people in the developing world will have 270 
problems with finding food to eat and water to drink. But 271 
they’re a million miles away from our lives and lifestyles. I 272 
think if you address the fact that climate change may impact 273 
health and wealth in the western world and you address those 274 
then people are going to be more inclined to act on a global 275 
problem.276 
Communicator, P3 
These inconsistencies and contradictions are common within interview 
discourse with scientists (e.g., Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Polanyi, 1986). Thinking 
more specifically about the contradiction of science information versus behaviour 
change, it may represent personal goals to achieve behaviour change, and these are in 
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conflict with the professional role of being a ‘climate scientist’. Alternatively, such 
expressions may not necessarily reflect personal views on behaviour change, but 
rather act as an indicator to scientists that the audience understands what has been 
communicated i.e., the information was communicated ‘effectively’ as shown by the 
actions following information provided. To some extent observing behaviour change 
following information could be a form of measuring ‘effective communication’. 
However, a wealth of research has shown a gap whereby attitudes towards and 
knowledge of environmental issues often do not lead to action (e.g., Kollmuss & 
Agyeman, 2002; Blake, 1999; Flynn, Bellaby, & Ricci, 2009; Poortinga, Steg, & 
Vlek, 2004; Lane & Potter, 2007). Therefore, behavioural responses are a weak gauge 
of effective communication. Though for scientists, audiences acting upon their 
science information could be a sort of positive affirmation of their professional role as 
a ‘scientist’ – despite this being potentially too personal to be science. Polanyi (1958), 
however, argues that the interplay between the impersonal and personal forces makes 
science what it is.  
Such contrasting messages seem to permeate through the organisation. The 
extract opening this chapter by the Chief Executive of a meteorological organisation 
points to two things of interest with the present research in mind. Firstly, the CEO 
suggests that uncertainty and poor understanding of climate change is amplified by 
the language use in this context. This is in line with what I had similarly set out in 
Theme Two, Challenges. Secondly, he is also explicit in saying that action is required. 
He uses the word ‘us’, though does not specify whom he specifically had in mind. I 
would speculate here that he is broadly alluding to humanity. This call for action is 
implied throughout the speech – and seems to be inconsistent with (scientist) 
perceptions of their (presented) role in the domain of climate change communications. 
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It may reflect conflicting sets of norms at an institutional level - norms around the 
impersonal character of science versus its counter norm of the personal character of 
science. In other words, impersonal and personal personas as characterised through 
empiricist versus contingent repertoires (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). 
Goodwin and Dahlstrom (2011) suggest that scientists can strengthen their 
appeals by increasing the risks they are undertaking in offering their views. Relatedly, 
Goodwin and Dahlstrom (2011) and Wynne (1992) that climate scientists may be 
more trusted if they present themselves as less certain. 
 3.1 Summary of Theme Three. While explicit expressions describing the role 
of the scientist and science organisation are of objectivity and of a non-advisor in 
terms of decision-making; implicitly there are some suggestions that scientists do 
expect the information they are communicating to be absorbed and taken into account 
when making decisions. Similarly, some (a minority) of the scientists show 
contrasting discourses between their professional role as a scientist and their personal 
goals pro-environmental behaviours. While the personal side of science is explicitly 
frowned upon, it appears to play an implicit role in how scientists construct 
themselves. 
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Chapter Summary and Discussion 
This qualitative research and its process gave me the advantage of exploring 
different perspectives regarding the communication of climate change information. At 
one level the descriptions of content are useful in establishing face-value ‘facts’. 
Moving beyond this, interpretation of the content and discourse reveal implicit 
perceptions, social realities, inconsistencies and conflicts.  
I first presented descriptions of what it is scientists and professional 
communicators do. There are substantial commonalities between the two groups e.g., 
perceptions of effective communication, uncertainty as a barrier to communications, 
and the iterative process of message production. There were also some significant 
differences between scientists and communicators, e.g., perceptions of primary 
audiences, perceptions of how uncertainty is a barrier, and its role in science 
communications. 
Fundamentally, it appears that climate scientists and professional 
communicators work on different models of communication. For scientists, the 
priority is transferring as much scientific information as possible, highlighting the 
uncertainties, and maintaining technical language. Scientists focus on an 
‘informational’ model of communication. This is akin to the deficit frame of science 
communication, assuming that the public are empty vessels waiting to be filled with 
knowledge. Historically this has been the dominant model of communicating science 
(Einsiedel & Thorne, 1999). For communicators, however, understanding their 
audience is primary in their communication – they prefer to understate the 
uncertainties, simplify language, speak directly with rather than at the public, bringing 
them along with the message being delivered (and the wider notion of all being in it 
together) and have a warm and friendly style of communication – which they call 
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‘tone of voice’ – indicating that communicators focus on a more ‘relational’ model of 
communication. This style is more similar to the interactive (rather than deficit) 
model of science communication. The interactional communications approach 
highlights the importance of context, audience beliefs and values (e.g., Sturgis & 
Allum, 2004; Wynne, 1991; Davies, 1998; Logan, 2001). 
These different approaches to communication appear to have caused some 
conflict between the two groups. This appeared implicit for scientists, for example in 
Extract 7, in addition to indications of a superior attitude (e.g., “tail wagging the dog” 
expression, line 626), this could also point towards some tension from the perspective 
of scientists towards communicators. Communicators were explicit about this 
intergroup conflict, using language such as ‘us and them’ to depict the relationship 
between scientists and communicators. This was unprompted, discussed in-depth and 
with emotion for communicators. This was a less salient issue among scientists, who 
rarely discussed it unprompted. Communicators believe the conflict does impact upon 
the final message e.g., taking overly long to produce a short message; or a short and 
concise message becoming meaningless to a member of the public due to its caveats, 
uncertainty and scientific language.  
At face value, these different approaches to communication may be because of 
these actors’ different areas of expertise, disciplines and training. For instance, 
scientists are trained to write in the third person, in a stylistic nature and from a 
positivist tradition. In fact, when discussing job roles, this was explicitly expressed by 
many of the participants. However, a further look at the discourse can also indicate 
more subtle perceptions of scientists, their audience and how they see themselves in 
social order. Extract 1 shows a scientist describing their audience, towards the end 
saying “down to policymakers”; and clarifying ahead of this by stating “not up”. This 
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suggests that this particular scientist sees himself as of higher social or intellectual 
status as one of his main audience. Or maybe just the message is higher as it is 
shrouded in objective science and therefore has a higher privilege than more relational 
messages. Some caution should be noted here, as one could argue ‘down’ in this 
context may indicate from the source (i.e., in terms of flow), rather than down i.e., 
from “on high”.  However, Extract 7 could also be indicative of a superior attitude, 
with scientists as the “dog” and communicators as the “tail” is indicative of a superior 
attitude (line 626). Regardless of causation, this could have the effect of increasing 
social distance between the scientist and their audience – which can be disengaging in 
the context of communicating climate change information, and more broadly, how 
this particular scientist perceives his function in society.  
I would suggest the language and use of uncertainty performs a number of 
functions. Among scientists uncertainty is a function of their professional role, with 
all scientists advocating that this is the way of science, and there will always be 
uncertainties and these uncertainties needs to be communicated. Uncertainty also 
seems to perform a psychological role, often explicitly expressed by communicators, 
with some implicit indicators by scientists themselves. Non-scientists have suggested 
that the language of uncertainty (alongside other science specific language-use) has a 
role in allowing scientists to show their ‘scientific prowess’, scientists how good they 
are, giving protection for the scientists and science (amongst their peers), and 
showing audiences how competent they are (to gain trust). Further, uncertainty and 
technical language use can serve ‘a number of legitimate functions in scientific 
communication’ (e.g., Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter, 1996; Edler & Ritter, 1996; 
Zanna & Darley, 1987). 
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These perceptual differences among scientists and communicators also are 
manifest in divergences in approach to message adaptation to increase audience 
engagement (and understanding). As I demonstrated, scientists preferred following an 
established rhetorical convention, i.e., including the uncertainties and certain technical 
language is important. When efforts are made to modify their communications to non-
science audiences, methods of message modification still tend to be within the science 
framework. With scientists’ model of communication, it could also point to 
underlying professional, social pressure or (self or other) expectations that accompany 
being a ‘scientist’. Therefore the deficit model approach of communication; 
‘educating’ publics on the science – whilst maintaining science community specific 
language/uncertainty - also maintains the role/image/status of scientists. 
In contrast, communicators modify their message by the language peripheral 
to the informational content. For example, the ‘tone of voice’ is an important aspect 
of effective communication of climate change information: such as adopting a warm, 
friendly style of writing/communication. Furthermore, communicators have a 
preference to make the message more meaningful in everyday life. For example, 
making the informational content more social, economic and empathetic is favoured 
by communicators. Scientists attempt to make information relevant to people, but still 
rely on the scientific approach for doing so (such as localised impacts of flood risks, 
reference to shorter term climate modelling rather than longer period – perhaps in an 
attempt to reduce the temporal and spatial distance). Communicators do explicitly talk 
about behaviour more than scientists, but still stop at giving advice on behaviour 
change, with the qualification of it not being part of ‘our’ (the organisation’s) role to 
do so. 
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This is akin to recent work on communicative differences in science discourse 
and construction of scientist (public) identity. Callaghan and Augoustinos (2013) have 
suggested that consensus and sceptical scientists debate the topic differently, and 
therefore engage audiences differently. They argue that the consensus scientists 
(advocating the occurrence of anthropogenic climate change) apply the information-
deficit model of communication. In contrast, sceptical scientists utilise an interactive 
model of communication, believe that science communication can and should always 
make the most of the interactive communicative style. By recognising the two 
different approaches of reified and consensual, contextualised in economic interest 
and using inclusive and colloquial language, they increase the feeling that (sceptical) 
climate science is common sense knowledge. This undermines consensual climate 
science – combined with the authoritative approach to communications this makes the 
alternate rhetoric (sceptical) more attractive. 
Indeed, interviewees rarely talked about what happens after the message has 
been ‘effectively communicated’. Once understanding of the science of climate 
change is increased, then what? Would it lead to people increasing their pro-
environmental behaviour? This is perhaps unlikely because the organisation likes to 
position themselves as politically neutral, holding the perception that any advice 
giving is not for them to do. For instance, the explicit attitude during interviews was 
that the work conducted by the organisation is policy-relevant but not policy-
prescriptive (e.g., Extract 24, 277). Yet implicitly, scientists do seem to expect that 
the information they are communicating is absorbed and taken into account when 
making decisions. Similarly, some (a minority) of the scientists show some kind of 
conflict between their professional role as a scientist and their personal pro-
environmental goals and behaviours. 
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In summary, the communication of climate change information is a complex 
one – even at the level of internal communications within a scientific climate change 
research organisation. ‘Uncertainty’ is the main challenge in such communications – 
due to its scientific and social complexities, which make it a particularly difficult 
challenge to overcome. Relational processes within this science organisation seem 
important when constructing a public communications message from scientific 
information. Scientists tended to advocate a deficit model of science communication, 
where what to communicate superseded consideration of how information is 
communicated (i.e., an informational communication style). In comparison, 
communicators were more concerned with how to communicate the information (i.e., 
a relational communication style).
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Chapter 3 
The roles of ‘tone of voice’ and uncertainty when  
communicating climate change information 
A series of experimental studies 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter presents an in-depth qualitative study, in which I 
investigated the process of climate change communication from the perspectives of 
scientists and professional communicators. On the basis of this analysis, I proposed 
three broad themes: 1) Communication Process(es); 2) Communication Challenges; 
and 3) (Conflicting) Goals/Roles of the Climate Scientist. Theme One, in particular, 
was concerned with the different ways in which scientists and professional 
communicators understand the basic process of communication and the goals they 
pursue in relation to this when dealing with the public. Climate scientists were 
advocates of the “information-deficit” model of science communication, whereby 
technical language and uncertainties are of central importance and fully educating the 
public about climate science is the primary goal of communication. Communicators, 
however, adopted a more relational approach to science communication. They 
preferred to build a relationship with their audience(s) and achieved this through 
using simplified language. Specifically, they adopted a warm and friendly style of 
communication, which they termed ‘tone of voice’.  
Building on these insights from this qualitative work, especially the ideas that 
emerged under Theme One, in the next phase of this research I wanted to 
experimentally explore the consequences of these two different models of 
communication and their possible impact when communicating climate change 
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uncertainty to  public audiences. Based on the qualitative work one of the main 
challenges was communicating (uncertainty) to non-scientific public audiences. 
Public communications was seen as important at the organisational level and was 
predominantly done by a team of communications experts. Though not viewed as a 
priority by scientists, communications with lay audiences was something they 
undertook. While internal (e.g., between scientists and communications team 
members) and other external (e.g., with policy-makers and industry) were also seen to 
present challenges, there appeared to be project and client-focussed iterative processes 
in place to assist these exchanges (see page 58). Bearing these issues in mind, in 
considering the target audiences for this set of experiments, the focus was with non-
specialised public audiences. 
My starting point for this investigation was a Pilot study in which I varied the 
language peripheral to the information. In one condition, the communicator employed 
an exclusive style of language, being cold and creating communicator-audience 
distance rather than closeness. In the alternative condition, the communicator used a 
warm ‘tone of voice’, via using inclusive and warm language peripheral to 
information. The latter maps onto the style advocated by communicators from my 
qualitative research. Varying the style peripheral to the content of the communication 
allowed me to explore what, if anything, might be conveyed to audiences by 
communicators who adopt different approaches to communication.  
Expanding on the Pilot study, my subsequent experiments included factors 
that represented the other themes to emerge from the qualitative research. 
Experiments 1 and 2 focus on how communication style interacts with the 
informational content of climate change messages – specifically content that 
communicates scientific uncertainty, one of the key challenges for climate change 
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communication identified under Theme Two of the qualitative analysis. Both these 
studies crossed the communication style manipulation with a manipulation of 
uncertainty (lower versus higher) and examined the combined consequences of these 
factors for audience engagement and action. Experiment 3 introduced a further factor 
to this design that drew upon the third theme from the qualitative research: the 
(conflicting) roles of scientists. In my interviews, scientists expressed concerns about 
the provision of advice on how publics might change their behaviour in response to 
the scientific information they provide. Specifically, scientists worried that providing 
advice and guidance might undermine perceptions of their role as neutral providers of 
impartial information. With this in mind, I varied the provision versus absence of 
clear advice in the message and explored how this, in combination with 
communication style and uncertainty, shaped responses to the climate change 
message.  
Before presenting an empirical study of this, I briefly recap the relevant 
literature on (risk) communication, trust and the role of person perception within these 
processes – and set the backdrop of these experiments in the research context. 
Research recap and experimental context. The aim of the experiments was to 
examine how uncertainty might be managed in communication to avoid its likely 
negative effects. However, unlike prior research on uncertainty communication, I 
wanted to consider how factors peripheral to the message itself might modify how 
people respond to the informational content, particularly any uncertainty contained 
within it. Specifically, I consider the audience perceptions of communicators and how 
these guide their responses to messages that contain uncertainty.  
To assess these possible consequences, I focus on perceptions of the 
communicator in terms of the stereotypic dimensions of morality, warmth and 
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competence. As highlighted in Chapter 1, person perception research suggests that 
these stereotypic perceptions capture most of the important variance in how one 
thinks of other people, and that perceptions of warmth/ morality are primary when 
people decide whether and how to engage with others (e.g., Brambilla, Rusconi, 
Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011). That said, morality seems to dominate ‘other’ person 
perception, whereas competence dominates self-perception (Wojciszke, 2005).  
Chen, Jing and Lee (2014) showed that perceptions of trustworthiness 
increased the chances of winning actual elections, but only for those who were judged 
as competent. It may also be noteworthy that Chen, Jing and Lee (2014) were using 
the term trustworthiness instead of morality – also the two terms were not used 
interchangeably. For the purposes of this thesis I will be using the term ‘morality’, 
predominately to remain consistent with terminology used in impression formation 
theories. However, I am also aware that the term morality can have slightly differently 
connotations outside of social psychological theory, for example with connections to 
religion (i.e., a relationship between religious views and morality). I would like to 
stress that in this context ‘morality’ does not necessarily equate to religious morals, 
but is a term used in previous research to capture traits such moral, trustworthy, 
honourable, honest. 
Information can be processed via different routes, and the level of influence of 
message and messenger will depend on situational factors. Within the elaboration 
likelihood model of persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), for example, information is 
processed through one of two routes: the central route whereby the individual thinks 
carefully about a communication’s content and is influenced by the strength of the 
arguments it contains; and the peripheral route, used to process information when the 
individual has little or no motivation to engage with the information being 
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communicated. Heuristics are used to process information via the peripheral route, 
include the stylistic features of the message other than its content (e.g., speed of 
presentation, use of imagery, length of message), and features of the source from 
which the message originated, such as source likeability, attractiveness or credibility 
(e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In the 
context of climate change, individuals are unlikely to feel motivated to seek out and 
fully process information about this issue because it is distant from their immediate 
concerns, both in time, space, and hypothetically (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & 
Liberman, 2010). This lack of motivation is likely to be further amplified by the 
probabilistic nature of climate science information. Research has shown that 
uncertainty and risk are barriers to effective communication. People avoid messages 
that contain uncertainty (Camerer & Weber, 1992) and uncertainty can hinder action 
(Kuhn, 1997). Such findings are clearly a concern for those involved in the 
communication of climate change to publics—the very nature of the message may 
undermine public engagement with communication around this issue.  
Given my assumption that much communication about climate change is 
likely to be processed peripherally by all but the most concerned and engaged of 
publics, it is useful to consider more deeply the peripheral features that might enable 
climate change communicators to be influential in the face of uncertainty. In relation 
to this, I focus on how the communicator is perceived—specifically the stereotypes 
that audience have about the sources of climate change messages—and the factors 
that might influence such perceptions.  
Moreover, communicating information about climate change is a form of risk 
communication. Research has shown that in relation to risks where public knowledge 
is low (e.g., biological security), public trust in the organisations communicating the 
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information is important (Blendon, Benson, Desroches, & Weldon, 2003; Siegrist & 
Cvetkovich, 2000).  
Therefore, in the context of climate change communications, perceptions of 
the messenger and their morality may be particularly important in fostering social 
trust between the actors, potentially increasing willingness to engage with climate 
change messages, despite them containing high levels of uncertainty. Arguably 
communication plays a role in developing trust, and language-use within that is 
potentially a key feature of that. With these in mind, I wanted to experimentally 
examine how the general chains of communication, messenger-message-recipient, 
interact in the context of communicating climate change information. 
Pilot Study 
The aim of the pilot study was to explore what, if anything, using a warm and 
friendly ‘tone of voice’ as learnt from the qualitative work, might contribute to the 
likely effectiveness of uncertain climate change communication, since this was 
considered a primary tool for effective communication by the professional 
communicators interviewed. To explore the consequences of this, I contrasted a warm 
‘tone of voice’ (open language) to a more corporate and distant ‘tone of voice’ (closed 
language) – the details of which will be described in the procedure below. Although 
both these conditions contained the same core information, I anticipated that the 
different communication styles might cultivate different impressions of the 
communicator by the recipient. To assess this, I measured perceptions of 
communicator warmth, morality and competence. 
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Method 
Participants, design and procedure 
Eighty-five participants took part in this online pilot study, recruited from 
within university networks and friends of friends by email invitation. Of the sample 
31 were male, 49 female and 5 respondents did not disclose their gender. The mean 
age of this sample was 32 (SD = 12.78). 
After following a link to the study, and being provided with some basic 
information about it, participants were presented with a screenshot from a webpage of 
a (fictitious) climate research organisation (the Hanley Centre). This webpage 
provided a description of the organisation and summarised some general climate 
change information based on their research. To manipulate language, I varied the 
wording on this webpage screenshot. In the open language condition (n = 40), the 
information was contextualised using inclusive words such as “we”, “our” and “us” 
(e.g., “We are a world-leading group with expertise researching changes in the earth’s 
climate”). In the closed language condition (n = 45), the same information was 
expressed using more exclusive and distant words, such as the name of the 
organisation (e.g., “the Hanley Centre is a world-leading group with expertise 
researching changes in the earth’s climate”).  
After they had read the description of the organisation, participants were asked 
to give their impression of the organisation by rating how well each of forty-five 
adjectives described the Hanley Centre (1 = not at all to 7 = extremely). The list of 
adjectives included a mixture of traits associated with the three common dimensions 
of stereotype content (warmth, morality and competence) as well as some additional 
descriptors considered relevant to the specific organisation and their communication 
(e.g., capable of emotions, united, biased).  
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Factor Analysis of the descriptive adjectives revealed an unclear and 
incoherent pattern of loadings. Accordingly, I restricted the items to those that 
mapped onto the stereotype content dimensions and re-conducted the Factor Analysis. 
This revealed three components that together explained 74.05% of the variance. 
Again, however, the factor loadings were somewhat ambiguous – for example, some 
competence and morality items loaded together (efficient, trustworthy, 
knowledgeable, competent, honest, intelligent, moral); and all but one of the reversed-
scored items loaded together (dishonest, inept, incompetent, immoral, untrustworthy, 
amateurish). The warmth-related items, however, did seem to cluster together.  
Given the indistinctness of this data reduction, perhaps due to the limited 
sample size, I decided to be guided by theoretical rather than empirical considerations 
and guided by previous research (e.g., Wojciszke et al., 1998; Fiske et al, 2002; Leach 
et al, 2007). Thus I formed three scales, one for each of the stereotype content 
dimensions: Competence (competent, intelligent, knowledgeable, efficient, and 
reversed scores of incompetent, inept and amateurish, α = .91); morality (moral, 
honest, trustworthy, and reverse scores of immoral, dishonest and untrustworthy, α = 
.91); and warmth/ sociability (warm, good-natured, friendly and reversed scoring of 
cold, α = .87). The Pilot study can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses revealed that gender was associated with organisational 
perceptions independent of language condition. Females (M = 5.65, SD = 1.10) were 
more likely than males (M = 5.05, SD = 1.19) to perceive the organisation as moral, 
t(77)=-2.30, p = .04, and were more likely than males to see the organisation as warm 
(Females M = 4.81, SD = 1.22; Males M = 4.29, SD = 1.14), t(77)=-1.94, p = .07. 
There was no gender difference on perceptions of competence, t(77)=1.51, p = .14, 
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(Females: M = 5.38, SD = 1.16; Males: M = 4.99, SD = 1.05). Accordingly, I 
controlled for gender in subsequent analyses.  
The main analysis compared the experimental conditions on the stereotypic 
dimensions of morality, warmth and competence while controlling for gender 
differences in these. With respect to perceptions of organisational morality, there was 
a significant effect of language on perceptions of morality, F(1, 79) = 4.54, p = .04. 
Open language created a perception of the organisation as more moral (M = 5.69, SD 
= .84) than the closed language (M = 5.18, SD = 1.35). There was also a marginal 
effect of the manipulation on perceptions of competence, F(1, 79) = 3.45, p = .07. An 
open language style also signalled slightly higher competence (M = 5.47, SD = .90) 
than the closed language style (M = 5.02, SD = 1.27). There was no effect of the 
language manipulation on perceptions of communicator warmth, F(1, 79) = .66, p = 
.42. 
On the basis of these results I concluded that language peripheral to 
information can influence audience perceptions of the communicator. Open language 
tends to convey morality compared to closed language. Open language also, but to a 
lesser degree, enhances perceptions of communicator competence, comparative to 
closed language. Neither open nor closed gave impressions to the audience regarding 
communicator warmth. 
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Experiment 1 
The pilot study established that there are consequences of different forms of 
communication in generating perceptions of the communicator. The goal of 
Experiment 1 was to build upon this and examine whether these consequences 
extended to affect the audience’s willingness to engage with and follow the 
communicator, for example by being influenced in positive ways around the message 
of climate change. I was also interested in how these variations in language style 
might interact with other features of the message and the information it contained. 
Building on Theme Two from the interviews, I was specifically interested in the 
barrier of uncertainty in climate change information and how this might affect 
audience responses. Thus, this study was designed to examine the combined effects of 
communication style and informational uncertainty on audience responses to a 
climate change message.  
 
Expectations for this study are summarised below: 
1. Using an open language style (as expressed by using a warm tone of voice) 
would cultivate perceptions of communicator morality in comparison to 
closed language; 
2. Higher levels of uncertainty would undermine the effectiveness of climate 
change communications; 
3. An open language style (as expressed by using a warm tone of voice) would 
buffer audiences against the negative effects of uncertainty by facilitating 
their engagement with the source and its message. 
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Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred and fifty-two psychology undergraduates were recruited during 
an in-class practical session. This sample consisted of 30 males and 122 females, and 
the mean age was 20.10 (SD = 3.92). Participants were presented with a pen and 
paper questionnaire to be completed during the class time. This questionnaire 
contained the experimental manipulations, to which participants were randomly 
assigned in a 2 (language: open, closed) x 2 (uncertainty: high, low) between-subjects 
design.   
Procedure and measures 
 Participants were told that the questionnaire was part of a market research 
exercise for a local scientific organisation seeking feedback about their web-design. 
As such, the questionnaire contained screen-shots from the organisation’s website and 
questions relating to respondents’ impressions of this. Within these screen-shots were 
the experimental manipulations and the associated questionnaire assessed the key 
dependent variables. The questionnaire as used in this experimental study can be 
found in Appendix 3.2. 
On the first page of their questionnaire, participants were presented with a 
screen-shot from the homepage of a (fictitious) climate research organisation (the 
Linford Centre), which described the organisation and its goals. To manipulate 
language, the wording on this homepage was varied. Consistent with the Pilot study, 
the ‘open language’ condition contextualised information using inclusive words, such 
as “we”, “our” and “us” (e.g., “We are a world-leading group with expertise 
researching changes in the earth’s climate”). The ‘closed language’ condition instead 
presented the same information using more exclusive and distant language, such as 
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the name of the organisation “the Linford Centre”, or “corporate” and “executive” 
(e.g., “The Linford Centre is a world-leading group with expertise researching 
changes in the earth’s climate”).   
Following this, I asked participants for their impressions of the Linford Centre 
based on their web-profile. Specifically, participants were presented with a list of 
twenty-four adjectives and asked to rate how much each adjective was reflected in 
their impression of the Linford Centre (1 = not at all to 7 = extremely). This list of 
adjectives was reduced from the Pilot study, and only included a mixture of traits 
associated with the stereotypic contents of competence, morality and warmth/ 
sociability (Wojciszke et al, 1998; Fiske et al, 2002; Leach et al, 2007). Consistent 
with theoretical expectations, the factor analysis represented this list via three 
underlying factors that together explained 57.28% of the variance. These factors 
represented perceived competence (powerful, prestigious, influential, confident, 
corporate, credible, efficient, professional, competent, capable, helpful, serious, 
proud, incompetence reversed); perceived warmth/ sociability (relaxed, casual, 
friendly, warm), perceived morality (moral, honest, sincere, trustworthy, and reversed 
distant and cold). Composite measures reflecting each of these dimensions were 
calculated by averaging the respective traits (αs> .72). See Table 3.1 for the list of 
correlations and alphas. 
Following this, participants were presented with a second screenshot from the 
Linford Centre webpage. This webpage summarised the key findings from their 
research on climate change and presented a series of future impacts of climate change. 
This is where the level of uncertainty was manipulated.  The intention of separating 
the language and uncertainty manipulations served to strengthen the effects of each 
manipulation.  
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I used a manipulation of uncertainty that had been successfully used in 
previous research (see Morton, Rabinovich, Marshall, & Bretschneider, 2011). I 
varied how these impact likelihoods were presented. In the low uncertainty condition, 
each impact statement was accompanied by a single probability rating (e.g., “Based 
on current rates of CO2 emissions [there is an] 80% chance that climate change will 
make a quarter of all species extinct”). In the high uncertainty condition, the same 
information was presented, but a range of probabilities was instead given (e.g., 
“Based on current rates of CO2 emissions [there is a] 70-90% chance that climate 
change will make a quarter of all species extinct”). Importantly, the probabilities 
presented in the low uncertainty condition were always the mean of the ranges in the 
high uncertainty condition counterpart. The language manipulation was reinforced 
within this screenshot by presenting the climate change information using either open 
and inclusive (“we”), or closed and exclusive language (“the Linford Centre”), 
consistent with the language condition of that particular survey.  
While the scientists in the interview study presented in Chapter 2 broadly 
speaking did not communicate with the public, there was a sense (at the 
organisational and individual level) that this is something they wanted to do more of 
in the future. They were keen to know ways that may facilitate communication of this 
type of information with non-specialised, public audiences. The type of uncertainty  
(i.e., probabilistic uncertainty of future impacts) used in the experiments is specific 
and subtle (rather than ambiguous uncertainty), however this form of uncertainty was 
referred to during the interviews (Chapter 2) and is often used in climate change 
projections, e.g., IPCC. The comparisons of low/ high uncertainty is indeed subtle, 
but climate change information is not void of uncertainty; thus the alternative 
condition still needs to be uncertain. 
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Following this second screenshot of the Linford Centre webpage, participants 
were presented with a series of opinion statements and asked to rate their agreement 
with each of these statements (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree).  
This questionnaire in this instance was interested in the key dependent 
measures: understanding of, and engagement with, the message; trust in the Linford 
Centre; belief in climate change; and pro-environmental behavioural intentions. The 
composite scales and reliability scores are described below. 
Engagement with the message. This was assessed with two items: “I found the 
summary engaging”, and “I tuned out while reading about this organisation’s research 
(reversed)” (r p < .001). 
 Perceived understanding of the message. This was measured via two items:  “I 
understand the meaning of the Linford Centre’s research” and “I do not understand 
what this research is supposed to mean”. After reverse scoring the latter, these two 
items were averaged to form a single index (r = .51, p < .001). 
 Climate change beliefs and global risk perceptions. Beliefs about the reality of 
anthropogenic catastrophic global climate change were assessed via three items 
measuring general climate change beliefs: “In my opinion climate change is 
happening”; “Climate change is something that I personally believe in”; and “I remain 
somewhat sceptical about climate change and if it is real” (reversed). A further three 
items assessed the more specific belief that climate change as an anthropogenic, rather 
than natural, phenomenon: “In my opinion climate change is man-made”; “Human 
beings are responsible for climate change” and “Climate change is a natural process 
rather than something caused by human activity” (reversed). Global risk perceptions 
were thus: “I believe there is a global risk of the consequences of climate change”; “I 
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think there will be bad consequences of climate change for the planet”; and “I believe 
that the global consequences of climate change will be severe” (Cronbach’s α = .89). 
Personal risk perceptions. Next a series of items assessed participants’ beliefs 
about the personal risks of climate change: “I feel personally at risk from the 
consequences of climate change”; “I personally worry about climate change and how 
it will affect me”; “I do not think that climate change affects my own personal life in 
any way” (reversed); and “For me, climate change is nothing that I am personally 
concerned about” (reversed). After appropriate reverse scoring, a measure of 
perceived personal risk of climate change was created (α = .87). 
 Individual intentions. Finally, a set of questions assessed how willing 
participants would be to engage in a variety of actions in response to climate change 
(1 = not at all willing to 7 = very willing). Specifically, I assessed intentions to engage 
in a range of pro-environmental household actions: “Reduce my household energy 
use”; “Recycle (more)”; “Use less water”; and “Reduce, reuse, recycle” (α 
  I also assessed intentions to engage in a various travel-related behaviours: 
“Walk (more) instead of using the car”; “Cycle (more) instead of using the car”; “Use 
a car less”; Use public transport (more) instead of the car”; and “Limit unnecessary 
air travel” (α = .72).  
I acknowledge the potential for variations in responses to specific climate 
communications, such as engagement and understanding, perceptions of risks, 
scepticism, behavioural intentions, acceptance of policy. The focus of outcome 
variables of interest in this study were in relations to perceptions of the communicator 
(competence, warmth, morality); the message (engagement, perceived 
understanding); and individual response (behavioural intentions). These were all 
variables that seemed of mutual interest to ourselves as researchers as well as the non-
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academic CASE partner. In hindsight, measuring other behavioural responses (such as 
political voting intentions) may have proven to be interesting.  
 Demographics. Finally, I gathered demographic information, such as gender 
and age, and provided a space at the end for further comments and a detachable 
information sheet was provided offering resources for further information about 
climate change and environmental behaviour. After participants had completed the 
questionnaire and returned their responses, they were fully debriefed about the 
experimental manipulations and the purpose of the research. 
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Table 3.1. Means, SDs, Correlations and Cronbach’s for variables in Experiment 1  
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Competence 5.09 .87 (.88)         
2. Warmth 3.93 .97 -.10 (.72)        
3. Morality 5.21 .89 .67** 0.10 (.82)       
4. Engagement 4.34 1.29 .38** .08 .40** (.86)      
5. Perceived understanding  5.51 1.08 .21* -.03 .20* .25** (.66)     
6. Global belief 5.40 .96 .21* -.01 .27** .38** .09 (.89)    
7. Personal risks 4.05 1.42 .10 .03 .13 .38** .05 .54** (.87)   
8. Household intentions 4.83 1.19 .01 -.04 .00 .20* .13 .24** .26** (.73)  
9. Travel intentions  4.17 1.38 -.09 -.05 -.15 .06 .05 .15 .19* .43** (.72) 
Note:  N = 152 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level, *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) are on the diagonal. 
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Results 
Preliminary Checks 
The descriptive statistics, correlations and Cronbach’s alpha for all variables 
can be found in Table 3.1.  
Despite efforts to randomise allocation to conditions, there were significant 
associations between gender and allocation to the uncertainty, 2  (1) = 5.58, p = .018, 
and language conditions, 2 (1) = 3.23, p = .07. This was particularly the case in the 
open language and high uncertainty conditions, although there were more females 
relative to males overall. In addition, preliminary checks on the data suggested 
associations between gender and age and some of the dependent measures. For 
example, older participants, r = -.19, p = .02, and men, r = .15, p = .07, perceived the 
organisation to be less competent; older participants were more willing to consider 
changes to their travel behaviour in response to climate change, r = .17, p = .03, and 
females were more likely than males to consider changes to their household 
behaviour, r = .16, p = .05. Given these slight differences in how people oriented to 
the target organisation and to the issue of climate change based on demographics, and 
given the non-random distribution based on gender, age and gender were included as 
covariates in all analyses.  
Main analyses 
Organisation impressions. First I was interested in the effects of the language 
manipulation on the impressions participants formed of the organisation as a whole. 
To explore this, the open and closed language conditions were compared on the three 
stereotype content dimensions (dependent variables) while controlling for gender and 
age (covariates).  
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This revealed a significant effect of language on perceptions of communicator 
morality, F(1, 150) = 2.62, p =.044. When language was open, the source was 
perceived as significantly more moral (M = 5.30, SD = .86) compared to when 
language was closed (M = 5.05, SD = .69). The language manipulation had no effects 
on perceived competence (which was always high, M = 5.06) or perceived warmth 
(which was neutral, M = 3.93, on a 7-point scale), F(1, 148) = .19, p =.67 and F(1, 
148) = .56, p =.46, respectively.  
This finding, in combination with the results of the Pilot Study, confirms that 
open language signals the morality of the communicator to the audience. To explore 
how these language-based organisational impressions shaped responses to 
communication, and the role of uncertainty in this, I conducted a series of 2 
(language: open, closed) x 2 (uncertainty: low, high) analyses of variance on the 
remaining dependent variables. 
Engagement with the message. The analysis on engagement with the message 
presented revealed no main effects of language or uncertainty, Fs <  2.17, ps > .13. 
There was, however, a marginally significant Language x Uncertainty interaction, 
F(1, 146) = 2.90, p = .09, however. A pairwise analysis revealed a significant effect 
of language in the high uncertainty condition, F(1, 146) = 5.61, p = .02. Under 
conditions of high uncertainty, respondents felt more engaged with the message when 
communicated using open language (M = 4.79, SD = 1.36) than when communicated 
using closed language (M = 4.12, SD = 1.03). Language did not influence message 
engagement under conditions of low uncertainty, F(1, 146) = .00, p = .95. This 
Language x Uncertainty interaction on message engagement is shown in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. Two-way interaction of language and uncertainty on level of engagement 
with presented climate change science 
 
 
Understanding of the message. The analysis of self-reported understanding 
showed no main effect of language, F(1, 146) = 0.1, p = .92, or uncertainty, F(1, 146) 
= 1.20, p = .27, and no interaction between these variables, F(1, 146) = .85, p = .36.  
Global climate change belief. Next I explored the effects of the manipulations 
on participants’ beliefs about global climate change. The analysis revealed a marginal 
main effect of the uncertainty manipulation, F(1, 146) = 3.56, p = .061. Participants 
were less inclined to believe that global climate change was happening when 
uncertainty was high (M = 5.27, SD = 1.01) compared to when uncertainty was low 
(M = 5.64, SD = .88). There was no main effect of language, F(1, 146) = .290, p = 
.591, or interactive effects, F(1, 146) = 1.95, p = .165, on this variable.  
Personal risk perceptions. With respect to perceptions of personal risk, there 
was a marginal main effect of language, F(1, 146) = 3.05, p =.083. Participants 
exposed to open language perceived more personal risk (M = 4.28, SD = 1.50) than 
those exposed to closed language (M = 3.83, SD = 1.32). There was no effect of 
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uncertainty, F(1, 146) = 1.95, p = .165, and no interaction effects, F(1, 146) = 2.67, p 
= .134.   
Behavioural intentions. Finally, I explored the effects of the manipulations on 
individual intentions to engage in pro-environmental behaviours. In the analysis of 
pro-environmental household behaviour, after controlling for gender, F(1, 146) = 
5.02, p = .027, and age, F(1, 146) = 2.25, p = .136, revealed no main effects of 
language, F(1, 146) = .23, p = .629, or uncertainty, F(1, 146) = .04, p = .840. There 
was, however, a significant interaction between language and uncertainty, F(1, 146) = 
4.47, p = .021. This interaction is displayed in Figure 3.2, below.  
 
Figure 3.2. Two-way interaction of language and uncertainty on pro-environmental 
household intentions 
 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that there was a significant effect of language 
under conditions of high uncertainty, F(1, 148) = 4.47, p = .036. When uncertainty 
was high, pro-environmental household intentions were greater for people exposed to 
open language (M = 5.91, SD = 1.14) compared to those exposed to the closed 
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language (M = 5.41, SD = .94). Under conditions of low uncertainty, language did not 
influence environmental household intentions, F(1, 148) = 1.00, p = .319. 
Looked at differently, there was also a marginal effect of uncertainty in the 
open language condition, F(1, 148) = 2.96, p = .087. When exposed to open language, 
participants’ intentions to engage in pro-environmental household behaviours were 
stronger under situations of high uncertainty (M = 5.91, SD = 1.14) compared to low 
uncertainty (M = 5.46, SD = 1.10). There was no effect of uncertainty in the closed 
language condition, F(1, 148) = 1.85 p = .18. 
In the analysis of pro-environmental travel intentions, after controlling for 
gender, F(1, 146) = .32, p = .570, and age, F(1, 146) = 3.84, p = .052, there were no 
significant main effects of language, F(1, 146) = .04, p = .846, or uncertainty, F(1, 
146) = .28, p = .601, and no interaction between these, F(1, 146) = .22, p = .641.  
Discussion 
The results of this study show that uncertainty is a barrier to communicating 
climate science information: higher levels of uncertainty resulted in lower levels of 
belief in climate change. However, my results also show that the negative effects of 
uncertainty are not inevitable and that is possible to maintain audience engagement 
even under higher levels of uncertainty. To do this, however, it is important to attend 
to the style of communication and what this signals about the communicator 
themselves. Indeed, previous work has shown that polite and formal language creates 
perceptions of distance (Brown & Levinson, 1987), thus adversely affecting levels of 
trust in the source of the communication. These two experiments show that adopting 
open language (e.g., by using words such as ‘we’ rather than more distant closed 
language) can foster perceptions of communicator morality (Pilot and Experiment 1), 
perceptions that seem to have positive consequences for the communication process, 
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especially when there are other factors that might interfere with effective 
communication – namely, the presence of uncertainty.  
In Experiment 1, when uncertainty was high, adopting open (versus closed) 
language resulted in stronger engagement with the message and stronger household 
intentions to act in line with it. When uncertainty was low, language used to 
communicate the information was less important for audience engagement and 
(intended) action. This suggests that relational processes between the communicator 
and recipients can shape how audiences respond to informational content of climate 
change messages, especially under conditions of high uncertainty. More specifically, 
it appears that relational aspects of communication (such as language style) can buffer 
people against the negative effects of (high) uncertainty in the information being 
presented i.e., respondents were more willing to follow communicator lead especially 
when uncertainty is high when open language is used. 
To explain this “buffering effect” of open communication in high uncertainty, 
it may be useful to consider what exactly an open communication style conveys to the 
audience. In both the Pilot Study and this experiment, an open communication style 
was consistently associated with enhanced perceptions of communicator morality.  
This signalling of communicator morality may increase trust from the 
audience and a willingness to follow the communicators lead, even when 
understanding may be low, for example under conditions of high uncertainty. Indeed, 
other research within the persuasion literature would suggest that particularly when 
motivation or ability to process messages is low, people rely on cues peripheral to the 
information when deciding how to respond, such as “experts are trusted” (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken, 1980). Language and associated perceptions of morality 
may be such a cue. 
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Although there are many other cues that may accompany a message and aid 
communication in challenging situations (e.g., when motivation is low), 
communicator morality may be especially important. When there is risk involved in 
communications, and climate science is a form of risk communication, perceived 
communicator morality is likely to be important (Blendon, Benson, Desroches, & 
Weldon, 2003; Siegrist & Cvetkovich 2000). Signals of morality through language-
use, are therefore important in cultivating a communications relationship involving 
trust. Once trust is established, individuals are more likely to follow instructions given 
by someone they trust (Shore, 2003).  
Practical implications. The findings from this experiment, and its associated 
Pilot Study could have important practical implications. For example, the IPCC 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) is a scientific body under the auspices 
of the United Nations with the mission to provide “a clear scientific view on the 
current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and 
socio-economic impacts” (IPCC, 2013). They report their consensus findings to the 
scientific communities as well as producing a document aimed at non-scientist 
audiences (namely policymakers), the aims of which are to present the key findings 
and uncertainties within climate change research to date. Research carried out by 
Fløttum and Dahl (2011) examined the linguistic and discursive features of the IPCC 
Summary for Policy makers. Interestingly, their research found that the report was 
dominated by impersonal language and contained no explicit use of “we”. Fløttum 
and Dahl suggest that such impersonal language may be a means to claiming 
neutrality of and areas of differing views between the author(s). The use of the 
passive voice is also likely to be a rhetorical product of traditional science convention 
(Billig, 2011; Halliday, 2004; Halliday & Martin, 1993). 
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The present findings would suggest, however, that such impersonal language 
may have unintended effects on other dimensions by which an organisation is 
perceived, and that this may have consequences for the effectiveness of their 
communications with the public. Specifically, using language that creates a feeling of 
distance may become a barrier in itself and hinder audience engagement. Thus, when 
communicating to an audience outside the scientific field of interest, it is important to 
recognise that the default science communication (“deficit model”) may not be 
effective in a non-science setting. Moreover, the information exchange between a 
science to non-science audience does not simply reflect the communicator’s own 
goals, but also to the relationship they are building with their intended audience. 
Interestingly, this tension parallels some of the differences between professional 
communicators and scientists interviewed in the previous chapter. On this basis, the 
role of communication processes in such important scientific material is undoubtedly 
an important focus for future research. 
Limitations. As with all empirical studies, although the results are interesting 
and inline with expectations, they are not without their limitations. Clearly, it would 
be important to replicate these results to demonstrate robustness to the findings and 
methods devised; particularly given this is a sample consisting of first year 
undergraduate psychology students. This led to Experiment 2 below. The issue of 
sample selection aside, it seems that understanding communication processes, and 
how these shape audience motivations, is key to managing uncertainty when 
delivering messages about climate change. One way to overcome the barrier of 
uncertainty when communicating with non-scientists is to consider the language 
peripheral to the message content, and what this signals to audiences about the 
communicator. 
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Experiment 2 
The primary aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the previous design to give 
robustness to Experiment 1’s findings. In so doing, I also considered why the effect of 
language is particularly relevant under conditions of high uncertainty. I suggested that 
in situations where uncertainty is high, individuals are particularly likely to evaluate 
communicators and rely on their perceptions of the trustworthiness of the message 
source. When uncertainty is low, the message is clearer and perceptions of the source 
may be less important. This reasoning suggests that perceptions of communicator 
morality might mediate positive effects, especially under conditions of high 
uncertainty. However, I was unable to test this in my previous study since morality 
perceptions were assessed before the uncertainty manipulation and might have been 
affected by it. Accordingly, in Experiment 2, I presented the manipulations together 
and measured organisational impressions after both manipulations have been 
administered. 
Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred and sixty-two students were recruited around the campus of the 
University of Exeter, located in the South West of England. The sample consisted of 
73 males and 85 females (four participants did not specify their gender) aged between 
eighteen and fifty years (mean age = 21.76; SD = 4.34). All questionnaires were 
administered by pen and paper, with all participants completing their survey on the 
spot, taking them about 15 minutes. As with Experiment 1, respondents were 
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (language: open, closed) x 2 
(uncertainty: low, high) between-subjects design.   
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Procedure and measures 
Participants were presented with a questionnaire that contained a screenshot 
from a fictitious science organisation’s (the Linford Centre) website and questions 
relating to respondents’ impressions of this – the same way as in Experiment 1. 
Within these screenshots the experimental manipulations of language and uncertainty 
were administered. The main difference between Experiments 1 and 2 was that the 
language and uncertainty manipulations were presented on the same page in this 
study, and participants’ impressions of the organisation were measured after the 
presentation of both manipulations together. The questionnaire as used in this 
experimental study can be found in Appendix 3.3. After completing the questionnaire 
participants were thanked and debriefed. 
As in the previous study, these organisational impressions included items that 
tapped into each of the stereotype content dimensions of morality, competence and 
warmth. As previously I created composite measures of each dimension: competence 
(competent, professional, efficient, capable, incompetence reversed); perceived 
warmth/ sociability (warm, friendly, cold reversed), perceived morality (moral, 
sincere, honest, trustworthy, immoral reversed) (all Cronbach’s αs> .72).  
Consistent with the previous study, I also measured engagement with the 
message, beliefs about climate change and the perception of associated risks, and the 
individual’s intentions to engage in a range of climate relevant behaviours as the 
primary dependent measures. Likert scales were used to record their agreement with 
each of the statements (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree).  
Engagement with the message was measured with two items: “I found the 
summary engaging”; and “I tuned out while reading about this organisation’s 
research” reversed, (r p < .001). These inter-correlation items are lower than 
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seen in Experiment 1 suggesting that the relationship between the correlation items 
are weaker among this sample. This could perhaps be due to different environmental 
conditions in which the information was read. Experiment 1 was conducted in-class 
where conditions were quiet with minimal distractions. Experiment 2 was conducted 
away from the class around campus where conditions were noisy and potentially more 
distracting for participants. This may have had an effect on engagement levels whilst 
completing the survey. 
Perceived understanding. This was measured with two items. “I understand 
the meaning of the Linford Centre's research” and “I do not understand what this 
research is supposed to mean” reversed, (r , p < .001). 
Linford Centre trust. Trust of the organisation was measured with two items. 
“Based on what I have read, I would find it hard to trust the Linford Centre as a 
source of information about climate change (reversed)” and “Based on their research, 
the Linford Centre seems to be a trustworthy source of information about climate 
change” (r 7, p < .001). 
Global climate change belief and personal risk perception. As with 
Experiment 1, I assessed belief that climate change is happening
7
, that it is caused by 
human actions
8
, that it represents a significant global risk
9
 and the degree to which the 
individual personal felt a sense of risk associated with this
10
. Again, I considered 
whether these various items represented distinct domains of belief versus a single 
underlying dimension. A Factor Analysis revealed two main underlying components 
                                                        
7 Items: “In my opinion climate change is happening”, “Climate change is something that I personally believe in” 
and “I remain somewhat sceptical about climate change and if it is real” reversed. 
8 Items: “In my opinion climate change is man-made”, “Human beings are responsible for climate change” and 
“Climate change is a natural process rather than something caused by human activity” reversed. 
9 Items: “I believe there is global risk of the consequences of climate change”, “I think there will be bad 
consequences of climate change for the planet” and “I believe that the global consequences of climate change will 
be severe”. 
10 Items: “I feel personally at risk from the consequences of climate change”, “I personally worry about climate 
change and how it will affect me”, and “For me, climate change is nothing that I am personally concerned about” 
reversed. 
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which emerged from the complete set of items. Global climate change belief items 
account for 53.72% of the variance; this composite measure achieved reliability score 
of Cronbach’s α = .92. Personal risk perception items accounted for 9.43%, with the 
composite measure achieving a Cronbach’s reliability of α = .74. 
 Behavioural intentions. A set of questions assessed how willing participants 
would be to engage in a variety of actions in response to climate change (1 = not at all 
willing to 7 = very willing). Specifically, as before, I created two behavioural 
intentions measures, household behaviour
11
 (α 12 (α 
= .81). 
 Demographics. Finally, I gathered demographic information such as gender 
and age, and provided a space at the end for further comments. 
 
                                                        
11  Items: “Reduce my household energy use”, “Recycle (more)”, “Use less water”, and “Reduce, reuse, recycle” 
12 Items: “Walk (more) instead of using the car”, “Cycle (more) instead of using the car”, “Use a car less”, Use 
public transport (more) instead of the car”, and “Limit unnecessary air travel”. 
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Table 3.2. Means, SDs, Correlations and Cronbach’s alpha for variables in Experiment 2  
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Competence 5.11 .88 (.81)          
2. Warmth 3.99 .84 .16* (.69)         
3. Morality 5.04 .86 .70** .29** (.79)        
4. Engagement 4.17 1.20 .32** .27** .29** (.45)       
5. Perceived understanding  5.14 1.28 .32** .19* .28** .26** (.72)      
6. Trust 4.60 1.24 .70** .24** .63** .36** .33** (.80)     
7. Global belief 5.22 1.10 .25** .00 .34** .22** .24** .31** (.89)    
8. Personal risks 3.79 1.21 .06 -.04 .10 .20* .02 .22** .60** (.74)   
9. Household intentions 4.90 1.29 .07 .06 .18* .16* .06 .07 .45** .36** (.83)  
10. Travel intentions  4.46 1.47 .02 .07 .12 .07 -.01 .00 .42** .37** .72** (.81) 
Note:  N = 162 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level, *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) are on the diagonal. 
 
 124 
Results 
The descriptive statistics, correlations and Cronbach’s alpha for the variables 
in Experiment 2 can be found in Table 3.2. 
Preliminary analysis 
As in the previous experiment, there were some demographic effects on the 
dependent variables. For example, when looking at the stereotypic traits, males (M = 
4.93, SD = .98) perceived the organisation as less competent than females (M = 5.23, 
SD = .86), t(156) = -2.06, p = .041. Males (M = 4.90, SD = .98) were also slightly less 
likely to see the organisation as trustworthy than females (M = 5.14, SD = .83), t(156) 
= -1.70, p = .091. There were no gender differences in perceptions of the 
organisation’s warmth between males (M = 3.98, SD = .816) and females (M = 3.98 
SD = .88), t(156) = .04, p = .966. Females (M = 5.26, SD = 1.15) were more likely 
than males (M = 4.46, SD = 1.30) to consider changes in their household behaviours, 
t(155) = -4.12, p < .001. Similarly, older people were more willing to change their 
household (r = .21, p = .007) and travel behaviour (r = .18, p = .021) in response to 
climate change.  
Given these demographic differences, age and gender were included as 
covariates in all analyses. Further to this, I carried out checks for outliers on key 
variables (such as morality) in key conditions (open language). One particular 
respondent was an extreme outlier on the variables, in responding value 1 on most 
variables (even on reversed scored items), giving the impression that little thought 
went into their answer. They were therefore excluded from the analysis. 
Organisation impressions. First, I checked whether the language manipulation 
successfully influenced audience impressions of the organisation’s morality, as found 
in the Experiment 1 and the Pilot Study. However, a 2 (language: open, closed) x 2 
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(uncertainty: low, high) analysis of variance controlling for age and gender revealed 
that perceptions of morality were not higher in the open communication language (M 
= 4.89, SD = 1.02) than the closed language condition (M = 5.16, SD = .76), F(1, 151) 
= 2.32, p =.130. Given the language and uncertainty manipulations were presented 
together, and then followed by the trait ratings, I also checked for effects involving 
uncertainty. However there was also no significant main effect of uncertainty or 
interactions between language x uncertainty, Fs <  2.87, ps > .093. The language 
manipulation also had no effect on perceived competence (which was always high, M 
= 5.09, on a 7-point scale), F(1, 151) = .15, p = .697, and there was no main effect of 
uncertainty or any interaction, Fs <  1.24, ps > .267. Perceptions of warmth also 
revealed no main or interactive effects of the variables, Fs <  .56, ps > .457. 
Thus, contrary to the previous Pilot Study and Experiment 1, the language 
manipulation did not elicit an impression of the organisation in the present study. This 
somewhat complicates the interpretation of this experiment, an issue I return to later 
in the supplementary analyses reported below. 
Outcome variables. Although the above results for organisational perceptions 
suggest that the manipulation of language failed, I nonetheless examined the effects of 
the manipulations on the dependent measures. A 2 (language: open, closed) x 2 
(uncertainty: low, high) analysis of variance on message engagement after controlling 
for gender, F(1, 152) = .12, p = .730, and age, F(1, 152) = .99, p = .322, revealed that 
no main effects of language, F(1, 152) = 0.56, p = .457, or uncertainty, F(1, 152) = 
.28, p = .596, and no interaction between these variables on message engagement, 
F(1, 152) = .60, p = .441. The same analyses performed on the remaining outcome 
variables – understanding, trust, global belief, personal risks, and household and 
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travel behaviour intentions – also revealed no main or interactive effects of the 
manipulations on any of these variables, Fs < 1.96, ps > .165. 
 
Supplementary analysis 
As noted above, and contrary to expectations, the language manipulation did 
not prompt a more moral impression of the organisation in the present study. 
Although I do not know why the manipulation failed to produce the expected results 
in this study, the absence of effects on perceived morality may explain the absence of 
further effects across the dependent measures. To explore whether the null findings 
were indeed due to the manipulations or whether the underlying hypothesis was, in 
fact, incorrect, I repeated the above analyses substituting the measured organisational 
perceptions (moral and competent) for the language manipulations and exploring the 
effects of these independently and in interaction with the manipulation of uncertainty. 
Both stereotype dimensions were retained in this analysis given their overlap – 
because of this overlap, it was considered important to examine the effects of morality 
independent of competence and vice versa. The following analyses contains a series 
of three-step regressions; using all dependent variables available, the three steps in 
which the independent variables were entered into the model as follows: Step 1, 
Gender and age; Step 2, centred perceived competence, centred perceived morality 
and manipulated uncertainty (dummy coded); Step 3, the morality x uncertainty and 
competence x uncertainty interactions were added. This analysis allowed control for 
each dimension variable, morality and competence (Step 2); and also their unique 
interactions with uncertainty (Step 3). 
Engagement with the message. The overall model was significant (F = 2.94 (1, 
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149), p = .007). This was driven by a marginally significant effect of perceptions of 
communicator competence (β = .21, p = .063). As shown in Table 3.3, there is no 
significant contribution of perceived morality (β = .17, p = .138) and manipulated 
uncertainty (β = -.00, p = .980) to this model; nor is there a significant interaction 
between perceived morality and manipulated uncertainty (β = -.03, p = .772) or the 
interaction between perceived competence and manipulated uncertainty (β = .03, p = 
.781). Engagement with the message is, to some extent, shaped by audience 
perceptions of communicator competence. 
 
Table 3.3. Regression analysis predicting message engagement 
Step/Predictor B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
1. (Constant) 4.52 .57  7.90 .000 
Gender .06 .19 .02 .30 .768 
Age -.02 .02 -.07 -.91 .366 
      
2. (Constant) 4.67 .55  8.55 .000 
Gender -.06 .19 -.02 -.32 .753 
Age -.02 .02 -.07 -.91 .365 
Perceived Competence .28 .15 .20 1.88 .062 
    Perceived Morality .24 .16 .17 1.52 .130 
    Manipulated Uncertainty -.01 .19 -.00 -.03 .975 
      
3. (Constant) 4.68 .55  8.50 .000 
Gender -.06 .19 -.02 -.30 .767 
Age -.02 .02 -.07 -.93 .356 
Perceived Competence .28 .15 .21 1.88 .063 
   Perceived Morality .24 .16 .17 1.49 .138 
   Manipulated Uncertainty -.01 .19 -.00 -.03 .980 
Morality x Uncertainty Interaction -.09 .32 -.03 -.29 .772 
Competence x Uncertainty Interaction .08 .30 .03 .28 .781 
Note: 
1R = .08, adj R² = .01; F(2, 154) = .45, p = .637. 
2R = .35, adj R² = .10; F(5, 151) = 4.15, p = .001. 
3R = .35, adj R² = .08; F(7, 149) = 2.94, p = .007. 
 
Perceived understanding of the message. The overall model was significant (F 
= 2.71 (1, 149), p = .011). This was driven by a significant main effect of perceived 
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competence (β = .28, p = .014). There are no further main or interactive effects of any 
further variables, βs <  .07, ps > .508. Suggesting that, as with message engagement, 
perceived understanding of the message was largely influenced by how competent the 
communicator was viewed by the audience. The results are shown in Table 3.4, 
below. 
 
Table 3.4. Regression analysis predicting perceived message understanding 
Step/Predictor B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
1. (Constant) 4.80 .61  7.87 .000 
Gender .12 .21 .05 .60 .550 
Age .01 .02 .02 .28 .782 
      
2. (Constant) 2.47 .85  2.91 .000 
Gender .00 .20 .00 -.01 .996 
Age .01 .02 .04 .45 .651 
Perceived Competence .39 .16 .27 2.45 .015 
    Perceived Morality .13 .17 .09 .78 .437 
    Manipulated Uncertainty -.13 .20 -.05 -.64 .526 
      
3. (Constant) 2.50 .86  2.92 .000 
Gender -.02 .21 -.01 -.12 .908 
Age .01 .02 .04 .52 .606 
Perceived Competence .40 .16 .28 2.48 .014 
   Perceived Morality .11 .17 .07 .66 .508 
   Manipulated Uncertainty -.13 .20 -.05 -.62 .536 
Morality x Uncertainty Interaction .06 .34 .02 .19 .853 
Competence x Uncertainty Interaction .09 .32 .03 .28 .778 
Note: 
1R = .53, adj R² = .-01; F(2, 154) = .22, p = .803. 
2R = .33, adj R² = .08; F(5, 151) = 3.76, p = .003. 
3R = .34, adj R² = .07; F(7, 149) = 2.71, p = .011. 
 
Linford Centre trust. The overall model was significant, F = 25.36 (1, 149), p 
< .001, something that was driven by the variables entered at Step 2 which has the 
greatest, F = 35.60 (1, 149), p < .001. The results are shown in Table 3.5. At Step 2, 
trust was predicted by perceived competence (β = .49, p < .001) and perceived 
morality (β = .30, p < .001). There was no significant main effect of manipulated 
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uncertainty (β = -.09, p = .126). At Step 3 of the model, there were no significant 
interactions of perceived morality x manipulated uncertainty (β = .03, p = .694) or 
perceived competence x manipulated uncertainty (β = .03, p = .744). 
 
Table 3.5. Regression analysis predicting Linford Centre trust 
Step/Predictor B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
1. (Constant) 4.41 0.59  7.52 .000 
Gender .34 0.20 .14 1.70 .092 
Age -.02 0.02 -.05 -.68 .499 
      
2. (Constant) -.74 .59  -1.25 .215 
Gender .08 .14 .03 .55 .587 
Age -.01 .02 -.04 -.63 .528 
Perceived Competence .69 .11 .49 6.20 .000 
    Perceived Morality .45 .12 .30 3.86 .000 
    Manipulated Uncertainty -.21 .14 -.09 -1.54 .126 
      
3. (Constant) -.71 .60  -1.18 .238 
Gender .05 .14 .02 .36 .720 
Age -.01 .02 -.03 -.50 .620 
Perceived Competence .70 .11 .50 6.21 .000 
   Perceived Morality .43 .12 .29 3.64 .000 
   Manipulated Uncertainty -.21 .14 -.09 -1.51 .133 
Morality x Uncertainty Interaction .09 .24 .03 .40 .694 
Competence x Uncertainty Interaction .07 .22 .03 .33 .744 
Note: 
1R = .15, adj R² = .01; F(2, 154) = 1.66, p = .194. 
2R = .74, adj R² = .53 F (5, 151)= 35.60, p = <.001. 
3R = .74, adj R² = .52; F(7, 149) = 25.36, p <.001. 
 
Global belief. The overall model was significant, F = 3.84 (7, 149), p = .001. 
This was driven by a significant main effect of perceived morality (β = .34, p = .003) 
and gender (β = .17, p < .033). There are no further main or interactive effects of any 
further variables, βs <  -1.20, ps > .233. The results are shown in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6. Regression analysis predicting global belief 
Step/Predictor B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
1. (Constant) 4.40 .51  8.60 .000 
Gender .44 .17 .20 2.53 .012 
Age .01 .02 .03 .31 .756 
      
2. (Constant) 2.62 .71  3.70 .000 
Gender .35 .17 .16 2.12 .035 
Age .01 .02 .03 .34 .733 
Perceived Competence .01 .13 .01 .09 .928 
    Perceived Morality .42 .14 .33 3.05 .003 
    Manipulated Uncertainty -.20 .17 -.09 -1.20 .231 
      
3. (Constant) 2.62 .72  3.67 .000 
Gender .37 .17 .17 2.15 .033 
Age .01 .02 .03 .33 .743 
Perceived Competence .00 .14 .00 -.01 .989 
   Perceived Morality .43 .14 .34 3.07 .003 
   Manipulated Uncertainty -.20 .17 -.09 -1.20 .233 
Morality x Uncertainty Interaction .08 .29 .03 .27 .785 
Competence x Uncertainty Interaction -.17 .27 -.07 -.63 .528 
Note: 
1R = .20, adj R² = .03; F(2, 154) = 3.25, p = .041. 
2R = .39, adj R² = .12; F(5, 151) = 5.34, p = .000. 
3R = .39, adj R² = .11; F(7, 149) = 3.84, p = .001. 
 
Personal risk. The overall model was not significant, F = 1.67 (7, 149), p = 
.121. Though there was a significant main effect of gender (β = .20, p = .014). There 
are no further main or interactive effects of any further variables, βs <  .94, ps > .350. 
The results are shown in Table 3.7. 
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Table 3.7. Regression analysis predicting personal risk 
Step/Predictor B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
1. (Constant) 2.79 .56  4.97 .000 
Gender .55 .19 .23 2.90 .004 
Age .01 .02 .03 .34 .736 
      
2. (Constant) 2.47 .82  3.01 .003 
Gender .54 .19 .22 2.79 .006 
Age .01 .02 .03 .31 .758 
Perceived Competence -.09 .15 -.07 -.59 .553 
    Perceived Morality .19 .16 .13 1.17 .243 
    Manipulated Uncertainty -.09 .19 -.04 -.48 .636 
      
3. (Constant) 2.53 .82  3.07 .003 
Gender .49 .20 .20 2.49 .014 
Age .01 .02 .04 .46 .648 
Perceived Competence -.07 .16 -.05 -.43 .671 
   Perceived Morality .15 .16 .11 .94 .350 
   Manipulated Uncertainty -.09 .19 -.04 -.45 .654 
Morality x Uncertainty Interaction .13 .33 .04 .39 .700 
Competence x Uncertainty Interaction .19 .31 .07 .62 .536 
Note: 
1R = .23, adj R² = .04; F(2, 154) = 4.26, p = .016. 
2R = .25, adj R² = .03; F(5, 151) = 2.01, p = .081. 
3R = .27, adj R² = .03; F(7, 149) = 1.67, p = .121. 
 
Behavioural intentions. The model predicting household behavioural 
intentions was significant, F = 5.34 (7, 148), p = .001, accounting for 17% of the 
variance in intentions, see Table 3.8. In the final model, the only significant predictor, 
aside from the covariates, was perceived morality, β = .23, p = .031. The demographic 
variables of gender (β = .32, p = < .001) and age (β = .24, p = .002) Participants who 
perceived the organisation to be more moral were more inclined to report willingness 
to engage in pro-environmental household intentions. No other effects were 
significant, βs <  .15, ps > .150. 
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Table 3.8. Regression analysis predicting household behavioural intentions 
Step/Predictor B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
1. (Constant) 2.02 .58  3.46 .001 
Gender .85 .19 .33 4.50 .000 
Age .07 .02 .23 3.14 .002 
      
2. (Constant) 2.10 .58  3.61 .000 
Gender .83 .19 .33 4.39 .000 
Age .07 .02 .22 3.03 .003 
Perceived Competence -.19 .15 -.13 -1.25 .212 
    Perceived Morality .35 .16 .23 2.21 .028 
    Manipulated Uncertainty -.00 .19 .00 -.01 .996 
      
3. (Constant) 2.05 .58  3.53 .001 
Gender .82 .19 .32 4.27 .000 
Age .07 .02 .24 3.15 .002 
Perceived Competence -.21 .15 -.15 -1.39 .167 
   Perceived Morality .35 .16 .23 2.18 .031 
   Manipulated Uncertainty -.01 .19 -.00 -.03 .977 
Morality x Uncertainty Interaction .47 .32 .15 1.45 .150 
Competence x Uncertainty Interaction -.42 .30 -.15 -1.39 .166 
Note: 
1R = .40, adj R² = .15. F(2,153) = 14.87, p <.001). 
2R = .44, adj R² = .16. F(5, 150) = 7.06, p <.001). 
3R = .45, adj R² = .17. F(7, 148) = 5.40, p <.001). 
 
 
 
The same analysis performed on travel intentions (summarised in Table 3.9, 
below), was also significant, F = 2.66 (7, 148), p = .013). Although there were no 
main effects of perceived morality (β = .19, p = .096) and manipulated uncertainty (
β = .03, p = .752), at the final Step of the model, there was a significant interaction 
between Perceived Morality x Manipulated Uncertainty (β = .29, p = .011). There 
was also a significant interaction between Perceived Competence x Manipulated 
Uncertainty (β = -.24, p = .031).  
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Table 3.9. Regression analysis predicting travel intentions 
Step/Predictor B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
1. (Constant) 2.43 .71  3.41 .001 
Gender .35 .23 .12 1.53 .129 
Age .07 .03 .19 2.453 .015 
      
2. (Constant) 2.47 .72  3.46 .001 
Gender .34 .23 .12 1.48 .142 
Age .07 .03 .19 2.38 .019 
Perceived Competence -.22 .19 -.13 -1.18 .238 
    Perceived Morality .34 .19 .20 1.75 .082 
    Manipulated Uncertainty .08 .23 .03 .36 .718 
      
3. (Constant) 2.38 .70  3.37 .001 
Gender .31 .23 .11 1.31 .191 
Age .08 .03 .21 2.69 .008 
Perceived Competence -.26 .18 -.16 -1.39 .166 
   Perceived Morality .32 .19 .19 1.68 .096 
   Manipulated Uncertainty .07 .23 .03 .32 .752 
Morality x Uncertainty Interaction -1.00 .39 -.29 -2.57 .011 
Competence x Uncertainty Interaction -.79 .37 -.24 -2.17 .031 
Note: 
1R = .23, adj R² = .04. F(2,153) = 4.12, p = .018) 
2R = .27, adj R² = .04. F(2, 150) = 2.27, p = .050) 
3R = .34, adj R² = .07. F(7, 148) = 2.66, p = .013) 
 
 
 
The significant interactions were decomposed by simple slope analysis (Aiken 
& West, 1991). The Perceived Morality x Manipulated Uncertainty interaction was 
driven by a significant effect of perceived morality under conditions of high 
uncertainty, t = 2.26, p = .025, but not low uncertainty, t = .33, p = .740. As graphed 
in Figure 3.3, travel intentions increase with increased perceptions of morality, this 
effect being amplified under high uncertainty. This pattern is consistent with what 
was observed experimentally in the previous study: under conditions of uncertainty, 
perceptions of morality guide audience responses. 
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Figure 3.3. Regression interaction for travel intentions between perceived morality 
and manipulated uncertainty, as indicated by manipulated high and low uncertainty 
subgroups 
 
The interactive effect involving competence and uncertainty was also driven 
by a marginal effect of perceived competence under conditions of high uncertainty, t 
= 1.81, p = .072, but not low uncertainty, t = -.75, p = .453. However, as the plotted 
graph below, Figure 3.4, shows, pro-environmental travel intentions decreased with 
higher levels of perceived communicator competence. This negative effect on travel 
behaviour intentions is slightly stronger under conditions of high uncertainty 
compared to lower uncertainty. 
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Figure 3.4. Regression interaction for travel intentions between perceptions of 
communicator competence and uncertainty, as indicated by manipulated high and low 
uncertainty subgroups 
 
Summary of supplementary analysis. When concerning perceptions of 
organisational trust, I found that perceived morality and perceived competence 
influenced trust in the organisation. Perceived morality also predicted household 
intentions. Engagement with and perceived understanding of the message was largely 
influenced by how competent the communicator is viewed by the audience. When I 
considered travel intentions, perceived morality interacted with the level of 
uncertainty: when perceived morality was low, whether uncertainty was low or high, 
perceived morality does not differ the predictive power of on travel intentions. When 
perceived morality was high, however, the predictive power was stronger under 
manipulated high uncertainty comparative to manipulated low uncertainty. The results 
also showed an interaction between perceived competence and manipulated 
uncertainty on travel intentions: with perceptions of high competence resulting in 
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similar predictive powers regardless of uncertainty condition. When perceived 
competence was low and manipulated uncertainty was high, however, the predictive 
power on travel intentions increased. 
Discussion 
Although the aim of this study was to replicate and extend the previous 
findings, the key manipulation of communication style appears to have failed. In 
contrast to both the Pilot Study and Experiment 1, there was no effect of an open 
communication style in enhancing perceptions of communicator morality. Since the 
reasoning is based on this effect, it is difficult to interpret any results of this 
experiment, especially those that involve the language manipulation. As the results 
showed, however, there were no effects of this manipulation on the dependent 
measures, either alone or in interaction with uncertainty. Despite this, supplementary 
analyses in which measured organisational perceptions were substituted for the 
language manipulation did reveal interesting patterns that were mostly consistent with 
Experiment 1 and expectations. Namely, in these supplementary analyses morality 
predicted trust in the organisation (alongside perceptions of competence) and there 
was an interaction between perceived morality and uncertainty on travel intentions: 
under conditions of high uncertainty, morality (more than competence) seemed to 
matter when individuals were making decisions about how to behave in response to 
the message.  
However, it should be noted that there was no similar effect of perceived 
morality and manipulated high uncertainty leading to higher engagement as per 
Experiment 1. This study, instead, found that perceived competence played an 
important role in shaping individuals’ engagement with the climate change 
information presented. One can speculate why the interaction between morality and 
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uncertainty was not also significant on engagement with the climate change message 
in this study. Perhaps, in adjusting the study and presenting both manipulations 
simultaneously, the influence of language manipulation was lost. There were also 
some interactions between perceived competence and uncertainty on travel behaviour. 
Here, unexpectedly, higher perceptions of communicator competence resulted in 
reduced behavioural intentions, a stronger relationship when under conditions of high 
uncertainty comparative to low uncertainty. In line with the finding from Experiment 
1, this is particularly the case under conditions of high uncertainty.  
Furthermore, circumstances surrounding survey administration itself may also 
have an impact on receptiveness to the questionnaire and responses contained within. 
The time of year and setting when completing the survey was different in experiments 
one and two; the first being an in-class experiment, the second being on campus 
during exam time in May. Or it could be that establishing trust (e.g., by language use) 
is a prerequisite before communicating information containing uncertainty. 
Though I have not been able to replicate the findings on all manipulations as 
per the earlier studies, the results of this present study partially support the previous 
work in this PhD research, and I have managed to replicate the earlier findings 
conceptually. Specifically, as seen in Experiment 1, high uncertainty and high 
morality conditions leads to increased pro-environmental behavioural intentions – 
though travel in this case, rather than household as seen in Experiment 1. There was 
also a negative role of perceived competence on travel intentions, something not 
shown earlier. 
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Experiment 3 
The experimental work that has so far been reported in this chapter was 
inspired by the first two themes that emerged from the initial qualitative work 
undertaken with scientists and professional science communicators. This qualitative 
work revealed three important overarching themes that were differentially associated 
with the two groups of participants. The first theme concerned the importance of 
communication as a process – that is a process within which communicators reach 
out, connect to, and engage with audiences through building relationships with them. 
Central to this process was the strategic use of language – often termed ‘tone of voice’ 
– to cultivate a warm, approachable and inclusive atmosphere around the 
communication of scientific information. Understandably, attending to the processes 
of communication was a key concern for the professional communicators interviewed. 
The second theme centred on the uncertainties inherent in climate science, including 
what is and is not known about climate change and the various scenarios that might 
reasonably be expected on that basis. Here the focus was on fully and accurately 
communicating uncertainties when presenting climate change information to 
audiences. Understandably, the importance of accurate information and the 
communication of uncertainties was a key concern for the climate scientists 
interviewed.  
In transitioning to the experimental work, each of these themes became the 
basis of the two key manipulations that have been employed. The theme of 
communication processes and how these might aid audience engagement was 
represented in the manipulation of language – that is, whether information was 
presented using an open and inclusive language (relying on words like “we” and “us”) 
versus a distant and closed language (relying on corporate language and referring to 
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the organisation as an entity). The theme of information and uncertainties was 
represented in the uncertainty manipulation – that is the degree to which climate 
projections were accompanied by lower versus higher levels of uncertainty. In the 
previous studies, I explored how these two factors combine to influence audience 
responses. The general picture to emerge is that both elements are important: although 
increasing uncertainty can erode audience engagement, the use of open language 
seems able to maintain, or even elevate engagement under high uncertainty.  
 So with these qualitative insights adapted for experimental manipulations, I 
have indeed some interesting findings, yet some further ambiguity – particularly with 
the Experiment 2, in its lack of manipulation and lack of interaction between 
(perceived) morality and high uncertainty. Such ambiguity may originate from the 
slight change in methodology (i.e., presentation of manipulations together, 
environmental conditions), or the mixed results may point to alternative explanations 
within the conceptual framework than previously seen. 
For the next, and final, experimental study presented in this chapter, I wanted 
to extend the work by incorporating the third significant theme that emerged from the 
qualitative investigation. This theme revolved around the (conflicting) roles of 
scientists as informers versus advisors of the public. More specifically, during the 
interviews scientists expressed concerns about the provision of guidance and advice 
on how publics might change their behaviour in response to the scientific information 
they provide. The provision of behavioural advice was something that scientists saw 
as being ‘not our role’. Instead, they felt more comfortable focussing on climate 
projections and leaving it up to publics and policy makers to themselves make 
judgements about how best to respond to this information. One reason cited for this 
was that the provision of advice might erode public trust by undermining the 
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perception of climate scientists as independent and neutral actors. However, 
embedded within this theme was also evidence of a conflict between the personal and 
professional goals of scientists (i.e., to be neutral and independent) and expectation 
that publics nonetheless should respond behaviourally to the information they present, 
even if they do not provide them with specific guidance over what the best response 
might be. In light of these concerns, I became interested in the further role that 
providing behavioural advice (versus not providing this) might play in shaping public 
responses alongside the interactive effects of language and uncertainty observed in the 
previous studies. 
Past research in health psychology has established that the notion of 
behavioural advice is important for message acceptance (Taylor, 2011). For instance, 
behavioural recommendations, as suggested in line with the Protection Motivation 
Theory, helps people avoid negative behaviours by increasing preventative behaviour: 
as well as perceived severity of and likelihood of harm; self- efficacy (i.e., personal 
goal attainment) and response efficacy (effectiveness of promoted behaviour) are 
suggested factors from the PMT which enable us to protect ourselves (Bandura, 1977, 
Rogers 1983). More specifically, response efficacy can potentially be achieved with 
provision of information that aims to increase beliefs about the effectiveness of the 
recommended behaviour. This is particularly prominent when in the context of 
creating fear (i.e., fear appeals), and the advised action will avert threat (Bandura, 
1977). High-fear appeals and high-efficacy messages have been shown to produce the 
greatest behaviour change (Witte & Allen, 2000).  
In the context of climate change, however, fear appeals may lead to denial, as 
a mechanism to manage the negative feelings of fear rather than attend to the potential 
threat (Moser, 2007; Swim et al, 2009; CRED, 2009; Feinberg & Willer, 2011). 
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Audiences may also reject fear-invoking appeals, viewing them as manipulative or 
underhand (Moser 2007; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009), and as a result are likely 
to undermine public engagement with climate change (e.g., Whitmarsh, 2011; O’Neill 
& Nicholson-Cole, 2009). For example, fear appeals may lead audiences to become 
desensitized to the message, or the other extreme of denial in order to cope with the 
risks posed by such a changing climate (O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009).  
 In addition to this, reflecting upon the views of scientists during the interviews 
(Chapter 2), there was the perception that provision of advice is not part of their role 
as a scientist. The provision of advice was seen to have potential negative effects of 
perceptions of competence and trustworthiness as a scientist. 
Despite the potential negative consequences of the provision of behavioural 
advice, it is plausible to argue there could be a potential (positive/neutral) role in 
climate change communication. Previous literature highlights the importance of trust 
and relationship building in risk communication (e.g., Kasperson, Golding, & Tuler, 
1992; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). Providing behavioural advice is, however, a 
different sort of information – which may help facilitate audience responses (such as 
efficacy). 
In taking the approach that communication is a relational process, arguably 
presenting information about climate change (i.e., risks and impacts) without 
informing what to do as a response could be viewed as a harmful to the 
communication process. Thus, one could postulate that accompanying impacts 
information with behavioural advice may be beneficial to the communication process. 
Goodwin and Dahlstrom (2011) talk about the importance of commitment towards an 
on-going relationship. So from this perspective, the provision of information with 
advice could be seen as part of the relationship building. This may be more beneficial 
 142 
than presenting advice for the sake of it, as well as providing information without 
advice. This could be related to aspects of trust previously documented. For example, 
viewing someone as trustworthy has been linked to viewing them as reliable and 
consistent in actions. McGregor (1967) proposes, “inconsistencies between words and 
actions decrease trust” (p.164). Not completing the communication relationship may 
be seen as inconsistent, and therefore be detrimental to the communication process 
Thus, with this in mind, it may indeed be that advice provision may be 
beneficial to message transmission and not necessarily have negative consequences 
on perceptions of communicator competence. Furthering this position, providing 
advice on a topic can increase its relevance to the audience especially in the case of 
climate change which is already perceived as irrelevant by many. de Vries, Terwel 
and Ellemers (2014) explored the relative persuasiveness of communications that only 
contain highly relevant information or combine highly relevant with irrelevant or 
moderately relevant information. Arguably, the science of climate change is irrelevant 
for many people but the actions required here and now are highly relevant. In the 
context of support for carbon dioxide capture and storage technology, highly relevant 
information for the argument that the implementation of carbon capture and storage 
would have important climate benefits. de Vries et al (2014)  showed that adding 
irrelevant information dilutes the impact of highly relevant information resulting in 
weakening people’s beliefs about the issue. 
Beyond this, the simple premise of advice provision is that the information, 
which it contains, reduces cognitive effort for recipients, especially when decisions 
are made under conditions of high uncertainty. Consequently, though the invoking of 
fear can prompt people into taking account behavioural recommendations, it is not 
necessarily a prerequisite to increasing response efficacy through information. Given 
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this, the advice presented in this experiment is emotionally neutral, avoiding the 
invoking of fear.  
The behavioural advice presented to respondents in this experiment aimed to 
be clear and simple actions that can help mitigate the effects of climate change. The 
advice was intended to be relevant in everyday life. The efficacy measures that 
followed this manipulation do not specifically refer to the advice provided; but was a 
broader efficacy measure in response to the present/ absent of neutral information. 
Whilst I acknowledge self and response efficacy have specific meanings (i.e., self 
versus action expectancies) I wanted to look at the bigger picture of the effects of 
advice provision versus information lacking advice.  
From a medical practice perspective, clear and concise recommendations 
increase the likelihood of information being understood and remembered (Ley, 1983; 
Ley 1998), and more precise behaviours are likely to be carried out (Michie & 
Johnston, 2004). This approach has been advocated in the context of climate change 
recommendations. Gardener and Stern (2008) state, “The public needs more direct 
and coherent advice concerning household and individual actions” (p.15). 
In the previous studies included in this programme of research, probabilistic 
information concerning the consequences of climate change has been presented 
without any advice on what individuals could personally do to respond to these 
climate projections. Despite the lack of specific advice, results have indicated that 
people are willing to respond behaviourally, especially under conditions of high 
uncertainty, at least given certain conditions – namely, under a high trust relationship 
associated with the use of open and inclusive language. Having observed this apparent 
willingness to engage, a remaining question is how this willingness is affected by the 
actual provision of advice. Drawing on the above-mentioned perspectives, it seems 
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that the provision of advice should strengthen beliefs about how their own behaviour 
would help mitigate climate change, and increase engagement with the climate 
change messages, even those that are associated with high uncertainty.  
However, in light of the concerns expressed by scientists, I was also interested 
in how the provision of advice might shape public trust in scientists and whether there 
was a potential for this to be undermined if scientists were seen to “have an agenda”. 
To explore these issues, I added an advice manipulation to the previously established 
paradigm, resulting in a 2 (language: open, closed) x2 (uncertainty: low, high) x2 
(advice: present, absent) experimental design. As in the previous studies, measures of 
message engagement and behavioural intentions were key dependent measures. To 
test whether behavioural advice facilitated increased feelings of efficacy, I included 
some additional measures (e.g., “I believe I can do something about climate change”). 
I also wanted to explore whether the provision (or not) of behavioural advice 
influences perceptions of communicator competence and morality, so I included 
person perception measures both before and after the behavioural advice 
manipulation. 
 
Expectations for this study are summarised below: 
1. Providing pro-environmental behavioural advice will have no negative 
effect on perceptions of communicator competence and/or morality 
i.e., the provision of advice will not reduce perceptions of 
competence/morality compared to when advice is absent; 
2. There will be a main effect of provision of behavioural advice; its 
presence will increase efficacy and behavioural intentions compared to 
its absence; 
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3. Irrespective of advice, people will respond more positively to 
messages contained in high uncertainty when open rather than closed 
language. 
Method 
Participants and descriptives 
Participants were recruited using a company that specialises in online surveys. 
They use an online loyalty scheme points, enabling respondents to collect points that 
can later be exchanged for products. This survey took approximately 20 minutes to 
complete. The questionnaire as used in this experimental study can be found in 
Appendix 3.4. Four hundred and twenty-one participants took part in this online 
study, 221 of which were male, 191 female and 9 respondents did not disclose their 
gender. The mean age this sample was 45.50 years old (SD = 17.94). 
All participants were provided with a weblink, which randomly directed 
respondents to one of the eight possible versions of the survey that represented 2 
(language: open, closed) x 2 (uncertainty: high, low) x 2 (advice: present, absent) 
between-subjects experimental design. The table below (Table 3.10) summarises the 
distribution of participants across these conditions. 
 
Table 3.10. Descriptive summary of participants within each condition 
             Advice  
       Present      Absent  
 Uncertainty 
Language Low High Low High Total 
Open 52 43 64 68 227 
Closed 41 47 55 51 194 
Total 93 90 119 119 421 
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Procedure and measures 
Consistent with the earlier experimental studies within this PhD programme of 
research, participants were told that the questionnaire presented to them was part of a 
research exercise for a (fictitious) scientific organisation, the Linford Centre. As 
before, this questionnaire contained screen-shots from the Linford Centre’s website 
followed by a series of questions designed to elicit the respondent’s impressions of 
this organisation and their views on climate change more generally. The three 
manipulations contained within each screenshot and measures following each 
manipulation are described below. 
 
Language manipulation and subsequent measures 
The questionnaire started with general information about the study and 
obtained the respondent’s consent to participate in the study. Following this, the 
survey started with a screen-shot from the homepage of a (fictitious) climate research 
organisation (the Linford Centre), which described the organisation and what they do. 
As in previous studies, language was manipulated by varying the wording on this 
homepage—specifically whether the organisation referred to itself using words like 
“us”, “we” and “our” (an open style) versus referring to itself in a corporate and 
impersonal way (e.g., “the Linford Centre”; a closed style).  
To ensure that people actively reflected on the organisation and the 
information around it, the survey asked participants whether they had heard of the 
Linford Centre (Yes/No/Maybe) and to write a small description of what the group 
does. Following this, participants were asked to rate the degree to which they 
perceived the organisation as possessing each of seven traits that included the 
dimensions of competence and morality. Items assessing competence were competent, 
 147 
professional, capable (α = .91), and the items assessing morality were moral, 
truthful, dishonest (reversed), sincere (α = .83). Ratings were given on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely. Although previous studies had also 
included traits that reflected the dimension of warmth, this was dropped from the 
present study given the lack of previous effects involving these measures.  
 
Uncertainty manipulations and following measures 
Following the webpage introducing the organisation, and the associated trait 
ratings, participants were presented with a second screenshot summarising the key 
findings of future impacts of climate change based on the organisation’s research. As 
in the earlier two experiments this is where the level of uncertainty was manipulated. 
Briefly, the page summarised climate projections based on the Linford Centre’s 
research, projections that were either accompanied by precise probabilities (e.g., 
“based on current rates of CO2 emissions [there is an] 80% chance that climate 
change will make a quarter of all species extinct”; the low uncertainty condition) 
versus a range of possibilities (e.g., “based on current rates of CO2 emissions [there is 
a] 70-90% chance that climate change will make a quarter of all species extinct”; the 
high uncertainty condition). The language manipulation introduced in the previous 
page was continued when presenting this information also.  
Following exposure to this second webpage, participants were presented with 
a series of opinion statements and asked to rate their agreement with each of these 
statements on a single 7-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree. These opinion statements explored the key dependent measures of 
understanding of and engagement with the message and trust in the source. The scale 
items and reliability scores are as follows: 
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Engagement with the message was measured with two items: “I found the 
summary engaging”; “I tuned out while reading about this organisation’s research 
(reversed)” (r = .41, p < .001). 
 Perceived understanding of the message was measured with two items:  “I 
understand the meaning of the Linford Centre’s research” and “I do not understand 
what this research is supposed to mean”. After reverse scoring the latter, these two 
items were averaged to create a single variable (r = .50, p < .001). 
Trust in the Linford Centre was measured by two items: “Based on their 
research, the Linford Centre seems to be a trustworthy source of information about 
climate change” and “Based on what I have read, I would find it hard to trust the 
Linford Centre as a source of information about climate change” (r = .50, p < .001). 
 
Advice manipulations and following measures 
Following the language and advice manipulations, which correspond to 
previous studies, a final screenshot was presented that contained the advice 
manipulation. In the advice present condition, the Linford Centre conveyed the 
message that they see it as part of their role to provide behavioural advice on 
responses to climate change (i.e., “We are committed to providing information on 
how to act as a response to climate change”) and then listed simple behaviours to 
mitigate against climate change was presented (e.g., “Cycle more”, “Reduce, reuse 
and recycle”). The advice absent condition conveyed the message that it was not part 
of their role to provide advice on responses to climate change and indicated where 
such information could be found (i.e., “We do not believe we should provide advice 
on how to respond to climate change. Below is a list of organisations and web links 
you can go to for information on how you can help avoid dangerous climate change”). 
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Again, the language peripheral to the content remained consistent with the language 
condition. 
Following exposure to this webpage, I again measured perceptions of the 
communicator competence and morality to see if the provision versus absence of 
advice altered initial perceptions. I also measured general attitudes towards climate 
change; beliefs about the (human) causes of climate change, perceived consequences 
of climate change, perceptions of climate change risk, efficacy and behavioural 
intentions. The scale items and reliability scores for each of these measures are as 
follows: 
Global climate change belief and personal risk perception. As in Experiments 
1 and 2, a factor analysis suggested one factor explaining 59.19% of the variance with 
the various belief items.
13
 The remaining items that did not load on this factor were 
the personal risk items, which loaded on a separate factor explaining 10.92% of the 
variance. Given this, the belief items were collapsed into a single index of global 
climate change belief (Cronbach’s α = .91) and the personal risk items were 
collapsed into a separate index (“I feel personally at risk from the consequences of 
climate change”; “I personally worry about climate change and how it will affect me”; 
and “For me, climate change is nothing that I am personally concerned about” 
[reversed]; α = .77).  
Efficacy. This was measured with four items; “I feel there is something I can 
personally do to act against climate change”, “I feel it is in my power to tackle climate 
                                                        
13 “In my opinion climate change is happening”, “In my opinion climate change is man-made”, “Human beings are 
responsible for climate change”, “Climate change is a natural process rather than something caused by human 
activity (reversed)”, “Climate change is something that I personally believe in”, “I remain somewhat sceptical 
about climate change and if it is real” (reversed), “I believe there is global risk of the consequences of climate 
change”, “I think there will be bad consequences of climate change for the planet”, “I believe that the global 
consequences of climate change will be severe”. 
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change”, “I believe my actions have an influence on climate change”, and “I feel there 
is nothing I can do about climate change” (reversed; α = .88). 
Individual intentions. A set of questions, identical to those used in the earlier 
experiments, assessed how willing participants would be to engage in a variety of 
actions in response to climate change  (1 = not at all willing to 7 = very willing), 
including household behaviours
14
 (α = .85) and travel intentions15 (α = .82). 
Organisation impressions. Participants were again presented with a list of 
traits and asked to rate how they perceived the organisations with respect to those 
traits (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). The list contained a mixture of competence- and 
morality- related words. The competence-related words used in this second 
measurement were able, skilled, incompetent (reversed; α = .77) and perceptions of 
morality were assed with the words honest, trustworthy and immoral (reversed; α = 
.73).  Organisational perceptions were measured differently here than earlier in the 
questionnaire to avoid repetition in the survey and repetition effects. 
 Demographics. Finally, I gathered demographic information such as gender, 
age, science training, and provided a space at the end for further comments. Here 
respondents were provided with a web link to receive their company reward points. 
Following this, participants were provided with information explaining the purpose of 
the research; the effects of the language and uncertainty manipulations from the 
earlier experiments; and they were informed of the additional experimental condition 
(advice provision) in the current survey. Participants were also provided with contact 
details for further information. This gave the participant the option to find out more 
information regarding the study deception and other aspects of the study if they 
wished. 
                                                        
14   Items: “Reduce my household energy use”, “Recycle (more)”, “Use less water”, and “Reduce, reuse, recycle”. 
15  Items: “Walk (more) instead of using the car”, “Cycle (more) instead of using the car”, “Use a car less”, Use 
public transport (more) instead of the car”, and “Limit unnecessary air travel”. 
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Table 3.11. Means, SDs, Correlations and Cronbach’s alpha for variables in Experiment 3  
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Competent Time1 5.28 4.78 (.91)            
2. Competent Time2 5.14 1.26 .21** (.77)           
3. Morality Time1 5.12 1.23 .87** .74** (.83)          
4. Morality Time2 5.17 1.22 .19** .86** .76** (.73)         
5. Engagement 4.48 1.38 .22** .63** .62** .58** (.58)        
6. Understanding  4.96 1.30 .08 .43** .40** .45** .46** (.65)       
7. Trust 4.60 1.42 .22** .67** .66** .66** .64** .44** (.67)      
8. Global belief 4.72 1.30 .17** .45** .49** .43** .53** .40** .48** (.91)     
9. Personal risks 4.05 1.38 .10* .38** .40** .36** .44** .22** .39** .72** (.77)    
10. Efficacy 4.44 1.45 .14** .50** .50** .50** .49** .29** .41** .57** .62** (.88)   
11. Household Int. 5.16 1.28 .07 .41** .44** .43** .36** .29** .28** .45** .45** .55** (.85)  
12. Travel intentions  4.68 1.43 -.01 .31** .33** .33** .32** .20** .22** .44** .45** .48** .66** (.82) 
Note:  N = 421 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level, *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) are on the diagonal.
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Results 
Demographic checks 
The descriptive statistics, correlations and Cronbach’s alpha for all variables 
can be found in Table 3.8. Consistent with the previous work in this PhD, women (M 
= 5.37, SD = 1.00) perceived the organisation as more moral than men (M = 4.93, SD 
= 1.24), t(410)=-3.93, p < .001. Similarly, women perceived the organisation as more 
competent (M = 5.48, SD = 2.00) than men (M = 4.87, SD = 1.31), t(410)=-3.70, p < 
.001; were more engaged with the message than men were (Ms = 4.62 & 4.33, SDs = 
1.32 & 1.43, t(410)=-2.08, p = .038); trusted the Linford centre more than men (Ms = 
4.94 & 4.28, SDs = 1.25 & 1.53, t(410)=-4.80, p < .001); and were more inclined than 
men to believe in anthropogenic climate change (Ms = 4.58 & 4.21, SDs = 1.36 & 
1.60, t(410)=-2.56, p = .01). There were also positive associations between age and 
reported understanding of the message communicated, r = .11, p = .022, and between 
age and household intentions, r = .11, p = .025, however age was negatively 
correlated with belief in the anthropogenic causes of climate change, r = -.10, p = 
.048. Due to these associations with key processes or dependent variables, age and 
gender were included as covariates in all analyses.  
Education, income and occupation had no such effects. For example, there 
were no effects of education on perceptions of communicator competence or morality 
Fs <  1.55, ps > .174. Similarly, education had no effects on engagement, 
understanding or trust, Fs <  1.45, ps > .205; or global beliefs, response efficacy, 
belief or household and travel behaviour, Fs <  1.40, ps > .225. There were similarly 
no effect of occupation on communicator perceptions, Fs <  1.33, ps > .217, 
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engagement and understanding, Fs <  1.03, ps > .418, or behaviour, Fs <  .25, ps > 
.987. The patterns were similar with respect to income, Fs <  1.46, ps > .190. 
 
Primary analysis 
As with the earlier experiments, to address the hypotheses I tested the main 
and interactive effects of the three manipulated variables on the outcome measures via 
a series of 2 (language: open, closed) x 2 (uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (advice: present, 
absent) analyses of variance. Although certain dependent variables were measured 
before all independent variables had been manipulated, I nonetheless analysed all data 
in this way in order to check for any spurious effects.  
 Organisation impressions. Organisational impressions were assessed both 
immediately after the first language manipulation and then again after the advice 
manipulation. To test how language shaped organisational impressions across time 
(i.e., before and after the advice manipulation), and to explore whether uncertainty 
and the provision of pro-environmental behavioural advice changes these 
impressions, I conducted mixed between-within ANOVA.  
The 2 (language: open, closed) x 2 (uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (advice: 
present, absent) x 2 (time: 1, 2) mixed ANOVA (controlling for age and gender) on 
competence revealed no main effect of time, F(1, 400) = .089, p = .766, and no 
significant main or interactive effects of the manipulations, Fs <  1.80, ps > .181. 
Thus perceptions of competence were not shaped by the manipulations and were 
relatively stable across time. The same analysis on morality revealed no main effect 
of time, F(1, 400) = .380, p = .538, and no main or interactive effects of the variables, 
Fs <  2.90, ps > .089. 
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Engagement with and perceived understanding of the message. The analysis 
on engagement with the message (which was measured before the advice 
manipulation) confirmed the absence of any spurious main or interactive effects of 
advice, all Fs < 3.06, ps > .08. Contrary to expectations, however, there were also no 
main effects of language, F(1, 411) = 2.52, p = .113, or uncertainty, F(1, 411) = .00, p 
= .999, and no interaction between these variables, F(1, 411) = 1.08, p = .299. The 
analysis of perceived message understanding similarly showed no main or interactive 
effects of advice, Fs < 1, but also no main effects of language, F(1, 411) = .051, p = 
.822, or uncertainty, F(1, 411) = .296, p = .587, and no interaction between these 
variables, F(1, 411) = .917, p = .339.  
Linford Centre trust. Levels of trust in the organisation were also measured 
after the language and uncertainty manipulations but before the advice manipulation. 
The 2 (language: open, closed) x 2 (uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (advice: present, 
absent) analysis of variance on trust confirmed the absence of any main or interactive 
effects of advice, Fs < 1, but also revealed no main effects of language, F(1, 410) = 
2.44, p = .119, uncertainty, F(1, 410) = .237, p = .627, and no interaction between 
these variables, F(1, 410) = 1.24, p = .266.   
All remaining variables were measured after the advice manipulation and 
could, therefore, potentially be influenced by this. However, across all these variables 
there was little evidence for any effects of these manipulations, as detailed below: 
Global climate change belief. The analysis on belief in global climate change 
revealed no main effects of language, uncertainty, or advice, all Fs < 1.07, ps>.302, 
and no interactions involving these variables, Fs <  2.05, ps > .15.  
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Personal risk perception. The analysis on personal risk perceptions showed no 
main effects of language, uncertainty, or advice, all Fs < .214, ps>.644, and no 
significant interactions involving these variables, Fs <  2.74, ps > .10. 
Efficacy. The analysis of response efficacy show no main effects of language, 
uncertainty, or advice, all Fs < 1.82, ps>.177, and no significant interactions 
involving these variables, Fs <  3.29, ps > .073. 
Behaviour. The analysis of general intentions revealed no main effects of 
language, uncertainty, or advice, all Fs < .407, ps>.524 and no significant interactions 
involving these variables, Fs <  1.91, ps > .168. Identical patterns were observed 
when travel intentions (all ps > .28) and household intentions (all ps > .148) were 
considered separately. 
 
Secondary analyses 
The primary analyses reported above revealed no main or interactive effects of 
any of the variables, and as such provide no straightforward support for the 
hypotheses. Although the overall picture did not conform to expectations, it was 
possible that the predicted effects might be shaped further by features of the 
respondents – for example, their demographic characteristics. Indeed, the previous 
studies were conducted mostly on young, higher educated, and female participants. It 
is therefore plausible that the evidence obtained from these studies is, in fact, limited 
to populations defined by those features. The large and diverse sample recruited for 
this study allowed me to test that possibility by including demographic factors as 
moderators of the predicted effects, rather than simply controlling for the effects of 
these, as was done in the primary analyses, for example. To begin this exploration, I 
initially focussed on gender as a possible moderator of the experimental effects. 
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Given the correlation between gender and science training, I controlled for science 
training in all gender analyses. I also separately tested the possible role of science 
training as a moderator of the experimental effects, given the intuitive relevance of 
this for science training. Again, in these analyses I controlled for any effects of 
gender.  
 
Gender effects 
Organisation perceptions. The previous mixed analyses of variance on 
organisational perceptions were repeated with gender as an additional variable. In the 
analysis of perceived competence, there were no significant main effects or 
interactions of time with the manipulations, Fs <  2.78, ps > .096. 
When examining perceptions of communicator morality, there was a 
significant time x gender x language x uncertainty x advice interaction, F(1, 380) = 
3.87, p = .050. However, as this interaction as driven by effects at Time 1, F(1, 380) = 
6.25, p = .013, rather than at Time 2, F(1, 380) = 3.81, p = .052, and that advice was 
only manipulated prior to the Time 2 assessment, it is difficult to interpret this 
interaction and these effects are likely to be spurious. There were no significant main 
effects or interactions of time with the manipulations, Fs <  2.17, ps > .148. 
Engagement with the message and understanding of the message. Including 
gender in the analysis of engagement revealed a main effect of this variable, F(1, 410) 
= 4.53, p = .034, as well as a significant Gender x Uncertainty interaction, F(1, 400) = 
3.87, p = .050, which was further qualified by a significant Gender x Language x 
Uncertainty, F(1, 411) = 3.80, p = .052. Probing of this three-way interaction revealed 
that it was driven by a significant Gender x Language interaction under conditions of 
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high uncertainty, F(1, 204) = 4.79, p = .030, but not low uncertainty, F(1, 208) = .07, 
p = .800.  
Under high uncertainty, men reported more engagement in response to closed 
(M = 4.57, SD = 1.40) rather than open language (M = 3.89, SD = 1.43), F(1, 200) = 
7.03, p = .009. Under high uncertainty, however, women reported no difference in 
engagement levels in response to open (M = 4.84, SD = 1.26) and closed language (M 
= 3.71, SD = 1.19), F(1, 200) = .234, p = .629. 
Looked at differently, under high uncertainty, women (M = 4.84, SD = 1.26) 
responded more positively to open language than men (M = 3.89, SD = 1.43), F(1, 
200) = 12.70, p = < .000. Men and women did not, however, differ in response to 
closed language under the same conditions (Men M = 4.57, SD = 1.40; Women M = 
4.71, SD = 1.19), F(1, 200) = .25, p = .621. In addition, although there was no 
significant difference in levels of engagement for women in response to open 
language under high (M = 4.84, SD = 1.26) versus low uncertainty (M = 4.38, SD = 
1.51), F(1, 187) = 3.08, p = .081, men responded better to open language under low 
uncertainty (M = 4.43, SD = 1.37) than under high uncertainty, (M = 3.89, SD = 1.43), 
F(1, 217) = 4.56, p = .034. Further, responses to closed language did not differ as a 
function of uncertainty for either men or women Fs <  .38, ps > .539. As such, the 
total pattern is such that whether participants responded to open language under high 
uncertainty constructively or destructively dependent on whether they were female 
versus male respectively. These interactions are shown in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5. The interaction of gender, language and uncertainty on reported 
engagement with the message 
 
The analysis of perceived understanding of the message revealed no main 
effects of language, F(1, 400) = .04, p = .84, uncertainty, F(1, 400) = .35, p = .555, 
advice, F(1, 400) = .032, p = .857, or gender, F(1, 400) = 2.37, p = .124. There was a 
significant main effect of age, F(1, 400) = 7.79, p = .006, and a marginal main effect 
of science training, F(1, 400) = 3.44, p = .064. Although there was a significant two-
way interaction between Gender x Advice, F(1, 400) = 3.80, p = .052, it should be 
noted, that this variable was measured before the advice manipulation and therefore 
this result likely to be spurious. Beyond this there was also a significant Gender x 
Uncertainty interaction, F(1, 400) = 4.97, p = .026, see Figure 3.6, below.  
Probing of this Gender x Uncertainty interaction revealed that women (M = 
5.20, SD = 1.22) reported higher understanding than men (M = 4.81, SD = 1.37) under 
conditions of high uncertainty, F(1, 408) = 4.63, p = .032. When uncertainty was low, 
female (M = 4.85, SD = 1.31) and male (M = 4.98, SD = 1.30) reported similar levels 
of understanding, F(1, 408) = .46, p = .497. Contrary to what might be expected on 
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the basis of the above, this pattern was not further moderated by language
16
, and there 
were no further significant two or three-way interactions involving these variables, Fs 
<  2.34, ps > .11. 
 
Figure 3.6. The interaction of uncertainty and gender on perceived understanding of 
the message 
 
Linford Centre trust. With the inclusion of gender in the analysis, there were 
no main effects of uncertainty or advice, Fs <  .296, ps > .587, although the effect of 
language did become marginal, F(1, 399) = 3.24, p = .072. There was a significant 
main effect of science training, F(1, 411) = 3.84, p = .051, and gender, F(1, 399) = 
15.42, p < .001. Females reported higher trust in the Linford Centre (M = 4.96, SD = 
1.26) compared to males (M = 4.32, SD = 1.49). The main effect of gender was, 
however qualified by uncertainty and language use; resulting in a significant three-
way interaction, F(1, 399) = 5.71, p = .017. Decomposing this interaction revealed 
                                                        
16 Though not statistically moderate by language, the Gender x Advice interaction was marginally significant in 
the open condition, F(1, 223) = 6.05, p = .015, and not the closed language condition, F(1, 189) = .19, p = .663. 
Simple effects analysis reveal females (M = 5.38, SD = 1.15) reported higher understanding than men (M = 4.78, 
SD = 1.30) under conditions of high uncertainty, F(1, 219) = 6.05, p = .015. Further, females responded better to 
open language when uncertainty was high (M = 5.38, SD = 1.15) comparative to when uncertainty was low (M = 
4.70, SD = 1.35), F(1, 219) = 7.21, p = .008. 
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that this was driven by a significant Gender x Language interaction under high 
uncertainty, F(1, 204) = 5.88, p = .016, but not low uncertainty, F(1, 207) = .18, p = 
.675. Under conditions of high uncertainty, the use of open communication elicited 
higher trust from females (M = 5.25, SD = 1.43) than males, (M = 3.96, SD = 1.25), 
F(1, 200) = 25.56, p < .001. When closed language was used under the same 
conditions, men and women did not differ, F(1, 200) = 1.97, p = .162. See Figure, 3.7 
below. 
Figure 3.7. The interaction of language, uncertainty and gender on reported trust of 
the Linford Centre 
 
 
Looked at differently, it can also be seen that women tended to perceive the 
Linford Centre as more trustworthy in response to open communication when 
conveyed under high uncertainty (M = 5.25, SD = 1.43) than under low uncertainty 
conditions, (M = 4.61, SD = 1.31), F(1, 187) = 6.62, p = .011, whereas uncertainty did 
not affect women’s responses to closed communication, F(1, 187) = 1.51, p = .221.  
There were no further significant two or three-way interactions involving 
these variables, Fs <  2.80, ps > .095. 
Global climate change belief. Including gender, F(1, 400) = 3.49, p = .062, in 
the analysis of beliefs in climate change revealed a marginal Gender x Language x 
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Advice interaction, F(1, 400) = 3.45, p = .064. There were no further significant two 
or three-way interactions involving these variables, Fs <  2.80, ps > .095. 
The Gender x Language x Advice interaction is depicted in Figure 3.8, below. 
This interaction was driven by the Gender x Language interaction when advice was 
present, F(1, 180) = 4.02, p = .046, rather than when this was absent, F(1, 232) = .42, 
p = .519. For men exposed to advice, belief was higher when this advice was 
communicated using a closed language style (M = 4.73, SD = 1.12) rather than an 
open language style (M = 4.19, SD = 1.66), F(1, 176) = 3.76, p = .054. For women 
under the same conditions, belief in climate change was not affected by 
communication style, F(1, 176) = .81, p = .371.  
Looking at this interaction differently, it can also be seen that providing advice 
in combination with an open language significantly reduced men’s belief in climate 
change (M = 4.19, SD = 1.66) relative to women’s (M = 4.96, SD = 1.06), F(1, 176) = 
7.92, p = .005, and in comparison to when advice was not provided (M = 4.80, SD = 
1.28), F(1, 219) = 6.94, p = .012. When male participants were exposed to a closed 
language, the presence or absence of advice did not affect beliefs (Ms = 4.73 & 4.66, 
SDs = 1.12 & 1.51), F(1, 185) = .064, p = .801.  
Figure 3.8. The interaction of language, advice and gender on global climate change 
belief 
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For female participants, the provision or absence of advice had no effect on 
belief, regardless of whether this was combined with open (Ms = 4.97 & 4.81, SDs = 
1.06 & 1.20) or closed language (Ms = 4.71 & 4.88, SDs = 1.36, 1.09), F(1, 219) = 
.342, p = .559, F(1, 185) = .412, p = .522. 
Personal risk perception. Including gender in the analysis of risk perceptions 
also revealed a significant Gender x Language x Advice interaction, F(1, 400) = 7.36, 
p = .007. There were no further main or interactive effects, Fs <  2.55, ps > .111. The 
significant three-way interaction is graphed in Figure 3.9, below. As can be seen, this 
was driven by a significant Gender x Language interaction when advice was present, 
F(1, 180) = 11.30, p = .001, compared to when advice was absent, F(1, 232) = .641, p 
= .424. More specifically, when advice was provided, communicating using an open 
style had a negative effect on personal risk perceptions among males, (M = 3.50, SD = 
1.42) compared to females (M = 4.57, SD = 1.24), F(1, 176) = 14.77, p < .001, and 
compared to when closed communication was used to deliver the same advice, (M = 
4.11, SD = 1.27), F(1, 217) = 3.75, p = .054. Conversely, providing advice with an 
open language increased females’ risk perceptions (M = 4.57, SD = 1.24) compared to 
when advice was given using a closed style (M = 3.83, SD = 1.45), F(1, 176) = 8.02, p 
= .005. When advice was provided using a closed language, men and women did not 
differ, F(1, 176) = .950, p = .331. There were no effects of language among males or 
females when advice was absent, Fs <  .824, ps > .365.  
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Figure 3.9. The interaction of language, advice and gender on perceptions of personal 
risk 
 
As can also be seen, among women, in response to an open language 
providing advice led to a higher personal risk perception (M = 4.57, SD = 1.24) 
compared to when advice was not presented (M = 4.03, SD = 1.17), F(1, 187) = 4.66, 
p = .032. The reverse was apparent among men: using open language whilst providing 
advice led to lower personal risk perception (M = 3.50, SD = 1.42) relative to the 
same language without advice, (M = 4.06, SD = 1.47), F(1, 217) = 4.12, p = .044.  
Efficacy. When gender was included as a variable, the analysis of efficacy 
revealed a significant Language x Uncertainty x Advice interaction, F(1, 399) = 4.18, 
p = .042, and a significant Gender X Language x Advice interaction, F(1, 399) = 3.82, 
p = .052. There were no further main effects Fs < 1.78, ps > .183, or interactions Fs <  
1.58, ps > .209 on this variable 
Further probing of the Language x Uncertainty x Advice interaction revealed 
that this was due to a significant Language x Advice interaction under conditions of 
high uncertainty F(1, 207) = 3.59, p = .060, rather than low uncertainty, F(1, 212) = 
.598, p = .440. When uncertainty was high, and closed language is used, response 
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efficacy increased in the presence of advice (M = 4.74, SD = 1.37) compared to the 
absence of advice, (M = 4.19, SD = 1.45), F(1, 203) = 3.44, p = .065, and in 
comparison to when advice was given using open language, although this was not 
significant (M = 4.25, SD = 1.53), F(1, 203) = 2.48, p = .117 . Under low uncertainty, 
the presentation of advice was equally effective when using both the open (M = 4.64, 
SD = 1.51) and closed language (M = 4.57, SD = 1.33) styles, F(1, 208) = .066, p = 
.797. This pattern is depicted in Figure 3.10, below. 
  
Figure 3.10. The interaction of language, uncertainty and advice on response efficacy 
 
Probing of the significant Gender x Language x Advice interaction (See 
Figure 3.11) revealed that this was due to a significant Language x Gender interaction 
when advice is present, F(1, 180) = 3.91, p = .050, rather than when advice is absent, 
F(1, 231) = .372, p = .543. When respondents were provided with advice using an 
open language, females (M = 4.80, SD = 1.34) felt more efficacious than males (M = 
4.15, SD = 1.63), F(1, 176) = 4.82, p = .030. Males, on the other hand, felt more 
efficacious to the presence of advice when communicated in a closed rather than open 
style (M = 4.76, SD = 1.30), F(1, 176) = 4.02, p = .047. Females, however, did not 
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significantly differ in their level of efficacy in response to advice given as a function 
of language, F(1, 176) = .62, p = .431. 
  
Figure 3.11. The interaction of language, advice and gender on response efficacy 
 
Behaviour. The inclusion of gender in the analysis of household behavioural 
intentions revealed a marginal Gender x Language interaction, F(1, 400) = 3.48, p = 
.063. When open communications styles were employed, females reported higher 
household intentions (M = 5.35, SD = 1.20) compared to males (M = 4.91, SD = 1.35), 
F(1, 408) = 6.37, p = .012. There was also a weak effect among males, F(1, 408) = 
3.23, p = .058, whereby reported household intentions were higher when language is 
closed (M = 5.24, SD = 1.12) rather than open (M = 4.91, SD = 1.35). Female 
household intentions did not vary as a function of language, F(1, 408) = 1.03, p = 
.310. This pattern is depicted in Figure 3.12.  
There were no further main or interactive effects on household intentions, Fs < 
2.37, ps > .125. There were also no main or interactive effects of any of the 
independent variables on travel intentions, Fs < 2.50, ps > .115. 
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Figure 3.12. Language and gender interaction on pro-environmental household 
intentions 
 
Summary of gender effects. The above analyses are complex, but did reveal 
some overarching patterns. Across a variety of measures, men and women seemed to 
diverge in response to the manipulations: women broadly replicated previous results 
from the earlier studies, whereas for men opposing results were observed. While 
women were more receptive to open language under conditions of high uncertainty, 
and with the provision of advice, men seemed to react against open language, 
especially when presented under high uncertainty and/or with advice. These diverging 
responses among men and women explain the absence of effects in the whole sample. 
 
Science training effects 
In addition to the possibility that variations in the gender composition of the 
research samples might explain the divergence between the initial analyses of this 
study and the previously observed effects – something that was substantiated by the 
above analyses – I also considered whether science training might also account for 
some of this variation. My previous studies used scientifically educated, mostly 
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female, samples. This study incorporated a sample that had wider range of scientific 
training. As such I tested whether science training shaped responses to the 
manipulations, controlling for the effect of gender. Level of science training was 
assessed by one of four possible responses: “I have had no science training at all” (n = 
224, 53.2%), “I have had some scientific training through my previous studies” (n = 
114, 27.1%), “I have had quite a lot of scientific training through my previous 
studies” (n = 41, 9.7%), “Most of my previous studies have been in the area of 
science. As such I have had a lot of training” (n = 29, 6.9%). Thirteen people (3.1%) 
did not respond, and were treated as missing. For the purposes of these analyses, 
science training was binary coded; where I retained people with no science training as 
one response (n = 224, 53.2%), and collapsing the remaining three options (some, a 
lot, mostly) as the other response (n = 184, 43.7%). The binary coding gave an almost 
equal split within the sample numbers, as well as its purpose of providing an insight 
to the broader role that science training has (or not) in the context of climate change 
communications. 
Organisational perceptions. There was no main effect of time on competence 
scores, F(1, 381) = .03, p = .866, and no significant interactions of time with the 
manipulations, Fs <  1.24, ps > .265. There was no main effect of time on morality 
scores, F(1, 380) = .64, p = .426, however there was a Time x Uncertainty interaction, 
F(1, 380) = 4.27, p = .036, as well as a Time x Science training interaction, F(1, 380) 
= 3.94, p = .048; a marginal Time x Language x Science training interaction, F(1, 
380) = 3.78, p = .053; and a significant Time x Language x Uncertainty x Advice 
interaction, F(1, 380) = 5.16, p = .024. However, this interaction is driven by the 
effects at Time 1, F(1, 208) = 3.24, p = .073, but not time 2, F(1, 208) = .35, p = .555. 
Similarly, within low uncertainty, there is a significant time effect of advice in 
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morality scores at time 1, F(1, 211) = 3.83, p = .052, but not time 2, F(1, 211) = 1.17, 
p = .280. Advice was only manipulated before Time 2 measures, it is difficult to 
interpret this interaction and these effects are likely to be spurious. There were no 
further significant interactions of time with the manipulations, Fs < 2.65, ps > .104. 
Engagement with and understanding of the message. Including science 
training as an additional variable in the analysis of engagement revealed a marginal 
main effect of language style, F(1, 400) = 3.51, p = .062, as well as a significant 
Science training x Uncertainty interaction, F(1, 400) = 10.00, p = .002. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed a significant effect of science training in the high uncertainty 
condition, F(1, 400) = 11.12, p = .001; whereby when uncertainty is high, people who 
had had some level of science training (M = 4.78, SD = 1.23) felt more engaged with 
the message than those who had no science training (M = 4.14, SD = 1.34). Under 
lower uncertainty, engagement did not differ as a function of science training, F(1, 
404) = 1.41, p = .236.  
In other words, for people who had had at least some science training, 
engagement was greater under high uncertainty (M = 4.78, SD = 1.23) than low 
uncertainty (M = 4.78, SD = 1.23), F(1, 404) = 5.12, p = .024, whereas for people who 
had no science training, engagement was greater under low uncertainty (M = 4.60, SD 
= 1.37) than high uncertainty (M = 4.14, SD = 1.34), F(1, 404) = 5.15, p = .024. This 
interaction is shown in Figure 3.13, below. There were no further main or interactive 
effects on reported engagement with the message, Fs < 2.93, ps > .088. 
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Figure 3.13. Uncertainty and science training interaction on message engagement 
 
The analysis of perceived understanding revealed a marginal main effect of 
science training, F(1, 400) = 3.55, p = .060, with, contrary to logic, people having had 
no science training reporting slightly higher understanding comparative to people who 
had science training (Ms = 5.13 & 4.87, SDs = 1.31 & 1.28). There were no further 
main of interactive effects on reported understanding of the message, Fs < 3.18, ps > 
.076. 
Trust in the Linford Centre. Inclusion of science training in the analysis of 
trust revealed a marginal main effect of science training, F(1, 399) = 3.63, p = .057, 
with people having had science training reporting higher trust towards the Linford 
Centre than those having no science training, (Ms = 4.79 & 4.38, SDs = 1.37 & 1.46). 
There was also a significant Science training x Uncertainty interaction, F(1, 399) = 
5.95, p = .015. Follow-up analyses revealed a significant effect of science training 
under high uncertainty, F(1, 403) = 15.06, p < .001: under high uncertainty, people 
who had had some level of science training perceived the Linford Centre as more 
trustworthy (M = 4.92, SD = 1.39) than people who had no science training (M = 4.16, 
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SD = 1.35). Under low uncertainty, science training did not affect trust, F(1, 403) = 
.045, p = .833. See Figure 3.14. There were no further main of interactive effects on 
trust towards the Linford Centre, Fs < 2.75, ps > .100. 
 
Figure 3.14. Uncertainty and science training interaction on Linford Centre trust 
 
Global climate change belief. Inclusion of science training in the analysis of 
beliefs did not reveal any significant main effects or interactions, Fs < 2.05, ps > .15.  
Personal risk perception. Inclusion of science training in the analysis of risk 
perceptions also did not reveal any significant main effects or interactions involving 
this variable, Fs <  .711, ps > .400. 
Efficacy. Inclusion of science training in the analysis of response efficacy also 
did not reveal and additional main or interactive effects involving this variable, Fs < 
1.50, ps > .222. 
Behaviour. When examining general behavioural intentions, there was a 
significant main effect of science training on overall behavioural intentions, F(1, 400) 
= 3.94, p = .048, those with no science training reporting higher intentions (M = 5.02, 
SD = 1.22) than those with some level of science training (M = 4.84, SD = 1.28). 
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There were no further main or interactive effects on overall pro-environmental 
behavioural intentions, Fs < 2.82, ps > .094. 
Although there were no further main or interactive effects on the pro-
environmental household behavioural intentions subscale, Fs < 3.02, ps > .082, 
analysis of the travel intentions subscale revealed a significant main effect of science 
training, F(1, 400) = 6.73, p = .010. Respondents who had no science training 
reported stronger pro-environmental travel intentions (M = 4.92, SD = 1.39) compared 
to respondents who had had science training (M = 4.52, SD = 1.48). There were no 
further main, Fs <  2.01, ps > .157, or interactive effects, Fs <  2.19, ps > .140.  
Summary of science training effects. There was some evidence of an effect of 
science training, however this was limited to certain dependent variables, namely 
engagement with the message and organisation trust. The importance of science 
training within the high uncertainty condition was similar to that seen before within 
this research – namely, there was an effect within high uncertainty comparative to low 
uncertainty. Specifically, science training played a positive role in people’s 
engagement and organisational trust when uncertainty was high, compared to those 
who had no science training under the same conditions. People who had no science 
training felt more engaged with messages containing low uncertainty comparative to 
high uncertainty. While these results are intuitive, it is important to recognise that the 
role of science training in this instance is limited to variables engaging with the 
message and organisation. When it comes to beliefs and intended actions in response 
to climate change, there is no significant role played by science training, and instead 
gender is more significant (as seen in the earlier section). 
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Age effects 
Organisation perceptions. The previous mixed analyses of variance on 
organisational perceptions were repeated with age as an additional variable. In the 
analysis of perceived competence, there were no significant main effects or 
interactions of time with the manipulations, Fs <  2.33, ps > .128. 
When examining perceptions of communicator morality, there was a main 
effect of gender F(1, 398) = 7.15, p = .008. There were no further significant main 
effects or interactions of time with the manipulations, Fs <  1.82, ps > .179. 
Engagement with the message and understanding of the message. With the 
inclusion of age as a fixed factor in the analysis, there were no main effects or 
interaction effects on engagement with the message, Fs <  1.44, ps > .232. Gender as 
a covariate has a marginal main effect on engagement with the message, F(1, 400) = 
3.47, p = .064. 
The analysis of perceived understanding of the message revealed no main 
effects or interactions when including age a fixed factor, Fs <  2.15, ps > .144. 
Linford Centre trust. When examining trust towards the Linford Centre, 
gender carried a significant main effect, F(1, 400) = 8.12, p = .005. There was a 
marginal effect of language, F(1, 399) = 3.00, p = .085. There were no further main 
effects or interactions Fs <  1.20, ps > .193. 
Global climate change belief. When age was included as a variable in global 
climate change belief, there was a main effect of uncertainty F(1, 400) = 3.99, p = 
.048. There were no further significant interactions involving these variables, Fs <  
1.81, ps > .181. 
Personal risk perception. When age was included as a variable in the analysis 
of personal risk perception there was a significant interaction of Language x 
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Uncertainty, F(1, 400) = 3.97, p = .048. There were no further significant main effects 
or interactions involving these variables, Fs <  .825, ps > .365. 
Efficacy. When age was included as a variable, the analysis of efficacy. There 
was a marginal main effect of advice, F(1, 400) = 3.47, p = .065. There were no 
further significant interactions involving these variables, Fs <  2.38, ps > .125. 
Behaviour. When age is added as a variable on travel behaviour, there were no 
significant main effects or interactions involving these variables, Fs <  2.56, ps > 
.111. 
When looking at household behaviour, there was a significant main effect of 
advice, F(1, 400) = 3.82, p = .053. There were no further significant interactions 
involving these variables, Fs <  1.09, ps > .374. 
Summary of age effects.  In addition to the possibility that variations in the 
gender and science training composition of the research samples might explain the 
divergence between the initial analyses of this study and the previously observed 
effects – something that is substantiated by the above analyses – I also considered 
whether age might also account for some of this variation. My previous studies used 
scientifically educated, mostly female, young, samples. 
When age is included as a fixed factor in this analysis the results show a 
marginal main effect of language on Linford Centre trust, a main effect of uncertainty 
on global belief, and marginal main effect of advice on efficacy. Age does not appear 
to play a major role or interact with any of the manipulations; the results have been 
noted here, particularly given the known effect of age on climate change attitudes in 
the prior literature. For instance, usually older people are more sceptical and have 
lower scores on environmental values (e.g., DEFRA, 2007; Whitmarsh, 2011; 
Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, Capstick, & Pidgeon, 2011). 
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Discussion 
The aim of this final experiment was to extend the prior work by incorporating 
the third significant theme that emerged from the qualitative investigation and became 
interested in the further role that providing behavioural advice (versus not providing 
this) might play in shaping public responses alongside the interactive effects of 
language and uncertainty observed in the previous studies. Furthermore I wanted to 
revisit the informational and peripheral effects of message transmission on a wider 
and more diverse audience. 
Though there were no significant effects that reflected the research 
expectations when analysing the full sample, analysis on sub-populations within this 
sample did reveal patterns of effect in response to the manipulations, sometimes in 
ways that were consistent with previous observations and sometimes in ways that 
contradicted these. In particular, on the basis of this study, it seems as though the 
previously observed patterns of effect may have reflected the predominantly female 
samples being studied. In this study, the responses of women to the language and 
uncertainty manipulations were very similar to those previously observed in 
Experiment 1 and (correlationally) in Experiment 2. Women tended to be more 
responsive to open language, particularly under conditions of high uncertainty. Men, 
however, showed opposing responses to the same manipulations – they displayed 
resistance to the open language, particularly when it was combined with high 
uncertainty. There was also some evidence that these diverging patterns extended to 
the provision of advice – women generally responded positively to the provision of 
advice, especially when combined with open language, whereas men tended to react 
against this combination of factors. These diverging patterns account for the overall 
null findings in the primary analysis.  
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Whether people have been scientifically trained or not also seemed to affect 
levels of engagement with the message, especially when this was overlaid with 
uncertainty. Understandably, those who were trained in science were able to engage 
with high uncertainty, whereas people with no science training reported more 
engagement under low rather than high uncertainty. This pattern was also evident in 
levels of trust towards the organisation. When uncertainty is high, people with some 
science training reported that they trusted the Linford Centre more than people who 
had no science training experience. Although these effects of scientific training are 
understandable and interesting, they are more limited in their effects than gender in 
shaping responses to communication, at least in this setting. This is also the case 
when considering age. In that sense, gender may be a more important variable in 
relation to scientific communication, and the effects of specific languages and the 
provision of advice within this.  
The effects of age in this study did not appear to have much influence in the 
results. Perhaps this is because other characteristics, such as gender, were more 
influential. Furthermore, perhaps the method of recruitment (internet-based) had 
something to do with this, with previously deemed traits associated with groups of 
older people (such as more conservative) are not necessarily applicable in this sample, 
as such traits are not constrained to older people here.  
Understanding the gender effects. Gender is broadly considered to be a social 
construct reflecting culturally determined prescriptions of feminine and masculine 
characteristics, identities and behaviours (Johnson, Murphy, Zewdie, & Reichard, 
2008). The literature also points to differences in the styles of communication among 
men and women, and their goals when engaging in communication (e.g., Roter & 
Hall, 2004; Sommers & Lawrence, 1992; Tannen, 1995; Steckler, & Rosenthal, 
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1985). For example, in workplace situations, women are less direct when they 
communicate and employ hedging words, such as ‘maybe’ or ‘if’. Men are, in 
comparison, more direct and more certain about content when they are 
communicating (Sommers & Lawrence, 1992). Interestingly, women also tend to 
have a more engaged and warm style of (nonverbal) communication compared to men 
(Hall, 1984). Indeed – in a study of email content, the use of “we” and “our” was 
more prominent among females than males (Colley & Todd, 2002).  
Aside from these stylistic differences, the literature has also suggested that 
men and women in Western culture perceive the purposes of communication 
differently. Men were found to be goal-oriented and result-focused, viewing 
communicative exchanges as a means towards outcomes, such as obtaining power or 
dominance. Women, however, seemed to value the process of communication and the 
social interactions that come with it; as such, women are understood to be more 
relationship-oriented, valuing the closeness and intimacy within interactions with 
other people (e.g., Maltz & Borker, 1982; Tannen, 1990; Gray, 1992; Eagly, 1987). 
These differences in the communicative cultures of men and women might help to 
explain their diverging responses in the present experiment – and indeed may offer an 
alternative perspective on the research conducted so far. 
Recasting our minds back to findings from the qualitative interviews (Chapter 
2), climate scientists (who were mostly males within the organisation, see page 43 
advocated a deficit model to science communication, where what to communicate 
superseded consideration of how information is communication (i.e., an informational 
communication style). In comparison, communicators (who were mostly females in 
the organisation, see page 44 were more concerned with how to communicate the 
information (i.e., a relational communication style). I would propose that, to some 
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extent, the differences seen between scientist and communicators in this study, such 
as language-use, tone of voice and purpose for communicating, mirrors the 
conclusions within male-female differences in gender communication literature, and 
indeed the findings in this experiment. 
Given the overlap between the scientists model of communication and male 
communicative preferences more generally, it is perhaps not surprising that men in 
this experiment responded better to the ‘traditional’ scientific, authoritative, distant 
way of communicating. Females, being stereotypically closer to the model of 
communication advocated by the professional communicators, responded more 
positively to inclusive language and an open communication style, even when 
uncertainty was high. 
While gender and communication research often points to the differences 
between men and women engaging in communicative exchanges, it also suggests that 
these are communicative styles that men and women prefer to be the recipient of. 
Indeed, when communications between men and women operate within their own 
gendered framework, misunderstandings arise, by virtue of using a different 
‘genderlect’, whereby males and females are speaking different dialects (Tannen, 
1990). Thus, as males tend to communicate more assertively themselves, when they 
receive information, they may respond in the same way; preferring low uncertainty 
and closed communication style. When layering advice on top of these language and 
uncertainty elements, given that research has shown women to be more proactive and 
open to information in the field of health of health promotion (e.g., Atkinson, 
Saperstein, & Pleis, 2009; Jones & Fox, 2009), it may be unsurprising that women 
were more inclined to engage with behavioural advice (especially under high 
uncertainty and/or open language); with men opposed to the provision of advice 
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(particularly when uncertainty is high or relational language is used). Males, however, 
responded to advice giving when the information provision is certain, and the method 
of communication is direct and distant.  
This gender divergence in communication styles also maps on to research that 
shows the gender of the perceiver determines whether moral or competence indicators 
are preferred: competence indicators being preferred by men, whereas morality 
indicators are preferred by women (Wojciszke, 1994). Wojciszke (1994) suggests that 
this is something that is learnt from socialisation as early as childhood, and cites 
Eagly (1987) to illustrate the point, “people believe that women more than men ought 
to manifest the communal qualities . . . and that men, more than women, ought to 
manifest the agentic qualities” (Eagly, 1987, p. 23). Meaning, males learn that 
competency (agency) features are appropriate for construing their own behaviour, 
whereas females learn that moral features (communion) are suitable for construing 
their own conduct (Eagly, 1987). 
Moving beyond the differences in communicative norms (as discussed 
earlier), and by looking into the stereotypic content of what behaviour is deemed 
gender appropriate may give insights into findings within my current study. Indeed, as 
Wojciszke states, there are “differences in what constitutes an appropriate frame of 
reference in understanding the behaviour of men and women” (1994, p. 231). From 
this, I would theorise that the gender differences in the acceptance-rejection of the 
differently framed messages, in addition to the contrasting communication styles, are 
also a product of a perceived violation of the expected stereotypic content dimension. 
When considering the general notion of information provision, despite (often 
fear-provoking) advice-provision being a well-researched topic within the context of 
responding to health promotion messages, the literature suggests the consideration of 
 179 
gender as a causal factor (rather than a differing effects consideration) has been 
limited (Gelb, Pederson, & Greaves, 2011). Exceptions have shown that women are 
more likely than men to search for health information online (Atkinson, Saperstein, & 
Pleis, 2009; Jones & Fox, 2009); indicating that women are more proactive and open 
to health information.  
Identity threat and motivated reasoning. Generally speaking, humans 
begrudge unwanted advice, especially when it is viewed to threaten aspects within our 
everyday lives. Indeed, a general problem of climate change campaigns and 
environmental advocacy are the boomerang effects these may bring (Byrne & Hart, 
2009). For example, anti-litter messages have been shown to actually increase, rather 
than decrease, tendency to litter (Reich & Robertson, 1979). Hart and Nisbet (2013) 
studied the boomerang effects in the context of climate mitigation policies. They 
suggest that such effects were due to biasing factors that occur when evaluating 
information in order to maintain existing beliefs. This draws upon previous research 
such as motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). 
So while behavioural advice may have the intention to be positive in 
responded to climate change, it may have a converse effect that negates this. This 
appears to be a similar to the concept, psychological reactance, proposed by Brehm 
(1966). Brehm says, “psychological reactance is conceived as a motivational state 
directed towards the reestablishment of free behaviours that have been eliminated or 
threatened with elimination” (p .385). So while advising people to reduce carbon 
emissions by small behavioural changes, this could just highlight the potential for 
encroachment on one’s lives and how these changes will be a violation of their 
freedom to act upon behaviours freely.  
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In such situations of personal threat, people are motivated to regain the 
threatened loss of freedoms. For example, people tend to develop attitudes that justify 
their behaviour and protect their identity (Kunda, 1990; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, 
Slovic, & Mertz, 2007). Hart and Nisbet (2013) showed this in the context of climate 
science communication. They suggest that motivated reasoning guide how people 
interact with available identity cues to influence their identification with the message 
and/or the messenger. This may lead to their interpretation of the information in ways 
that reinforce their existing political views. Indeed, Whitmarsh (2011) found that 
similar perceptions of the credibility and trustworthiness of communicators of climate 
change information are guided by how individuals view the world.  
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General Chapter Discussion 
The goal of this chapter was to build on the insights from qualitative work 
(Chapter 2). I developed a series of studies to explore elements of the three themes 
revealed in the qualitative work: communication processes, challenges, and roles of 
the climate scientist. Theme One concerned the different ways in which scientists and 
professional communicators understand the basic process of communication and the 
goals they pursue in relation to this when communicating. Climate scientists were 
advocates of the “information-deficit” science communication, whereby technical 
language and uncertainties are of central importance, and fully educating the public 
about climate science was the primary goal of communication. This model 
conceptualises the public as deficient in and ready to absorb scientific knowledge 
(Wynne, 1991; Gross, 1994). Despite this comment, I should here note that perhaps if 
I had interviewed climate scientists who specialised in communications with the 
public, this might have been different. However, while the scientists in my interview 
sample communicated with the public, the climate scientists did not focus on publics 
as the audience for their communication efforts (rather, they focussed on policy-
makers, industry and other scientists). Communicators, however, adopted a more 
relational approach to science communication. They preferred to build a relationship 
with their audience(s) and achieved this through using features of language. 
Specifically, they advocated adopting a warm and friendly style of communication, 
which they termed ‘tone of voice’. This is akin to interactive approaches to 
communication which can also include an informal conversation style, such as using 
inclusive language (Logan, 2001; Einsiedel & Thorne, 1999). 
I started the experimental research by way of a Pilot study to explore the 
possible effects of communication style (as varied by language use) on audience 
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perceptions of the communicator. Experiments 1 and 2 focussed on how 
communication style interacts with the informational content of climate change 
messages – specifically content that conveys scientific uncertainty, one of the key 
challenges for climate change communication identified under Theme Two of the 
qualitative analysis. Both these studies combined the communication style 
manipulation with a manipulation of uncertainty (lower versus higher) and examined 
the joint consequences of these factors for audience engagement and action. Sample 
selection for the Pilot and Experiments 1 and 2 was limited to university students. 
Experiment 3 introduced an issue to this design that drew upon Theme Three 
from the qualitative research: the (conflicting) roles of scientists. In my earlier 
interviews, scientists had expressed concerns about the provision of guidance and 
advice on how publics might change their behaviour in response to the scientific 
information they provide. Specifically, they worried that providing advice and 
guidance might undermine their image as neutral providers of impartial information. 
With this in mind, I varied the provision versus absence of clear advice in the 
message and explored how this, in combination with communication style and 
uncertainty, shaped trust perceptions and responses. In addition, a much wider sample 
was selected, more representative of the general public. 
There were recurring patterns within the data in the experimental studies 
presented in this Chapter that suggested that an open communicative style (through 
inclusive language use) had positive effects when communicating climate change 
information; perception of communicator morality (rather than warmth or 
competence) was influential when engaging and acting on climate change 
communication, particularly in situations of high uncertainty. These patterns appeared 
to be driven by females’ response to information under such conditions. Men, in 
 183 
contrast, reacted in opposition to open language and high uncertainty. When 
behavioural advice was provided, the same language-uncertainty patterns were seen 
among the different gender groups. 
In the Pilot and Experiment 1, I showed that when open language was used, 
the audience perceived the communicator as more moral rather than competent (a 
marginal effect in the Pilot) or warm. Furthermore, using a closed language style did 
not influence audience perceptions of communicator competence, morality or warmth. 
Experiment 1 showed that uncertainty can be an obstacle when 
communicating information about climate change. Global climate change beliefs 
declined when information contained high comparative to low uncertainty. Adopting 
an open language style engaged respondents more with the message and increased 
behavioural intentions, under conditions of high uncertainty. Experiment 2 showed 
correlationally similar patterns of the influence of perceived morality (despite the 
language manipulation failing) on pro-environmental intentions of household 
behaviour. Primary analysis of Experiment 3 revealed no main or interactive effects 
of any of the variables. The large and diverse sample used in the final experiment, 
however, meant that I could move beyond simply controlling for demographic effects 
and also explore any interactive effects demographics may have with the manipulated 
variables. Women were more receptive to open language under conditions of high 
uncertainty, and with the presence of advice. Men seem to react against open 
language, when presented under high uncertainty and/or advice. Science training 
played a small role in communications, limited to certain dependent variables, namely 
engagement with the message and organisation trust. 
Despite the gender divergence in the final experiment, I have consistently 
shown that audience perceptions of communicator morality were particularly 
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important when uncertainty was high. As such, I would look towards the uncertainty 
management model by means of fairness and justice (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002) to 
give further insight into why this may be. van Prooijen and Jostmann (2013) asserts 
that “when people experience uncertainty they are more in need for information about 
the extent to which decision-makers have benevolent intentions, information that 
people tend to derive from the morality of the decision- makers’ behaviours” (p.109). 
In two studies examining the influence of uncertainty and perceived morality on 
belief in conspiracy theories, they provide evidence that perceived morality of 
authorities influences conspiracy beliefs, particularly when people experience 
uncertainty. They conclude, “uncertainty leads people to make inferences about the 
plausibility or implausibility of conspiracy theories by attending to morality 
information”, (p. 109). They suggest this could be because the situation of high 
uncertainty is more threatening to oneself (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990), therefore 
people look for signals of morality to help or harm them. With that, van Prooijen and 
Jostmann (2013) believed that the perceived morality (or immorality) strongly 
predicts the extent to which people believe in conspiracy theories under conditions of 
uncertainty. 
In establishing the importance of linguistic features when communicating 
information, looking beyond the field of social psychology can offer further insights. 
Education research, for instance, has shown as early as the 1960s that the varying of 
language, and using words such as “we” reduces the psychological distance between 
teachers and students, and increases student motivation and learning (Mehrabian, 
1969). This stylistic feature, termed ‘verbal immediacy’, has also the effect of 
increasing information recall (Kelly & Gorham, 1988) and motivation in-class 
(Christophel, 1990). Research suggests that verbal immediacy is related to receiver 
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judgments of source competence and character, and also how the communicator 
perceives the person they are interacting with (i.e., an affective appraisal) (Bradac, 
Bowers, & Courtright, 1979). 
Limitations. It is acknowledged that the measured understanding of the 
message is perceived understanding rather than actual understanding. This brings a 
(potentially) certain limitation in that perceived knowledge and understanding does 
not necessarily equate to actual knowledge and understanding (e.g., Southwell, 
Murphy, DeWaters, & LeBaron, 2012; Laugksch, 2000). For example, Southwell, 
Murphy, DeWaters and LeBaron (2012) examined perceived and actual 
understanding of energy among the public, specifically measuring three concepts: 
perceived understanding of energy, demonstrated energy knowledge, and the ability 
to interpret an energy bill. They found that perceived understanding was not directly 
equivalent to actual understanding. Therefore, it has been argued that self-reported 
and actual measures of understanding are conceptually different and therefore 
consequently lead to different patterns of results when assessed (Ladwig, Dalrymple, 
Brossard, Scheufele, & Corley, 2012).  
Despite this discrepancy between the two measures of ‘understanding’ (i.e., 
perceived versus actual), some researchers argue that with some science topics, 
perceived knowledge may be a better assessment of an individual’s knowledge 
(Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2009; Satterfield, Kandlikar, Beaudrie, 
Conti, & Harthorn, 2009). Ladwig, Dalrymple, Brossard, Scheufele and Corley 
(2012) suggest that the premise behind this comes from meta-cognition literature, 
specifically they say, “knowledge about one’s knowledge plays an important role in a 
variety of processing tasks” (p.2). This implies that while these are measuring two 
different constructs of understanding (actual versus perceived) there appears to be 
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different roles (and benefits) each aspect of knowledge can play when applied in 
research. 
Ladwig, Dalrymple, Brossard, Scheufele and Corley (2012) suggest that this 
notion of perceived versus actual knowledge (which they term familiarity and factual 
knowledge respectively), to some extent, may be mapped on to how information is 
initially acquired and processed (discussed in Chapter 1, 5.1 Dual process models of 
information processing). Specifically, perceived understanding is arguably relying on 
heuristic processing, whereby mental shortcuts guide decision-making, particularly 
when interest is low. Conversely, actual understanding of a topic may rely more on 
systematic processing, whereby interest might be high and information is deliberated 
at a deeper level. In setting the backdrop for this research, I argued that (due to its 
lack of personal and direct relevance, complexity, and uncertainty) most people will 
likely process climate change information peripherally or heuristically rather than 
centrally or systematically (see p.24).  
The aim of the experimental studies presented in this chapter was (in part) to 
examine source influence in the communication process (i.e., heuristic processing). It 
therefore arguably follows that the ‘understanding’ that is assessed should also be at 
the heuristic level (i.e., perceived understanding). If the experimental studies had the 
aim of examining systematic processing (i.e., deliberation over information rather 
than via peripheral cues), perhaps measures of actual understanding would be more 
appropriate. In such studies, it would be wise to check whether the information had 
been properly read and processed (through manipulation checks), as well as testing 
for actual understanding of the information content. 
Future research could further this examination of message content 
understanding (and its variations). For example, exploration of the relationship 
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between self-assessed (perceived) understanding and objectively-assessed (actual) 
understanding with respect to attitudes and behaviours could be compared.  
Implications. Within the experimental research presented in this chapter, I 
broadly compared the informational deficit (distant, closed) and the relational (open, 
inclusive) styles of communication and their effects on audience perceptions and 
responsiveness. Experiments 1 and 2 pointed toward positive responses to the 
relational communication model. Experiment 3, however, is a reminder that not all 
segments within audiences react to information and its presentation in the same way. 
Indeed, Experiment 3 suggests there may be a role for the information deficit 
approach when communicating with a specific audience make-up (i.e., consisting 
typically of males) and conveying a particular type of information (i.e., low 
uncertainty). Such findings would support previous literature that promotes the 
segmentation of audience samples (e.g., Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz 
2009; Anable, Kelay, & Lane, 2006; Barnett & Mahony, 2011). 
While previous research has shown the importance that framing climate 
change information has on audience responsiveness, I would suggest this should not 
be limited to how the information is represented, such as cost and loss framing (e.g., 
Spence & Pidgeon, 2010) or how uncertainty itself is worded, (e.g., Budescu, 
Broomell, & Por, 2009). Understanding audience values and beliefs is important 
when framing climate change communications; and indeed, tone of voice peripheral 
to the information content and how language resonates through words are also points 
to consider in such communications (Moser & Dillig, 2007). Based on my findings, I 
echo this position, and say that understanding communication processes, and how 
these shape audience motivations, is potentially the key to managing uncertainty 
when delivering messages about climate change. With the language manipulations 
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within this research illustrating such a gender divide, (females preferring open, males 
preferring closed) I reasoned that these language manipulations tap into the gendered 
norms of communication (as well as science and professional communicator 
differences).  
This and previous research has highlighted the need for communicators to 
vary messages according to these diverse values, and depending on the particular 
goals of communication, potentially to frame message content and tone according to 
their audiences. Ebring, Goldenbery and Miller (1980) have shown that personal 
messages, especially interactive messages, have been shown to have a greater impact 
on attitude and behaviour change. Leiserowitz (2007) argued that a similar strategy 
should be applied to climate change communication and communicators should 
“tailor messages and messengers for particular interpretive communities” (p.57).  
Though these informational and relational approaches to communication are 
quite different, I see them as belonging within the concept of managing 
communicative exchanges through language style. That is, being aware of the 
different approaches to communication may enable communicators a stronger toolset 
of relational management achieved through language characteristics. Specifically, as 
suggested, there are gender differences in the stylistic features, with males tending to 
be assertive, authoritative and goal-orientated, and females being warm and 
relationship-oriented. Being aware of these communication differences can help 
communicators understand and appreciate different sides of communication, thus 
enabling communicators to adapt the contrasting communication styles to their 
audience. As such, communication can become more effective by engaging audiences 
and reducing potential intercultural misunderstandings. 
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Research on computer-mediated communication (e.g., text-based via email, 
instant messaging) has shown that verbal similarity increases trust between the actors 
involved (Taylor & Thomas, 2008; Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky, 2009). For 
example, Scissors, Gill, Geraghty and Gergle (2009) used level cooperation within a 
computer-mediated social dilemmas game as a proxy measure for trust 
(Riegelsberger, Sasse, & McCarthy, 2003; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998), 
concluding that the type of language convergence is important in establishing trust. 
They found, while measures of structural (tenses or syntactic components) and 
stylistic (surface) convergence support the view of communication similarity 
increasing trust, content (semantic) level convergence is more ambiguous, and levels 
of trust can depend on the topic. They note “not all similarity is good, and that it can 
operate independently across different communicative levels” (p.535). Such nuances 
were not something I explored within the current research programme. Though taking 
into the account the amount and type of accommodation, and with whom, before it 
becomes damaging to interactions within the context of climate change 
communications would need to be considered.  
Communication accommodation theory (Coupland, Coupland, Giles, & 
Henwood, 1988) can give insights into why this process may be effective. 
Communication accommodation theory suggests that interlocutors converge or adapt 
their communications to become similar to that used by the person they are 
communicating with (Giles & Ogay, 2007), (e.g., male-female exchanges). Thomson, 
Murachver and Green (2001) tested this theory in experiments whereby email 
communications were manipulated to be with the same or opposite sex. In examining 
the linguistic content of said emails, they found participants would modify their 
language style to suit the gender of their correspondent, i.e., convergent 
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accommodation. In a similar study, Colley and Todd (2002) found that women would 
significantly accommodate and converge in communication styles more than men. 
Females would employ affectionate language when signing-off, supporting the view 
that female communication contains more social warmth comparative to males (e.g., 
Lakoff, 1975). Furthermore, when males were communicating with females, there 
were more references to the informational topics (e.g., location), reflecting the male 
role as information-giver (e.g., Tannen, 1990).  
With this in mind, modifying language to align with the audience can help 
people engage with communication; consideration of your audience and variations 
within audiences is important, as I discovered in Experiment 3. The series of 
experiments ended with a large sample (n = 421) comprising of a broad distribution of 
people, which allowed me to test my previous experimental findings beyond the 
confines of a university campus. While the use of university students (mostly 
psychology, majority female) as participants had the advantages of convenience and 
cost, the need for variability and a wider sample to survey was important on gender 
and science training variables, as shown in Experiment 3. On-campus studies are a 
reasonable place to develop research ideas and model concepts, but testing these 
manipulations (in this case language and uncertainty variations) on a diverse 
population is especially important to assess the generalisability of these findings. This 
helped provide a fuller picture of the manipulated effects beyond the student 
subpopulation, and doing so in this case proved fruitful and informative – supported 
by previous research and theories to help better understand this particular research 
context. 
Better understanding of (sub)audiences’ preferred communication styles 
would enable communicators and organisations to provide (and invest monies in) 
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services and methods that will enable them to target messages more effectively. I 
demonstrated how certain subpopulations (specifically females and males) are more 
responsive to different styles of communication, perceptions of morality and levels of 
uncertainty. I explained such differences by gendered norms in communication, 
showing the importance of considering the norms and values of the audience, not just 
the information contained in the message, thus providing further support for the 
interactional communication model. 
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Chapter 4 
Moving from the Linford Centre to the Met Office:  
Understanding better the origins of perceptions of organisational morality and 
competence. Quantitative and qualitative findings from a survey 
 
The aim of this study was to better understand the basis of perceptions of 
competence and morality in climate change communications. The experiments 
contained in the previous chapter (Chapter 3) focussed on the possibility that open 
language would foster perceptions of organisational morality and shaping audience 
engagement, especially under conditions of high uncertainty. Although there was 
some evidence that language did have such effects, the relationship between 
communications styles and organisational perceptions was variable across the 4 
studies in which this was tested. Despite this, perceptions of organisational morality 
seemed to be implicated in positive responses across studies – either because they 
were affected by language manipulations or independently of this. In part, the variable 
link between language and morality is likely to be due to the reality that language is 
only one input into organisational perceptions, and a fairly diffuse and subtle one at 
that. Equally it seems that what signals morality is also in the eye of the beholder, as 
revealed by the divergent responses of men and women to open language in 
Experiment 3. 
 
The causes and consequences of perceived morality 
Social psychology theories of person perception and stereotypic content 
suggest that evaluations of others can be shaped typically within two or three 
dimensions (depending on theoretical perspective), namely competence, warmth and 
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morality (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy and Glick, 2007; Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & 
Cherubini, 2011). Often the constructs of warmth and morality have been grouped 
together (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy and Glick, 2007), with some studies viewing warmth and 
morality separable (e.g., Wojciszke, 2005). Research indicates that it is not 
competence that guides person perception, but rather warmth (e.g. Fiske, Cuddy and 
Glick, 2007) or morality (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Wojciszke, 
2005).  
The theorising backdrop of judgements being based on warmth/ moral 
dimensions have been connected to a self-regulatory theory (Higgins, 1997) in that we 
seek cues to guide us to approach pleasure and avoid pain. Thus we makes inferences 
about whether a person will harm us (someone to avoid) or help us (someone to 
approach), and this is why perceptions of morality particularly (rather than 
competence) are the dimensions that drive our evaluations on whether to engage or 
not (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). In furthering this 
perspective of morality, Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh and  Hepp (2009) propose two 
distinct forms of morality with each style mapping on to the approach-avoid 
components. They suggest that prescriptive morality is responsive to positive 
outcomes (i.e., what we should do) is in contrast to proscriptive morality, that is 
sensitive to negative outcomes (i.e., what we should not do). 
 Given the importance of morality within person perception research, and 
indeed its importance within this particular research, I wanted to further evaluate the 
insights already found – qualitatively how people explained the basis of perceptions 
of morality and competence; and quantitatively in its application to a real world 
organisation. 
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The present study 
To explore further the factors that might influence perceptions of morality, 
and perceptions of competence, in response to a real (rather than hypothetical) 
organisation, I conducted a survey asking participants to rate both the morality and 
competence of the Met Office
17
 and indicate their reasons for doing so. 
As with Experiment 3 (Chapter 3), I decided to exclude the dimension of 
warmth from the present study due to the lack of previous effects in my earlier 
studies. Furthermore, based on previous literature, it is morality that is important in 
guiding impressions of others, particularly under conditions of high uncertainty. In 
addition to assessing these perceptions, I also asked participants to elaborate on what 
they were thinking about when they provided such ratings. This allowed examination 
of whether ratings of morality and competence – both positive and negative – are 
based on substantively different things, or whether similar inputs inform both 
dimensions. In addition to obtaining elaborations of what people look for to determine 
morality and competence, the scale responses to these items, in combination with 
additional questions (e.g., perceptions of scientific uncertainty beliefs about climate 
change and willingness to take action against this), gave me the opportunity to 
explore quantitatively the connections between these variables in a more real-world 
setting than the previous experiments allowed.  
Method 
Participants  
Participants were recruited using a company specialising in online surveys, 
who use an online loyalty scheme points, enabling respondents to collect points that 
can later be exchanged for products. This survey took approximately 10 minutes to 
                                                        
17 The Met Office (an abbreviation for Meteorological Office) is the United Kingdom's national 
weather service. The Headquarters of the Met Office are located in Exeter, Devon, UK. Further 
information about the Met Office can be found on their webpage: http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/  
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complete. One hundred and eleven participants took part in this survey, of which 51 
(46%) were male and 60 (54%) were female. The age of participants ranged from 19 
to 70 years old (M = 46.54, SD = 13.86). 
 
Procedure and measures 
Unlike the previous studies reported in the last chapter, the goal of this study 
was to elicit peoples existing opinions. As such, there were no manipulations nor any 
information to be evaluated contained within this survey. Instead, I wanted to know 
how the public perceived a real organisation – the Met Office – on the dimensions of 
competence and morality, and to gain insight into the factors that informed these 
impressions. As such, participants were asked to separately rate the Met Office on 
indices of competence and morality and following these ratings were asked to 
describe the reasoning behind the given rating. The reasoning were qualitatively 
analysed and are presented following the quantitative results. I also included a range 
of scales to assess broader responses to climate change – including perceptions of 
uncertainty, belief in climate change, and individual intentions to act – in line with the 
previous studies. These scales, in combination with the ratings of organisational 
morality and competence, were analysed quantitatively using regression.  
The survey started with a brief introduction outlining the purpose of the 
research and assuring respondent confidentiality and anonymity. Informed consent 
was gained before moving on to the content of the survey. I then had a series of 1 to 7 
scale responses measuring the respondent’s: perceptions of the morality and 
competence of the Met Office, perceptions of uncertainty in climate science, beliefs 
about the (human) causes of climate change, perceived consequences of climate 
change, perceptions of climate change risk, and behavioural intentions. The survey 
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used in this study can be found in Appendix 4.1. The scale items and reliability scores 
for each of these measures were as follows: 
Organisation perceptions. At the outset, participants were asked how familiar 
they were with the Met Office and its work (1 = not at all familiar to 7 = very 
familiar). Then to assesses respondents’ perceptions of Met Office competence and 
morality, ratings on stereotypic traits were captured using a 7-point scale, ranging 
from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely. Items assessing perceived competence were: 
competent, skilled, able, efficient, professional and incompetent reversed, (α = .91), 
items assessing perceived morality were: moral, trustworthy, honest, sincere and 
dishonest reversed) (α = .91). After completing each subscale (competence then 
morality) participants were prompted to elaborate on what they were thinking about 
when they gave these responses and given space to type these thoughts into the 
survey. The exact wording to probe this was, “Can you tell us a little bit more about 
what you were thinking of when you answered the questions above? When you rated 
the Met Office on the adjectives above, was there something you were thinking about 
that might explain the impression that you have? In the space below, please tell us 
what you were thinking about when you answered the above questions about your 
impressions of the Met Office”. 
Participants were moderately familiar with the Met Office and the work they 
do (M = 3.88, SD = 1.51), and generally had a positive impression of the Met Office 
in terms of competence (M = 5.30, SD = 1.15, ranging from 1.50 to 7) and morality 
(M = 5.33, SD = 1.18, ranging from 2.20 to 7). After giving these brief impressions of 
the Met Office, participants were asked more general questions about their 
perceptions of climate science and climate change. 
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Perceived uncertainty within science and among scientists. Five items 
measured participants’ perceptions of uncertainty within climate science and amongst 
climate scientists. These items included: “Among scientists, there is disagreement 
about the causes and consequences of climate change”; “In the science, there is still 
uncertainty about how much climate change is really happening”; “In the science, 
there is still uncertainty about the effects climate change might have”; “Scientists 
generally agree about the causes and consequences of climate change” reversed; and 
“All things considered, the scientific community are very certain about the nature and 
extent of climate change” reversed. All items were rated on the 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. After appropriate reverse scoring, 
each of these sets of items was averaged into single index of perceptions of science 
uncertainty (α = .75). 
Global climate change belief. As outlined in the chapter presenting the series 
of experiments (Chapter 3), I combined a range of relevant items into a single index 
of general belief in the reality of dangerous human-caused climate change (α = .84). 
This general index combines subscales of: climate change belief (e.g., “In my opinion 
climate change is happening”, 3 items, α = .84); climate change as an anthropogenic, 
rather than natural, occurrence (e.g., “In my opinion climate change is man-made”, 3 
items, α = .81); and perceptions of global risk as a consequence of climate change 
(e.g., “I believe there is a global risk of the consequences of climate change 3 items, 
α = .87).  
Personal risk perceptions. As in previous studies, specific perceptions of 
personal risk were separated from the global belief index and measured through three 
items: “I feel personally at risk from the consequences of climate change”; “I 
personally worry about climate change and how it will affect me”; and “For me, 
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climate change is nothing that I am personally concerned about” (reversed; α = .73). 
 Individual intentions. I measured intentions to engage in pro-environmental 
behaviours in the same way as the previous studies. Household intentions consisted of 
items: “Reduce my household energy use”; “Recycle”; “Use less water”; and “Reduce, 
reuse, recycle” (α = .90); and travel-related behavioural intentions consisted of 
items: “Walk instead of using the car”; “Cycle instead of using the car”; “Use a car 
less”; Use public transport instead of the car”; and “Limit unnecessary air travel”  (α 
= .79). Each statement was responded to on a 7-point scale, 1 = not at all willing to 7 
= very willing. 
 Demographics. Finally, I gathered demographic information such as gender 
and age, and provided a space at the end for further comments. Here respondents were 
provided with a web link to receive their company reward points. Following this 
participants were provided with information explaining the purpose of the research. 
Participants were also provided with contact details for further information. 
Quantitative Results 
Preliminary analysis 
Unlike the earlier studies, there were no gender differences in perceptions of 
perceived competence, t(107) = -.09, p = .992, and perceived morality, t(107) = -.86, 
p = .364, males (M = 5.30, SD = 1.08, M = 5.43, SD = 1.23) and females (M = 5.28, 
SD = 1.07, M = 5.24, SD = 1.14). There were also no significant relationships 
between gender and perceptions of uncertainty, t(107) = -1.11, p = .260, (males M = 
5.28, SD = 1.05; females M = 4.51, SD = 1.09) or with belief in climate change 
(t(107) = -.34, p = .734), perceived personal risk, t(107) = -.21, p = .833, and 
household, t(106) = -.66, p = .511, and travel intentions, t(106) = .54, p = .591. Age 
was positively correlated with perceptions of uncertainty in science, (r = .24, p = 
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.014). Due to the absence of demographic effects in this dataset, age and gender were 
not included as control variables in the subsequent analyses.  
The item means, standard deviations, correlations and reliability scores for the 
focal variables are summarised in Table 4.1. As shown in the table the strongest 
correlation is between perceived morality and competence of the Met Office (p = 
.001). There was no significant relationship between perceptions of uncertainty in 
science and competence or morality (ps > .569).  
Perceived competence was correlated with a number of variables; belief of 
global climate change (p < .001), household intentions (p < .001) and travel intentions 
(p = .05). Perceived morality was correlated with household intentions (p = .001) and 
travel intentions (p = .023). 
Perceived climate science uncertainty was significantly negatively correlated 
with global climate change belief (p < .001), perceptions of personal risk (p < .001), 
travel intentions (p = .025). 
Given the strong positive correlation between competence and morality, in the 
subsequent analyses I controlled for the alternative dimension when examining the 
role of morality and competence in shaping responses to uncertainty and guiding 
climate related thoughts and actions.  
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Table 4.1. Means, SDs, Correlations and Cronbach’s alpha for variables in Met Office perceptions survey 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Competence 5.30 1.15 (.91)       
2. Morality 5.33 1.18 .79** (.91)      
3. Perceived uncertainty 4.40 1.07 -.06 -.05 (.75)     
4. Global belief 4.88 1.10 .32** .31** -.36** (.84)    
5. Personal risks 4.18 1.23 .16 .17 -.42** .67** (.73)   
6. Household intentions 5.40 1.13 .35** .31** -.17 .39** .28** (.90)  
7. Travel intentions  4.91 1.29 .19 .22* -.22* .42** .37** .70** (.79) 
Note:  N = 111 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level, *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) are on the diagonal. 
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Moderated Regressions 
To develop further the preliminary insights from the bivariate analyses, 
regression analyses were undertaken in which climate change belief, perceptions of 
risk and behavioural intentions, were taken as dependent variables. As with the 
previous studies, my primary interest was in whether and how perceptions of the Met 
Office, especially perceptions of morality, interacted with perceived uncertainty to 
influence individual responses. Thus, two-step hierarchical multiple regressions were 
conducted in which perceptions of the Met Office (competence, morality) and 
perceptions of uncertainty in climate science were entered in Step 1; and then 
interactions between Met Office (competence and morality) perceptions with 
uncertainty were entered at Step 2. 
Global climate change belief. The overall model predicting belief in global 
climate change is significant, F(5, 103) = 7.35, p < .001. At the first step, this model 
was driven by a significant main effect of perceived uncertainty (β = -.34, p < .001): 
as reported above, higher uncertainty reduced belief in global climate change. At Step 
2 of this model, F Change (2, 103) = 2.63, p = .077, there was a marginally 
significant interaction between perceived competence and perceived uncertainty (β = 
.31, p = .065), and a significant interaction between perceived morality and perceived 
uncertainty (β = -.40, p = .024). There were no main effects of perceived competence 
or perceived morality, βs < .19, ps > .182. The results are shown in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2. Regression analysis predicting global belief 
Step/Predictor B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
1. (Constant) 4.78 .62  7.69 .000 
Perceived Competence .17 .13 .17 1.23 .220 
    Perceived Morality .14 .13 .15 1.10 .275 
    Perceived Uncertainty -.35 .09 -.34 -3.97 .000 
      
2. (Constant) 4.43 .64  6.90 .000 
Perceived Competence .13 .13 .13 .95 .346 
   Perceived Morality .18 .13 .19 1.34 .182 
   Perceived Uncertainty -.26 .10 -.26 -2.73 .007 
Competence x Uncertainty Interaction .25 .14 .31 1.87 .065 
Morality x Uncertainty Interaction -.32 .14 -.40 -2.29 .024 
Note: 
1R = .48, adj R² = .20; F(3, 105) = 10.18, p<.001. 
2R = .51, adj R² = .23; F(5, 103) = 7.35, p <.001. 
 
To probe the Morality x Uncertainty interaction, I followed the procedures 
outlined by Aiken & West (1991) and examined the relationship between (centred) 
uncertainty and belief and values of perceived morality 1SD above and below the 
mean. This analysis revealed that when perceived uncertainty was low, people were 
more likely to have stronger climate change beliefs when they perceived Met Office 
morality is high comparative to when perceived Met Office morality is low, t = -3.97, 
p = < .001. When perceptions of uncertainty are high, however, global beliefs are 
similar to when perceived Met Office morality is low and high. This interaction is 
graphed in Figure 4.1. Looked at differently, when perceived morality is high, global 
belief is higher when uncertainty is perceived to be low (M = 5.49) comparative to 
high (M = 4.60). 
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Figure 4.1. Simple slopes predicting global belief with perceived morality and 
perceived uncertainty 
 
Personal risk perception. When the same analysis was performed on personal 
risk perceptions, there was again a significant effect of uncertainty at Step 1 (β = -
.41), F(3,105) = 8.80, p < .001, higher uncertainty was associated with less perceive 
risk. This effect remained constant at Step 2 (β = -.39, p < .001), and was not 
moderated by either perceived morality or competence. The full model was 
significant, F(5, 103) = 5.26, p < .001, F Change (2, 103) = .17, p = .884. The results 
are shown in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3. Regression analysis predicting perceptions of personal risk 
Step/Predictor B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
1. (Constant) 5.38 .71  7.61 .000 
Perceived Competence .05 .15 .05 .34 .732 
    Perceived Morality .11 .15 .11 .77 .444 
Perceived Uncertainty -.47 .10 -.41 -4.73 .000 
      
2. (Constant) 5.25 .75  7.03 .000 
Perceived Competence .06 .16 .05 .35 .727 
   Perceived Morality .11 .15 .11 .76 .451 
   Perceived Uncertainty -.45 .11 -.39 -4.00 .000 
Competence x Uncertainty Interaction .01 .16 .01 .03 .973 
Morality x Uncertainty Interaction -.05 .16 -.06 -.33 .740 
Note: 
1R = .45, adj R² = .18. F(3,105) = 8.80, p <.001. 
2R = .45, adj R² = .17. F(5, 103) = 5.26, p < .001. 
 
Household behavioural intentions. When the same analysis was performed on 
household intentions, there was a marginally significant effect of competence at Step 
1 (β = .28, p = .062), F(3,104) = 6.12, p = .001, again higher perceived competence 
was associated with higher household intentions. This effect remained constant at 
Step 2 (β = .28, p = .068), and was not moderated by perceived uncertainty. The full 
model was significant, F(5, 102) = 3.64, p = .005, F Change (2, 102) = .08, p = .922. 
The results are shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4. Regression analysis predicting household intentions 
Step/Predictor B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
1. (Constant) 4.21 .68  6.24 .000 
Perceived Competence .28 .15 .28 1.89 .062 
    Perceived Morality .08 .14 .08 .56 .577 
Perceived Uncertainty -.16 .10 -.15 -1.63 .107 
      
2. (Constant) 4.30 .72  6.01 .000 
Perceived Competence .28 .15 .28 1.84 .068 
   Perceived Morality .08 .15 .08 .54 .593 
   Perceived Uncertainty -.17 .11 -.17 -1.62 .109 
Competence x Uncertainty Interaction -.01 .15 -.02 -.10 .924 
Morality x Uncertainty Interaction .04 .16 .05 .29 .776 
Note: 
1R = .39, adj R² = .13. F(3,104) = 6.12, p = .001. 
2R = .40, adj R² = .11. F(5, 102) = 3.64, p = .005. 
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 Travel intentions. The model predicting travel intentions was significant, F = 
3.407 (5, 102), p = .020. At the first step of this model, F = 2.256 (5, 102), p = .054, 
there was a significant negative effect of uncertainty in climate change (β = -.20, p = 
.032): Higher perceived uncertainty was associated with reduced pro-environmental 
travel intentions. There were no effects of competence or morality at this step, βs <  
.18, ps > .214. At Step 2, F Change (2, 102) = .57, p = .566, the effect of uncertainty 
remained significant (β = -.25, p = .018) and there were no significant interactions 
with perceived uncertainty, βs <  .15, ps > .453. The results are shown in Table 4.5, 
below. 
 
Table 4.5. Regression analysis predicting travel intentions 
Step/Predictor B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
1. (Constant) 4.75 .79  5.99 .000 
Perceived Competence .04 .17 .03 .21 .837 
    Perceived Morality .20 .17 .18 1.18 .241 
Perceived Uncertainty -.25 .11 -.20 -2.18 .032 
      
2. (Constant) 5.02 .84  6.00 .000 
Perceived Competence .04 .18 .03 .21 .831 
   Perceived Morality .19 .17 .18 1.13 .262 
   Perceived Uncertainty -.30 .13 -.25 -2.40 .018 
Competence x Uncertainty Interaction -.04 .18 -.05 -.25 .804 
Morality x Uncertainty Interaction .14 .18 .15 .75 .453 
Note: 
1R = .30, adj R² = .06. F(3,104) = 3.41, p = .020. 
2R = .32, adj R² = .06. F(5, 102) = 2.26, p = .054. 
 
Discussion of Quantitative Analysis 
The quantitative aspect of this survey revealed that perceptions of Met Office 
competence and morality were relatively high—and that these dimensions were also 
highly correlated.  
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Comparing these results with other research (Barometer, Met Office, 2013, n 
= 1992) on perceptions of the Met Office, 80% of respondents said they trusted the 
organisation, ranging from ‘a little’ to ‘a lot’. While my Met Office perceptions study 
did not have a specific measure of trust, we could combine measures of competence 
and morality as an indicator measure of trust. Here perceptions of Met Office 
competence and morality responses were not qualitatively labelled, but instead used a 
7-point scaled which was labelled 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so). As a guide I took 
just over the mid-point as an equivalent to ‘a little’; with this as a guide upwards, 90% 
of the present sample having a view from ‘a little’ to ‘a lot’.  
Based on the regression analyses reported, perceptions of climate science 
uncertainty seemed to be the main determinant of responsiveness to climate change. 
Consistently, as might be expected, the higher the perceived uncertainty, the less 
people believed in climate change, the less they felt it was a personal risk for them 
and the less inclined they were to act (at least with pro-environmental transport 
choices).  
Uncertainty. This study has highlighted the different dimensions of certainty. 
The uncertainty that is dealt with in this chapter is different to the uncertainty 
presented in the Chapter 3, where experimental studies manipulated the level of 
uncertainty of climate impacts. Some of this work appears to contradict the findings 
from the earlier experiments that showed perceptions of organisational morality allow 
people to engage even under high uncertainty: in this study a converse pattern is 
shown, where perceived high uncertainty combined with perceptions of high 
organisational morality seemed to undermine (rather than support) belief in the 
phenomenon of climate change. One could speculate the reasons for this. Perhaps this 
was due to the difference in type of uncertainty examined in the respective studies. 
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Recall, for instance, the previously observed interactions involved manipulations of 
uncertainty via climate change likelihood impacts. The form of uncertainty presented 
in this study is to some extent akin to Knight’s (1921) probabilistic uncertainty. The 
uncertainty assessed here was not manipulated in any way. Instead, it was a free-
response measure of uncertainty and it referred to uncertainty around the phenomenon 
of climate change itself, rather than simply its impacts. This form of uncertainty is 
arguably similar to Knight’s (1921) concept of immeasurable uncertainty.  
 As discussed in the opening chapter of this thesis (Introduction), uncertainty 
can characterise many aspects in the risk assessment and risk communication contexts 
(from page 9 in particular). From quantifiable errors/ unknowns in the data, to 
uncertain projections of human/ non-human behaviour - often these are represented by 
metrics in probabilistic terms (page 9). This is a common form of uncertainty used by 
climate scientists and within the IPCC reports. 
However, uncertainty can also be characterised in other forms. For example, 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) differentiate between three types of uncertainty. 
Inexactness, i.e. a technical uncertainty concerning errors in empirical quantities; 
Unreliability, which is related to methodological uncertainties, for example, from an 
incomplete understanding and from the approximations made when describing the 
structural and functional characteristics of a system under study; and epistemological 
uncertainty (e.g., omissions of processes and parameters due to ignorance – 
‘ignorance of ignorance’). 
The European Environment Agency (2001) argued that the term ‘uncertainty’ 
was often conflated with other terms, such as ‘risk’ and ‘ignorance’. To clarify the 
concepts, the EEA propose that risk has ‘known’ impacts and ‘known’ probabilities 
(e.g., asbestos causing respiratory disease, lung and mesothelioma cancer, 1965–
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present). Uncertainty, however, has ‘known’ impacts and ‘unknown’ probabilities 
(e.g., antibiotics in animal feed and associated human resistance to those antibiotics, 
1969– present). Finally, ignorance has ‘unknown’ impacts and therefore ‘unknown’ 
probabilities (e.g., the ‘surprises’ of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and ozone layer 
damage prior to 1974; asbestos mesothelioma cancer prior to 1959). 
Other faces of uncertainty, beyond that of scientific uncertainty, have been 
recently argued for, such as social uncertainties. These are uncertainties over political 
and social decisions related to climate change (Hulme, 2009). Corner, Whitmarsh and 
Xenias (2012) conducted experimental work based on Hulme’s distinction between 
the science of climate change and its social, political and moral implications. The 
researchers varied newspaper articles that either created scientific uncertainty or 
political/ moral uncertainty around climate change. While their results showed that 
science-based editorials were viewed as more reliable and convincing than the 
editorials that focussed on moral/ political uncertainty, there was no significant 
attitudinal change following either article (whether it contained moral/ political 
uncertainty or scientific uncertainty). 
Perceived uncertainty is a key determinant of climate change scepticism 
(Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, Capstick, & Pidgeon, 2011). Poortinga, Spence, 
Whitmarsh, Capstick and Pidgeon (2011) explored uncertainty and scepticism about 
climate change and the potential impacts of climate change. They applied the 
scepticism framework of Rahmstorf (2004). This framework distinguishes between 
trend sceptics, who deny there is such a thing as an upward trend in global 
temperatures; attribution sceptics - who accept that the earth’s climate is changing, 
but do not accept this is due to anthropogenic forces; and impact sceptics, those who 
believe in the occurrence of anthropogenic climate change, but do not think it will 
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lead to substantial detrimental impacts. They found that uncertainty and scepticism 
concerning climate change impacts were common, while trend and attribution 
scepticism were less common. They also found that politically conservative attitudes 
and traditional values seemed to shape people’s responses to social representations of 
climate change. 
Social scientists have suggested that, despite a growing expert consensus 
opinion of climate change, public scepticism towards climate change has increased in 
recent years (e.g., Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith, & Dawson, 2013). 
This use of the term ‘scepticism’ strays from the traditionally understood position of 
organised scientific scepticism (Merton, 1944/73). Nowadays, particularly in the 
context of climate change, ‘scepticism’ has become synonymous with disbelief in 
anthropogenic climate change. However, Corner (2010) asserts that scepticism and 
non-belief are crucially distinct. He argues that, rather than base their views on 
(overwhelming) scientific evidence, climate sceptics’ opinion is often based upon 
ideology. When exploring public perception of cold weather events as evidence for 
and against climate change, Capstick and Pidgeon, (2013) demonstrate that how 
people interpret cold weather is associated with levels of pre-existing scepticism 
about climate change, which is in turn related to more general worldviews. 
Scepticism and identity threat. The increase of public scepticism towards 
climate change (Whitmarsh, 2011) appears almost paradoxical given the high levels 
of public awareness of climate change (e.g., BBC, 2010); and public acceptance of 
human-induced climate change (e.g., ESRC, 2014); and a scientific consensus of the 
Earth’s changing climate (e.g., IPCC, 2013). The concepts of identity threat and 
motivated reasoning were discussed earlier in Chapter 3 (specifically in the context of 
Experiment 3, with advice provision) – similarly this may be applicable here. 
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Perceptions of higher levels of uncertainty may enable defensive responses toward 
climate change information (such as lower belief, lower perceptions of risk and lower 
intentions to engage in pro-environmental travel behaviours). Pre-existing beliefs (i.e., 
scepticism, perceived uncertainty) have generally been shown to have a strong 
influence on audience responsiveness (e.g., Corner, Whitmarsh and Xenias, 2012).  
The present study has provided evidence that perceived uncertainty (i.e., 
scepticism) was a strong predictor of global and personal risk perceptions, and travel 
intentions (but not household intentions). The issue of identity threat and motivated 
reasoning may again be relevant in interpreting the behavioural intentions results. 
Thus, the implicit perception that climate change has the potential of encroaching on 
one’s personal life may make people resistant to change, yet where uncertainty is 
perceived as high, may provide just reasoning to be unresponsive to climate change. 
For instance, the results show that uncertainty predicts unwillingness to 
change travel but not household behaviours. This finding is concurrent with previous 
research that has shown travel behaviour change being viewed as more challenging 
compared with other lifestyle changes (e.g., Chatterton, Musselwhite, Lyons, & 
Clegg, 2009). This may be because travel mode choice is strongly linked to personal 
motives, such as autonomy (e.g., Ellaway, Macintyre, Hiscock, & Kearns, 2003; 
Gardner & Abraham, 2007; Hiscock, Macintyre, Kearns, & Ellaway, 2002; Mann & 
Abraham, 2006; Musselwhite & Haddad, 2010). In a study commissioned by the 
Department for Transport, Chatterton, Musselwhite, Lyons and Clegg (2009) 
explored the influence of environmental information on personal travel behaviour. 
They found strong links between the use of the car and perceived freedom, 
concluding this link is a key challenge in efforts to change travel behaviour.  
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Challenges that hinder the reduction of private car use comes from the 
affective motivations as well as the utility (i.e., cost, time) of the car. Steg, Vlek and 
Slotegraaf (2001) distinguished between symbolic-affective and instrumental-
reasoned motives for car use. Instrumental reasons are concerned with the 
functionality of the car, such as time and costs. Symbolic functions of the car include 
using the car as a status symbol, as a means of self-expression, and prestige. The 
affect aspect refers to the emotions induced by the symbolism of the car, such as 
power and feelings of sensation. Steg et al. (2001) conclude that instrumental and 
symbolic-affective meanings of the car are significant features underlying the 
attractiveness of car use. 
Jensen (1999) argues that the car is symbolic of freedom and they believe 
“that the make of the car says something about one’s personality” (p.21). Akin to this, 
Mann and Abraham (2006) identified four types of satisfaction linked with car use 
(personal space, identity, autonomy, and experiential). 
Recent qualitative work by Thomas, Walker and Musselwhite (2014) 
compared focus group discussions regarding carbon reduction targets amongst 
different travel mode users of the same workplace. Again, travel mode was strongly 
linked to personal autonomy. Furthermore, Thomas, Walker and Musselwhite (2014) 
found car drivers and motorcyclists to be most pessimistic and cautious regarding 
imposing restrictions associated with carbon emissions; whereas than walkers and 
cyclists showed most awareness and concern.  
Recent social psychological research (e.g., Jaspal, Nerlich, & Cinnirella, 2013) 
makes links between social representations of climate change, identity and travel 
mode choices. Jaspal, Nerlich and Cinnirella (2013) argue that autonomy associated 
with car use is not simply at the level of the individual, but is also “informed by 
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relevant social representations, and the degree to which the individual endorses these 
as part of their on-going strategy to maintain and serve the identity” (p.120). Indeed, 
the car in particular can constitute an important element of identity (Mann & 
Abraham; 2006; Prillwitz, & Barr, 2009).  
This can again be related to motivated reasoning or identity-protective 
cognition (Kunda, 1990; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic, & Mertz, 2007). This entails 
the appraisal of evidence in ways that validate pre-existing beliefs and identity, a 
phenomenon that has recently been linked to climate change perceptions (Whitmarsh 
2011; Corner, Whitmarsh, & Xenias, 2012). Car drivers and motorcyclists were found 
to often shift the emissions blame to larger sources of emissions. This has been 
suggested to be a defence mechanism, justifying continued driving or motorcycling 
(Chatterton, Musselwhite, Lyons, & Clegg, 2009; Thomas, Walker, & Musselwhite, 
2014).  
van Prooijen and Sparks (2014) propose that attenuating information towards 
one’s pre-existing beliefs and values has the potential of increasing acceptance of 
human-induced climate change. They explain this in the context of self-affirmation 
theory (Harris & Napper, 2005; Steele, 1988), whereby when people encounter 
counter-attitudinal information, they are likely to process this in a biased manner in 
order to defend beliefs that are part of the self-identity. In addition to how the impact 
of initial beliefs on the acceptance of anthropogenic climate change information can 
be attenuated, van Prooijen and Sparks (2014) also found that self-affirmation 
increased acceptance of climate change risks and individual efficacy only among 
participants who were initially more sceptical about the impact of human activity 
Organisational perceptions. Although the previous experiments led to 
expectations of interactions between uncertainty and organisational morality, this 
 213 
interaction was only significant with respect to belief in climate change. Moreover, 
the form of this interaction was somewhat different to what was previously observed. 
In the earlier experiments in this thesis, organisational morality (as signalled by 
language) buffered people against the negative effects of uncertainty and made them 
more inclined to act under uncertainty. In this study, those who perceived high 
organisational morality were most affected by uncertainty: if the science was 
perceived to be uncertain they were less inclined to believe in climate change and 
conversely when the science was perceived to be certain they were most believing in 
the phenomena. Those who did not perceive the organisation as moral were not 
affected by scientific uncertainty.   
Qualitative Data Analysis 
In addition to the quantitative data,, I collected qualitative data concerned with 
how people explained their perceptions of organisational morality and competence. 
To assist with the analysis of this qualitative data, I divided participants into two 
groups based on higher versus lower perceptions of Met Office morality and 
competence, using the bottom and top quartile of the variable range. The distribution 
of responses on these variables was not even and did not spread across the entire scale 
range. As already shown in the descriptive statistics, both competent and moral 
dimensions achieved a mean score of over 5 on the 7-point scale. The scale range was 
also truncated at the lower end with very few participants scoring below the scale 
mid-point of 4. Thus, the upper quartiles on these measures represent very positive 
perceptions of the organisation (upper quartile M competence = 6.17; upper quartile 
M morality = 6.20), and the lower quartiles represents moderate (or ambivalent) rather 
than explicitly negative perceptions (lower quartile M competence = 4.67; lower 
quartile M morality = 4.40). Reflecting this ambivalence, participants within these 
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lower quartile groups tended to write less when elaborating on their previous ratings, 
compared to more extended texts provided by those who gave positive scores on each 
dimension. 
Despite the limited data that was obtained about the basis of “negativity” (or 
more accurately “ambivalence”), when responses were given, positive and negative 
perceptions seemed to be based on similar criteria to the positive judgements. That is, 
if one person perceived the Met Office positively in terms of competence because 
their forecasts were reliable, another might perceive them negatively on that 
dimension according to the same criteria (i.e., because their forecasts are unreliable). 
Thus the difference between groups was more one of evaluation of criteria rather than 
the criteria on which these evaluations were made. Accordingly, when determining 
themes within the qualitative data, positive and negative responses to each dimension 
are discussed together, because they reveal very similar underlying judgemental 
criteria.  
The analysis of this data began with myself becoming familiar with the text. I 
looked for repetition, coding these as I went along. I labelled these patterns of themes 
that helped explain the data. I then reached a point where new readings of the 
verbatim would fit previously determined concepts without introducing new themes. 
Two central themes emerged from the qualitative examination of the verbatim 
responses within this dataset. The first concerns points of overlap between 
perceptions of Met Office competence and morality; and the second concerns points 
of divergence in articulations between competence and morality. This discussion of 
these themes will be supplemented with verbatim extracts from the data18 and the 
participant’s mean score for the particular dimension they were referring to in their 
                                                        
18 Minor spelling errors were corrected. 
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text. 
Theme One. Overlap: Accuracy & reliability. 
The first and most striking observation is that in articulating the reasons 
behind their judgements, people generally based their perceptions of the Met Office 
on the accuracy and reliability of the weather forecasts provided. This was almost 
always the case, and was discussed in relation to both competence and morality. 
Where this was not the case, this was also interesting and makes up Theme Two of 
this analysis. 
Firstly I note that when examining the texts from the lower and upper quartiles 
(i.e., ambivalent to positive), people were basing their judgements of the Met Office 
on the same feature being accuracy of weather forecasts. Meaning that, despite having 
opposing perceptions of Met Office on levels of competence and/or morality, 
judgements were being made on the same characteristic (i.e., weather forecast 
accuracy) but the perceptions were in differing directions. 
Secondly, evaluating the Met Office based on the (perceived) accuracy of their 
weather forecasts occurs whether respondents were prompted to talk about 
competence or morality. That is, when people talked about one content dimension 
(e.g., morality) they would refer to the alternate dimension (e.g., competence). Indeed, 
this dimensional commonality was already apparent from the high correlation 
between these dimensions in the present and all other studies (r = .79). As such, it was 
not surprising to see such overlap qualitatively; clearly perceptions of one tend to 
inform perceptions of the other. 
The following extracts are verbatim responses from four different participants 
describing the features on which they reasoned their judgements. More specifically, 
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the four extracts presented below illustrate the commonalties at two levels, a) 
ambivalent and positive scores; and b) competent and moral dimensions. 
 
On the whole their forecasts are pretty accurate 
Respondent 103 (Competent score 6.83) 
 
Couldn't get a weather forecast correct to save 
their lives  
Respondent 46 (Competent score 3.38) 
 
They appear to know what they are talking about 
Respondent 47 (Morality score 7) 
 
They can’t predict the weather all the time   
Respondent 60 (Morality score 2.60) 
 
While positive and ambivalent perceptions of competence refer to accuracy of 
weather forecasting, responses among the upper quartile particularly appeared to be 
more sympathetic of the difficulty in weather forecasting: 
 
Difficult job, getting harder with severe 
weather variations - this has not impacted 
in the quality and accuracy of their 
forecasts. 
Respondent 77 (Competent score 6.17) 
 
 
Unlike those who perceived the Met Office positively in terms of competence, 
those who were ambivalent in this dimension displayed little understanding of 
inherently uncertain weather and climate systems. Further, there may be a small role 
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of respondent lack of understanding of what the Met Office do relating to a lower 
level of perceived competence. For instance, 
 
As I am not sure what the met office do these are my 
only answers. 
Respondent 45 (Competent score 3.33) 
 
 
With respect to perceptions of morality, those who perceived the Met Office 
positively on this dimension also displayed an understanding of the challenges the 
Met Office faced with respect to forecasting. However, understanding was also 
expressed by people who were more ambivalent (rather than positive) on this 
dimension, this was not an uncommon pattern. One could infer that this points to 
judgements regarding morality drawing more sympathy and understanding than 
judgements on competence:  
 
I don’t think it’s their fault they’re not 
very good, it is quite difficult to predict 
the unpredictable. 
Respondent 54 (Morality score 3.60) 
 
Within the free-text responses, competence-based criteria were articulated first 
even in the context of the subsequent dimension of morality. In part, this reflects the 
question ordering within the survey; however, when the open-text responses were in 
reference to morality, respondents would often continue along the same criteria they 
established for competence. This suggests that when making evaluations of the 
organisation, people tended to reflect upon features of competence, rather than 
morality, in the first instance. The two extracts below illustrate the articulation 
ordering; I observed that the first quote (articulation of only competence) was far 
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more common and representative within this data than the second extract. Both quotes 
were in response to morality, not competence. 
 
I think they do their best to produce accurate 
forecasts, particularly in vital areas like shipping 
Respondent 103 (Morality score 6.60) 
 
I trust what they are saying and they usually get it 
right. 
Respondent 86 (Morality score 7) 
 
Within the qualitative responses in this dataset, it is evident that there are 
lasting effects of perceptions of competence (and morality). Once perceived 
competence is established, this can lead to habitual behaviours and people will 
automatically return to the Met Office for information again. 
 
I always check the met office forecast if 
I travel anywhere, as it is the best 
indicator of what to expect from the 
journey and what to take in the way of 
appropriate clothing. 
Respondent 4 (Competent score 6.17) 
 
There was also some indication that the behaviour of third parties can feed in to 
people’s perceptions of Met Office competence – for example, if a separate group 
uses information provided by Met Office and its services, positive perceptions of Met 
Office competence may be reinforced or even created. This is potentially amplified if 
people view the organisation independent from the Met Office also as competent and 
moral. The below two quotes point to the power of a third-party (in this case the 
BBC) in shaping perceptions of Met Office competency: 
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Used by the BBC. Good website. Authority over issuing 
UK weather warnings. Respected Reputation. 
Respondent 110 (Competent score 6.17) 
 
I am mainly influenced by watching the regular 
forecasts on the BBC. 
Respondent 35 (Competent score 6.17) 
 
To summarise, although competence and morality have been theoretically 
distinguished, there was a lot of overlap between these dimensions ordinarily in 
people’s minds. Criteria that establish competence are equally perceived as being 
reflective of morality and (to a lesser extent) vice versa. Accordingly when people are 
thinking through competence (or morality) they are also thinking through the other 
dimension.  
 
Theme Two. Divergence: Concrete vs. abstract.  
The relationship between perceived competence and morality is a complex 
one, containing much overlap, as set out above. The primary theme was very obvious 
in the first instance of analysis – perhaps because the theme itself is somewhat 
descriptive and tangible. The secondary theme, however, was less obvious and was a 
theme that revealed itself through the course of the analysis: making it a more 
interpretive observation, rather than descriptive. 
Whilst I saw the considerable overlap between the bases for judgements of 
morality and competence, detailed in theme one, the data also revealed distinct 
differences between how these dimensions were reasoned and explained. Theme two 
within this analysis therefore revolves around dimension divergence rather than 
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dimension overlap. Principally, this difference was not necessarily in the content that 
was brought to bear on such judgments (i.e., accuracy and reliability of forecasting) 
but rather in the process through which the dimensions were reasoned.  
Notably, evaluations of Met Office competence were expressed in experiential 
terms – for example, the (in)accuracy of previous weather forecasts, the utility of such 
information, and how the (in)accuracies have been applied in their lives. In essence, 
judgements of competence seemed to be made according to some very concrete, 
measureable and tangible criteria. For example, in addition to referring to the 
accuracy of forecasts (above), some people would further expand on these 
perceptions, often by referring to other concrete sources or signals of competence. 
Citing the Met Office consisting of educated employees and using modern technology 
was a common response; these are also concrete indicators of (in)competency.  
The three extracts below illustrate how perceptions of competence are measured 
via concrete features; the first two quotes are evaluating competency as high, whereas 
the third quote described the Met Office in lower terms of competence. Note that the 
quotes below, Respondents 22 and 106, are both referencing technology (in the 
context of reliable forecasting), however they are coming to different conclusions 
about the competency of the organisation on the basis of this criteria.  
 
I imagine you would need a science degree and they 
usually seem to get it right 
Respondent 86 (Competent score 6.17) 
 
Seem to be very reliable and use the latest 
technology. 
Respondent 22 (Competent score 6.17) 
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How poor the weather predictions can be even 
with today’s technology  
Respondent 106 (Competent score 4.50) 
 
In contrast to the concrete indicators that were referred to in assessments of 
(in)competences, evaluations of morality were either inferred from judgements of 
competence (i.e., they are competent, therefore they are also trustworthy) or morality 
was  simply assumed. For example, many people were unable to specify the reason 
for their perception of the Met Office as moral, or could not think of any reason why 
they would not be and therefore made their judgment on the absence of indicators.  
The two extracts below illustrate how evaluations of morality were construed 
through evaluations of competence – both texts were given in response to the 
morality, not competence, questions. 
 
I can normally rely on the Met to give accurate 
information 
Respondent 49 (Morality score 6.6) 
 
They seem fairly efficient as an organisation. 
Respondent 34 (Morality score 6.2) 
 
It is also worth noting that some responses in the context of responding to 
morality, referenced communication processes. The quotes below show two 
respondents reasoning the morality of the Met Office, not solely through the content 
of the information and its accuracy, but the way they have communicated such 
information with a non-science audience seems to take importance. 
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I believe they give us the best explanation of 
the readings they can and put it into layman’s 
terms 
Respondent 25 (Morality score 6) 
 
How well they report all the weather conditions. 
Respondent 80 (Morality score 7) 
 
Furthermore, the respondent below draws upon the combination of quality of 
information content with how this is presented as to why they have scored the Met 
Office highly in terms of morality. 
 
Reliable well presented forecasts 
Respondent 22 (Morality score 6.2) 
 
For some people, the Met Office holds a presumed authority and responsible 
role in society (i.e., being a governmental organisation), and with that comes morality. 
The next two quotes reveal reasoning Met Office morality through the absence of 
indicators or on the basis of more implicit assumptions, pointing towards their societal 
role: 
 
I can’t believe the met office would be dishonest – 
It’s a public body! 
Respondent 24 (Morality score 6) 
 
 
In my eyes, the met office don’t lie. It 
wouldn’t be in their interest to do that. 
Respondent 12 (Morality score 6.8) 
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As inferred above, the perceived good intentions of the work done by the Met 
Office, as well as their role as providing a public (as well as scientific service), is 
something that accompanies perceptions of morality – and this was a common view 
among the sample. This may indeed help people accept the uncertainties inherent in 
their work, and soften reactions when they are inaccurate. 
 
The Met Office provide a public service as 
well as proper scientific research, in my 
view, and neither of these things benefit 
from lying or dishonesty - it had never 
occurred to me to think these things! Okay, 
they don’t always get the weather forecast 
right but for genuine mistake reasons, not 
anything underhand - what would be to gain 
from that, anyway! 
Respondent 21 (Morality score 6.2) 
 
Finally, a common ‘reasoning’ of morality judgements, without explicit 
reference to the Met Office being a government body, was that the Met Office are 
intrinsically moral. 
 
You can trust the forecasters to do the right thing 
Respondent 16 (Morality score 6.2) 
 
I trust what they say and I don’t think they would 
gain anything by lying. 
Respondent 82 (Morality score 7) 
 
As can be seen from these quotes, perceptions of morality “just are” and 
morality is assumed in the absence of any specific reason to think otherwise. In this 
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sense and in comparison to perceptions of competence, morality seems to be reasoned 
on the basis of more abstract, implicit and inferred criteria. This is consistent with 
research on values as truisms: whereby beliefs that are widely shared and rarely 
questioned (McGuire, 1964; Maio, & Olson, 1998). McGuire (1964) describes the 
characteristics of truisms that people should agree highly with truisms and people 
should lack cognitive support for truisms. In some ways, this seems similar to concept 
of appeal to authority, in the sense that positions are accepted without question or 
without a need to qualify their endorsement. 
Discussion of the Qualitative Analysis 
The aim of the qualitative aspect of this study was to gain more insight into 
how people think about morality and competence outside of laboratory manipulation 
and in response to a real organisation and, relatedly, the things that might influence 
perceived morality beyond the communication style adopted by an agent, which was 
the focus of the previous studies. To achieve this aim, rather than simply assessing 
participants’ perceptions of the Met Office in terms of competence and morality 
scores, I also asked them to explain these judgments and the basis on which they were 
made. Although this kind of data relies on people’s introspections, it nonetheless 
provides an indication of what competence and morality are in lay thinking. 
The data itself suggested two important insights about this. Theme One 
highlighted the overlap between perceptions of competence and morality. From the 
explanations provided, it appears that assessments (whether positive or more 
ambivalent) were informed by similar criteria (mainly the reliability and accuracy of 
weather forecasting), regardless of which dimension was being considered. Thus, just 
as morality and competence are correlated measures, they are overlapping concepts 
and often inferred from similar things.  
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Theme Two, however, highlighted the points of divergence between these 
dimensions. Here it was observed that although morality and competence were often 
inferred from similar things (i.e., content) the ways in which these judgements were 
arrived at were different (i.e., process). More specifically, evaluations of competence 
appear to be based on concrete features – that is, things that are tangible, directly 
observable and measureable. Perceptions of morality, in comparison, seem to be 
inferred more indirectly – for example, it was reasoned from competence or simply 
assumed based on other criteria (e.g., the absence of reasons to think otherwise or the 
apparent trust displayed by others).   
I compared this content reasoning with the Met Office’s own public 
perceptions survey (Barometer, Met Office, 2013). In the Met Office study 
participants within the 80% subset who viewed the Met Office as trustworthy were 
also asked their reason for this. Of these, accuracy 35.8%; 
Expertise/professionalism/qualified 25.8%; Official/government/impartial 10.8%; 
Proven record, 5%; Wouldn’t knowingly misinform 4.2%; Up to date 
technology/science 2.5%; Don’t know 14.2%; and Other 1.7%.; i.e., responses to why 
people trust the Met Office are generally reasoned through competence terms, the top 
two responses are accuracy (35.8%) and expertise (25.8%). It should be said here that 
it was unclear whether the responses were open-text format, or pre-defined categories 
that were later coded thus. That said, similar to my study, competent-related (e.g., 
accuracy, expertise) features emerged as the common reasoning for trust, with more 
intangible features (e.g., wouldn’t knowingly misinform) as less reasoned. This shows 
again that often people are inferring qualities of morality from the concrete features of 
competence; while to a lesser extent drawing upon more abstract features as a proxy 
of morality. 
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Though it is unclear whether respondents’ focus of qualitative responses on 
competence criteria is a methodological artefact (such as order effects) or a genuine 
effect, the overlap of the morality/ competence descriptions provides a triangulation 
that competence is a central component of organisational trust.  
Interestingly, Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh and Hepp (2009) found that language 
variations can act as indicators of different types of morality. More specifically, they 
suggest that proscriptive morality (i.e., things we should not do) was perceived as 
concrete, whereas prescriptive morality was perceived as more abstract (i.e., what we 
should). They drew upon Semin and Fiedler’s (1988) four-level linguistic category 
model – this is a framework of interpersonal language that provides a way of 
investigating linguistic devices that are used to represent events. Principally, this 
model differentiates between concrete and abstract within a construct by way of 
linguistic features. Ranked in terms of increasing abstractness, these are: descriptive 
action verbs (most concrete), interpretive action verbs, state verbs, and adjectives 
(most abstract). Semin, Higgins, de Montes, Estourget, and Valencia (2005) suggest 
in prevention efforts (i.e., proscriptive morality) people used more concrete language, 
whereas those in promotion efforts (i.e., prescriptive morality) use more abstract 
language. 
Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh and Hepp (2009) go on to postulate that differences in 
language style aligned with morality type also point towards differences in 
psychological distance and levels of construal (see Trope & Liberman, 2003). For 
Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009), temporally and spatially close events contain more 
concrete detail and are clearly defined, and behavioural strategies highlighting the 
avoidance of harm (i.e., proscriptive morality) would be more effective. In contrast, 
temporally and spatially distant events contain less concrete detail and more abstract 
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levels, and with this greater psychological distance, less urgency is conveyed and the 
behavioural strategies highlighting promotion (i.e., prescriptive morality) is more 
effective here.  
With this in mind, it may be more fruitful to apply the outcomes of behaviour 
change associated with climate change (temporally and spatially distant) in abstract 
terms; rather than concrete everyday restrictions of behavioural prevention (e.g., do 
not drive).  
In applying the concepts by Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh and Hepp (2009) and 
Semin, Higgins, de Montes, Estourget, and Valencia (2005), abstract language has the 
potential to encourage distant behaviour by promotion (rather than prevention). 
Employing a linguistic signature that is characteristically abstract can encourage 
promotion for certain behaviours. Thus to encourage the promotion of behaviours as a 
response to the (currently abstract) effects of climate change, messages may be more 
effective if presented in an abstract sense also. They point to examples of advertising 
where concrete or abstract wording is used as a function of the right strategic 
inclination to achieve the goal of that production, for example advertisements that use 
cue sentences regarding strategic approach to promotion goals such as beauty 
(“L’Oréal, because you’re worth it”), happiness (“Coca-Cola, the taste of life”), and 
so on. “All of these examples stress a strategic approach orientation to positive 
outcomes represented as hopes and aspirations (ideals), and they tend to be abstractly 
represented in language” (Semin, Higgins, de Montes, Estourget, & Valencia, 2005, 
p.44). Thus, marrying the message to the strategy that best motivates goal 
achievement for concrete or abstract goals (i.e., promotion abstract; prevention 
concrete) may be an interesting approach to consider for behavioural change analysts 
and communicators. 
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General Discussion 
In this study I revisited the fundamental concepts that were the focus of the 
experimental work: perceptions of competence, morality and uncertainty. Like the 
previous work presented in this thesis, I was interested in how these things combined 
to influence individual climate change beliefs, perceptions and behaviours. In this 
study, however, I was especially interested in exploring qualitatively the features that 
might inform perceptions of competence and morality of an established organisation, 
the Met Office. Insight into this was considered important for transitioning from the 
language-based manipulations used in the experimental work to provide a more 
detailed analysis of morality that might help organisations, like the Met Office, 
understand better the ways in which they are perceived by the public and the 
consequences of those perceptions. 
As detailed above, the quantitative results are somewhat different to the results 
observed in the earlier experimental studies. Earlier in this thesis I showed how high 
levels of uncertainty can be troublesome when communicating climate change 
information, but also how this can be cushioned when audiences perceive the 
communicator as moral, as signalled through their language-use. More spontaneous 
perceptions of Met Office morality also interacted with perceived uncertainty in this 
study, but not consistently and not in ways that immediately matched the pattern 
observed before. Instead, perceived uncertainty alone seemed more important for 
determining individual responses to climate change. The perception of scientific 
uncertainty was associated with reduced belief in climate change and reduced 
individual action tendencies. 
Where morality did come into play was in conditioning the relationship 
between uncertainty and belief in climate change. The relationship between 
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(un)certainty and belief is present only among those who perceive the Met Office as 
moral. People who do not see the Met Office as moral are not influenced by scientific 
uncertainties. This indicates that when situations are uncertain, the audience seeks 
perceived moral intent of the communicator, to the extent that beliefs are increased, a 
pattern also seen in previous research (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002; van Prooijen & 
Jostmann, 2013). 
Drawing direct comparisons with the other quantitative work presented within 
this thesis (Chapter 3) should take into account the nuances between the survey study 
here and the experimental studies presented in Chapter 3. There are some subtle, yet 
significant, differences that may be accounting for any disparities seen between these 
works. Firstly, the present survey was not an experimental study. Thus, rather than 
experimentally manipulating uncertainty (via probabilistic risks) and organisational 
perceptions (via language), this study freely assessed those things. In addition to the 
difference between manipulated versus measured variables, with respect to 
uncertainty, the previous studies focussed on uncertainty of the impacts of climate 
change (i.e., probabilistic uncertainty), but nonetheless still communicated to 
audiences that scientists believed that climate change was real. The measure in this 
study, however, assessed the degree to which participants’ perceived scientific 
uncertainty about the phenomenon of climate change itself (i.e., ambiguous 
uncertainty), not just its possible impacts. These different foci of uncertainty may 
explain somewhat the apparent divergence between the different studies. The findings 
in this study suggest the effect of perceived morality on behavioural responses will 
likely be in accordance to whatever level of ambiguity (uncertainty) is perceived i.e., 
certain would lead to an increase in behavioural intentions in accordance with this 
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certainty; whereas uncertain would lead to decreased behavioural intentions in 
accordance to the lack of certainty (ambiguity). 
If one considers the specific questions considered in this survey, (p.197), they 
are more related to perceived uncertainty within science and among scientists. The 
composite of perceived uncertainty items include: uncertainty among scientists that 
climate change happening, its causes and consequences, and its potential impacts. 
Uncertainty and scepticism. The present results of perceived uncertainty had a 
strong influence on audience responsiveness, as indicated by predictors of global and 
personal risk perceptions, and travel intentions (but not household intentions). This 
finding is in concurrence with previous research that has shown travel behaviour 
change being viewed as more challenging compared with other lifestyle changes (e.g., 
Chatterton, Musselwhite, Lyons, & Clegg, 2009). In considering why increased 
uncertainty reduced pro-environmental travel intentions, but not within the household, 
could be because travel behaviour is more resistant to change due to its link to identity 
(e.g., Mann & Abraham; 2006; Prillwitz, & Barr, 2009) and autonomy (e.g., Ellaway, 
Macintyre, Hiscock, & Kearns, 2003; Musselwhite & Haddad, 2010), in addition to 
the utility that the car brings (e.g., Steg, Vlek, & Slotegraaf, 2001; Musselwhite & 
Haddad, 2010). Indeed, car drivers and motorcyclists have a tendency to shift the 
emissions blame to larger sources of emissions (Chatterton, Musselwhite, Lyons, & 
Clegg, 2009; Thomas, Walker, & Musselwhite, 2014). This has been suggested to be 
a defence mechanism, justifying continued driving or motorcycling (e.g., Chatterton, 
Musselwhite, Lyons, & Clegg, 2009; Thomas, Walker, & Musselwhite, 2014). This 
may be some way of protecting parts of one’s identity that is associated with 
symbolic-affective (e.g., Steg, Vlek, Goos, & Slotegraaf, 2001; Mann & Abraham; 
2006; Prillwitz, & Barr, 2009). Thus, while people may acknowledge environmental 
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problems associated with driving, there remains a wish to disassociate their own 
behaviour (e.g., driving) from the cause (a concept similar to that of cognitive 
dissonance, Festinger, 1957).    
Organisational perceptions. It is also worth noting that while the connections 
between organisational perceptions, uncertainty about the science, and audience 
responses to that uncertainty were relatively strong in the previous studies, in this 
study organisational perceptions were more strongly associated with the 
organisation’s weather forecasting role rather than their science (as revealed by the 
qualitative work), and uncertainty and individual responses to climate change were 
measured more generally without reference to the organisation. As such, while it is 
interesting that perceptions of Met Office morality moderated the link between 
perceived scientific uncertainty and belief in climate change, it is not immediately 
apparent whether audiences directly attributed the uncertainty to the Met Office or 
were basing their beliefs on anything the Met Office had communicated to them.  
   As with the correlations that have been seen in this and the previous studies 
(Chapter 3), there was considerable overlap between perceived competence and 
morality. In addition to this qualitative overlap, there were also important differences 
between people’s articulations of competence and morality. People seemed to reason 
about competence and morality in slightly different ways, even though they ultimately 
drew on the same information when doing so. 
On the basis of the qualitative data, it seems that people tended to assess levels 
of competency by looking for evidence and examples that support (high competency) 
or refute (low competency) the ability of the group within a particular domain. In 
other words, competency (high and low) commonly referred to the (poor) quality, the 
(in)accuracy and (un)reliability of the information being communicated. While this 
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was also discussed in relation to perceptions of morality, it was apparent that 
assessments of morality were given on the basis of less tangible, and more abstract, 
things. In contrast to competence, morality seemed to be reasoned through deduction. 
In its essence, morality appears indefinable and immeasurable, whereas competence 
seems concrete and tangible. Furthermore, the presentation of complex forecast 
information and the ability to communicate this to non-science audiences, were also 
important features for people when they talked about assessment of morality. Taken 
together, this suggests that the quality of informational content can signal 
competence, whereas the quality of presentation and communication can signal 
organisational morality. 
Past research suggests that morality is the first thing people look for in person 
perception (e.g., Wojciszke, 2005; Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Leach, 
Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). This current (qualitative) data suggests that people were 
more focused on competence – as implied by the amount articulated around 
competence. This was the case even when respondents were asked to discuss their 
reasoning behind their morality scores of the Met Office. This provides evidence that 
this a key component of organisational trust. We should, however, consider that this 
may partly be a product of a few issues: the methodology (competence was always 
asked first); the domain (the focal point was a science organisation, competence is 
particularly salient in this field); and with competence being concrete it is easier to 
talk about than morality and its abstract attribute. 
Further, it is worth noting that research indicates that competence dominates 
self-perception whereas morality govern person perception (e.g., Wojciszke, 2005) - 
this may in part explain why scientists and science organisations perceive they are 
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being judged by non-scientists as competent; whereas actually they are being judged 
in terms of their moral content.  
Zucker’s (1986) three modes of trust production may be relevant to consider 
here. She proposes characteristic based trust, which is dispositional and based on 
social characteristics; process based trust, which is based on previous experience with 
the organisation; and institutional based trust, which is based on reputation and 
attributes held by an organisation. In considering this in the context of this study, 
there is a crossover between respondents referring to process based trust (previous 
experience) and institutional based trust (reputation) of the Met Office. 
In addition to the difference in survey populations, the Met Office study 
differs from the experiments with regarding to the institution being evaluated. The 
institutions being evaluated are different: in the experiments the organisation was 
hypothetical, while in this study the Met Office is an organisation well-known to the 
sample. 
Layered on top of this issue is the variation of uncertainty. In the experiments, 
with the fictitious organisation, the uncertainty was presented and was quite specific. 
In this study, with the Met Office, uncertainty was not presented nor specified, and 
therefore ended up being quite vague and subjectively determined. In addition to the 
ambiguous uncertainty, perceptions of trust towards the institution was specific due to 
pre-existing awareness/ opinions of the Met Office. Furthermore, respondents’ 
perceptions of the Met Office as climate change communicators are likely to be 
inferred by perceptions of their role in weather (not climate change). 
 Limitations. There are some caveats that must be noted when digesting both 
the quantitative and qualitative work within this study. Making comparisons between 
this quantitative work and those presented in Chapter 3, studies focussed on 
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uncertainty of the impacts of climate change vs. assessed the degree to which 
participants perceived scientific uncertainty about the phenomenon of climate change 
itself, not just its possible impacts. These are different concepts of uncertainty, which 
may have implications in the differing effects uncertainty has in moderating the 
relationship between beliefs and perceived morality. Despite this, perceptions of 
competence, rather than morality, are important features contributing to impression 
formation. 
Notably, respondents were asked their perceptions of competence first and this 
may, in part, explain why they had little to say when elaborating on morality 
(sometimes noting “see previous”). Thus the abstractness of morality might also be an 
artefact of the order in which these questions were posed. Future studies could 
explore this further by ensuring that the order of questioning is properly 
counterbalanced. It would be interesting in itself to see how responses differed when 
the abstract is prompted first, and then the concrete. In that, was the high referencing 
to the concrete indicators of competence when asked about morality simply a function 
of morality following competence within the questionnaire? Or it may be a function 
of the abstract nature of morality, inferring through competence was the best way 
participants could verbalise their perceptions of morality. Or would probing morality 
first yield some further insights into the qualitative features of this content dimension, 
above and beyond the order effects of the survey. 
 Implications. These presented findings of public perceptions of the Met Office 
are consistent with previous opinion polls, particularly the point that accuracy is the 
most important input into public opinions. For example, a YouGov poll showed 
around 80% of respondents say they trust the Met Office, with the main stated reason 
being the accuracy of their weather forecasts (Barometer, Met Office, 2013). Dee 
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Cotgrove (Met Office Executive Head of Communications) seems to mirror some of 
the responses within my qualitative work, saying, “The public know that ultimately it 
is our people - their forecasting, science and technological expertise - which make 
Met Office forecasts the trusted source of advice” (Barometer, Met Office, 2013). In 
other words, she also acknowledges that audience perceptions of trust is inferred by 
concrete attributes associated with their competence in forecasting and their perceived 
technical expertise.  
It should be worth noting that following controversies such as ‘Climategate’ 
public opinion showed a decrease in trust in climate scientists (e.g., Shuckburgh, 
Robison, & Pidgeon, 2012; Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith, & Dawson, 
2013; Gavin & Marshall, 2011; Maibach, Leiserowitz, Cobb, Shank, Cobb, & 
Gulledge, 2012; Pidgeon, 2012). Consequently, as the Met Office is seen as primarily 
a weather-forecasting organisation, any climate research from this source could 
potentially be treated with higher levels of public trust than climate science specific 
organisations. 
The findings presented in this Chapter point towards morality and competence 
as elements of trust that can be viewed towards the Met Office. Indeed, Cotgrove 
recognises this – she also says that, “In the end, trust is not only about doing what you 
say you’ll do and doing it well. It’s also about being a good listener and responding to 
what you hear”. Again, as with the earlier quote, here Cotgrove starts by highlighting 
the competence features of trust (i.e., “doing what you say you’ll do and doing it 
well”); and then talks about aspects that are not necessarily competence traits, but 
may be indicators of moral character (such as, “being a good listener and responding 
to what you hear”). 
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She goes on to say, “For us at the Met Office it is vital that people trust, listen, 
and act on our warnings and advice”. These do indeed make for interesting discussion 
points, given the roles of scientists, forecasters and the organisation as a whole appear 
mixed and in conflict with regards to being simply informers or also advisors. Indeed, 
with 80% of respondents claiming to have taken action as a result of a Met Office 
forecast in the last 12 months (Barometer, Met Office, 2013) – this suggests that the 
Met Office are in fact aware that their information has behavioural consequences. 
Rather than seeming to deny such, and in effect contradicting themselves, it may be 
better that they embrace this and work within this framework. I do acknowledge such 
behavioural responses are in relation to weather advice and not climate advice, while 
these are different types of information: it may be confusing to the public to appear to 
have different approaches to provision of different information. 
That said, one could argue that it does not necessarily matter what or how the 
Met Office communicate, when only 5% of communications with the public is direct 
from the Met Office (Barometer, Met Office, 2013). The majority of receivers of Met 
Office (weather) information obtain this via third-party sources; the majority of these 
people (64%) using the BBC (Barometer, Met Office, 2013). With this in mind, the 
influence of impression formation the Met Office can have directly with their 
audience is slim.  
Some questions, aimed towards the practical implications, rather than 
theoretical, would highlight and question what is/has been done to engage the public 
with the Met Office directly. While the Met Office has various means whereby people 
can seek information (e.g., via their website) and contact the Met Office in an 
interactional sense (e.g., Twitter, email enquiries); in light of the figures suggesting 
that direct communications with the public is a rarity rather than the norm, perhaps 
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the Met Office, as an organisation, should a) question why is it that direct contact with 
publics is so low; b) consider ways in which direct communications with the public 
can be increased; and c) build on the fact that communications at present is done via 
third-parties. Furthermore, why research (and publish the results) public opinion of 
their service of only weather information provision, when the organisation also does 
work in the climate science domain. While this may be helpful in gauging opinion in 
how people perceive the Met Office in terms of their weather service, but not 
necessarily so in understanding and building towards public awareness about the 
climate science work they conduct. 
Thinking beyond the organisation-specific implications of this research, there 
may also be suggestions within these findings that are transferable to climate change 
communication more generally. In this study, perceptions of the Met were based 
largely on forecasting accuracy. This is a very concrete piece of information that is 
communicated with intentions to prompt immediate forms of action. Indeed, the latest 
figures on the annual public perception survey reveal that 80% claim to have taken 
some form of action in the last 12 months in response to a forecast (Barometer, Met 
Office, 2013). 
The kinds of behaviours people make in response to forecasts are also 
concrete, local and engaged for the short-term. When dealing with such concrete 
behaviour (e.g., weather-related) it may make sense that judgements are strongly 
based on communicator competence, as the information provided is immediately 
useful and verifiable. Climate change, however, as a topic is abstract. It is something 
that is temporally and spatially distant, that cannot be confirmed or refuted by the 
(in)accuracy of predictions. By virtue of this, the behaviours that could or should be 
enacted in response to climate change information are also, to some extent, abstracted 
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and uncertain. The information conveyed in the climate change context may not be of 
immediate use, nor verifiable for its reliability. Therefore, given the lack of the 
empirical verification process, it is logical that people rely on more diffuse and 
abstract notions of trust to assist them when deciding on what they should think and 
do in response to that information. Indeed, research does show that people’s 
perceptions about impacts of catastrophic climate change are distant temporally and 
spatially (e.g., Moser, 2010; Milfont, 2010) and given this climate change is not seen 
as an urgent issue (Moser & Dilling, 2004). 
One can relate this to the linguistic features work done by Janoff-Bulman, 
Sheikh and Hepp (2009). Within their framework, linguistic moral signals are either 
proscriptive, whereby emphasis is on concrete information about how (not) to behave 
and misconduct to avoid; or prescriptive, whereby emphasis on abstract behaviours 
provides more general (as opposed to specific) guidance about morality. In the 
context of climate change, while specific behavioural features to avoid (e.g., fly 
planes less) can be communicated, this provides a mismatch in providing information 
behavioural advice in concrete terms for an abstract problem. It may be more fruitful 
to frame responses to climate change in an abstract way, marrying the message to the 
context. Indeed, Semin, Higgins, de Montes, Estourget and Valencia (2005) showed 
that intentions to engage in specific activities were stronger when there is a fit 
between message wording and chronic orientation than when there is no fit. 
Furthermore, being aware of how people are making judgements about an 
organisation in terms of competence (concrete) and morality (abstract) may be helpful 
when communicating about topics that vary in their abstractness. People may indeed 
judge communications based on perceived organisational competence when those 
communications refer to the here and now (i.e., definable parameters of competence). 
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Thus, in this case, the fact that people do perceive the Met Office as positive, both in 
terms of morality and competence (i.e., trust), is an asset for communication. Yet 
most of these judgements are being made based on only part of the work they do. 
Harnessing the already existing trust amongst publics when communicating about a 
topic that is abstract (climate change) may help overcome some of the barriers to this 
kind of communications. But where trust is low, inferences based on more concrete 
terms (i.e., competency forecasting the weather) may be usefully drawn on and 
applied to the abstract concept (i.e., climate change). Equally, however, if people 
perceive the Met Office as incompetent, and base this perception on their experience 
of unreliable weather forecasting, inferences of incompetence may also be extended 
to other work they do and the broader things they communicate about (i.e., climate 
change science). Although morality may theoretically dominate perceptions of people 
and groups, in practice most organisations will want to be perceived as both moral 
and competent. 
Conclusion. This Chapter has studied climate change perceptions and 
responses in a different context to that presented in the experimental studies. The 
uncertainty examined in this study measured a more diffuse and ambiguous aspect of 
uncertainty, thus difference in the apparent effects of ‘uncertainty’, and the specific 
ways in which this interacted with morality, might plausibly be due to the different 
types of uncertainty being considered.  
Furthermore, the study also showed that perceived (unspecific and ambiguous) 
uncertainty around climate change goes a long way towards shaping audience 
responses to belief, perceived threat and (travel) behaviour intentions. Arguably this 
maps on to previous research in line with work on scepticism and motivated 
reasoning. This has shown that people who hold more sceptical beliefs are more likely 
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to reject information if it is seen as a threat to their personal life (e.g., van Prooijen & 
Sparks 2014; Whitmarsh, 2011). 
Specifically, perceptions of organisational morality might increase pro-
environmental action in the face of uncertainty about the impacts (but not the 
phenomenon) of climate change. Conversely, perceptions of organisational morality 
may make people less inclined to believe in climate change when uncertainty is being 
expressed about the phenomenon itself (i.e., by a trusted source). In this sense the 
interactive pattern observed in the final study reflects concordance between the 
perceived message (climate change is uncertain) and individual beliefs only under 
conditions when the scientific organisation that might be responsible for that message 
is perceived as moral and trustworthy. 
In sum, on the basis of the results in this study, I conclude that perceptions of 
communicator morality are based on more abstract criteria, things that are less 
definable and less measureable than the criteria that inform perceptions of 
competence. Indeed, perceptions of morality were based upon competent criteria. 
While it may be challenging to establish audience trust from scratch, being already 
highly trusted in one area of work may indeed be a benefit when communicating 
about a topic whereby trust is of high importance. In addition to this, encouraging 
behavioural change in the context of climate change is complicated by the 
psychological distance and abstract nature this topic brings. Drawing on work 
regarding linguistic features of abstract vs. concrete topics and their respective 
behaviours (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009), it may be worth moving 
from concrete descriptors of the present and towards abstract goals of the future i.e., 
rather than advocating avoidance of behaviours in the present for a goal that is 
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ultimately abstract; aligning the promotion of the end goal which is abstract, in 
promoting the goal in the abstract. 
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
 
Effective communication is central to efforts to engage the public with the 
important issue of climate change. But the communication of anthropogenic climate 
change presents many challenges for communicators, scientists and policymakers 
alike. Most notable among these is the issue of uncertainty. Uncertainty is an inherent 
feature of the phenomenon, and the science, of climate change. But uncertainty is 
known to be a barrier to effective communication, and something that can undermine 
perceptions of communication sources. This raises the important question of how 
uncertainty can best be managed in the communication of climate change. This broad 
question was the focus of the research contained within this thesis. In this final 
chapter, I summarise the key ideas behind this work, the findings that were produced 
and their possible meaning for both theory and practice. 
 
1. Summary of Results 
In the current research programme, I drew on what has been established in 
earlier works of social and environmental psychology from areas of risk perception, 
trust and impression formation. Specifically, past research has argued and 
demonstrated that the informational content of messages is not always processed 
independent of its source. Accordingly, how sources are perceived – in terms of 
credibility, trustworthiness and morality – is an important factor in the process of 
communication. Moreover, recent research has established that these source factors 
might become especially significant under conditions of uncertainty or ambiguity.  
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To understand better the roles of source factors and uncertainty in the process 
of climate change communication, I explored the total communicative sequence: the 
source, the informational content, and the recipient in the communications process. 
Empirically, I achieved this goal by (1) interviewing originators and communicators 
of the information of climate change to better understand their perspective, and; (2) I 
considered the content of the information, specifically its level of uncertainty, how 
audiences responded to variations in this informational content (and its varying levels 
of uncertainty) and the role of source factors (specifically communication styles) in 
shaping those responses. Finally, (3) I explored in more detail the nature and origins 
of public perceptions of a real-world scientific organisation. By triangulating the 
research to explore questions from different sides of the communication process I 
hoped to provide a more complete understanding that connects to the specific 
concerns of the actors involved in this process. Below, I briefly summarise the key 
insights that have emerged from each of these pieces of the empirical work. 
1.1 Chapter 2. Interviews. The first empirical chapter reported the findings 
from a qualitative study involving interviews with climate scientists and professional 
communicators from the same science organisation. Three broad themes were 
identified in the interview data. Theme 1 predominately represented the 
Communication Process(es) involved in climate change communications, specifically 
how scientists and communicators perceive their audiences, how messages were 
produced, and what was seen to be effective communication. Theme 2 represented the 
perceived Communication Challenges around climate change communication, 
specifically the challenges inherent in the subject (such as uncertainty) and the 
challenges concerning relationships with people. Theme 3 represented the perceived 
(Conflicting) Roles of Climate Scientists, specifically how scientists view themselves 
 244 
as providers of objective information, and also how scientists hold a view of how the 
public perceives them (meta-stereotype). This theme also revealed how their 
professional role can often conflict with their personal roles and goals. 
These interviews, and the themes they revealed, provide an insight into the 
language and use of uncertainty. Among scientists, uncertainty is a function of their 
professional role and was seen as inherent to climate science. Because of this, fully 
communicating uncertainties was something they saw as important. But uncertainty 
seemed to also perform a function of maintaining status and boundaries for scientists 
towards non-scientists (e.g., policymakers, communicators, and publics). This 
psychological role was something that was often explicitly expressed by 
communicators, but also implicitly revealed through discourse with some scientists. 
For instance, communicators expressed the view that the language of uncertainty 
(alongside other science specific language-use) has a role in allowing scientists to 
show their ‘scientific prowess’, whereby scientists can show-off their competence as 
well as protect their integrity as a scientist – both in the eyes of publics and fellow 
scientists alike. Further, uncertainty and technical language use can serve a number of 
legitimate functions in scientific communication.  
From these themes, I concluded that climate scientists and professional 
communicators work from different models of communication. For scientists, 
transferring as much scientific information as possible, highlighting the uncertainties, 
and maintaining technical language was the priority. I argued that this represents an 
‘informational’ model of communication. For communicators, however, 
understanding their audience, and simplifying language was their focus. Conveying 
(complex) scientific information while maintaining a warm and friendly style of 
communication – which they called ‘tone of voice’ – was also important. These things 
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combine to suggest that professional communicators were operating within a more  
‘relational’ model of communication. These insights are interesting in and of 
themselves, but they also informed the experimental work that followed. 
 1.2 Chapter 3. Experiments. Following on from the interviews, I conducted a 
series of experiments to explore how some of the themes identified in the interviews 
might play out when audiences are exposed to climate change communications. 
Specifically, the three experimental studies examined how the communication of 
uncertainty (Theme 2) affected audience responses, how this might be shaped by 
communication processes, specifically the tone of voice adopted by communicators 
(Theme 1), and other features of the message being communicated, specifically the 
provision of advice (Theme 3). Building on past research and theory, my key 
hypothesis was that an open ‘tone of voice’ would signal communicator morality to 
the audience, and that this would facilitate engagement even, or perhaps especially, 
under high levels of uncertainty. 
To begin this line of enquiry, I first conducted a Pilot study to test the effects 
different communication styles might have on peoples’ perceptions of 
communicators. This Pilot study confirmed that a warm ‘tone of voice’ (open 
language), compared to a corporate and distant tone style of communication (closed 
language) resulted in perceptions of the source of communication as being 
significantly more moral, marginally more competent, but not more warm. This was 
taken as evidence for the assumption that communication styles have implications 
primarily for the perception of communicator morality. 
To explore how communication styles might shape responses to climate 
change in the context of uncertainty, Experiment 1 again manipulated these language 
styles and crossed this with a manipulation of lower versus higher uncertainty 
 246 
embedded within a climate change communication. Following this I assessed a range 
of responses to the message itself as well as to the broader issue of climate change. 
The results indicated that higher levels of uncertainty resulted in reduced belief in 
climate change. Despite this negative effect of higher uncertainty, the results also 
indicated that participants expressed higher engagement with the message, and 
stronger intentions to act in climate friendly ways, after being exposed to high 
uncertainty provided this was accompanied by open rather than closed language. 
When uncertainty was low, communication style had no effect on these audience 
responses. Thus the data indicate that perception of morality does shape responses to 
uncertainty more so than perceived competence, and this is particularly so in 
conditions of high uncertainty. 
To follow up on this, Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the basic finding. In this 
study, however, the manipulations of communication style and uncertainty were 
presented together, rather than sequentially, as was the case in Experiment 1. The 
results of this study did not reveal the expected interaction between the manipulations 
of communication style and uncertainty and there were no main or interactive effects 
of the manipulations on any of the dependent variables of interest. Speculatively, this 
was attributed to the decision to combine these manipulations, specifically it seemed 
plausible that the communication style manipulation was “lost” in the uncertainty 
manipulation, and that organisational perceptions might need to be cultivated first in 
order to shape audience responses to messages that subsequently vary in uncertainty. 
Furthermore, Experiment 2 was conducted in conditions with more external stimuli 
(around campus) than conditions of Experiment 1 (in-class). This may have had an 
effect on the absorption of the subtle (now-combined) manipulations. 
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Although the experimental aspect of this study failed, the measures of 
perceived organisational morality and competence were analysed to see if there was 
any evidence that these spontaneous perceptions of the communicator moderated 
responses to uncertainty in ways that were consistent with the overarching hypothesis. 
Indeed, this analysis revealed significant interactions between (measured) perceptions 
of organisational morality and (manipulated) uncertainty in ways that were consistent 
with expectations. Specifically, climate-friendly travel intentions increased with 
higher perceptions of morality, an effect that was amplified under conditions of high 
uncertainty versus low uncertainty. This pattern is very similar to the experimental 
effects observed in Experiment 1. Perceived competence was also found to interact 
with uncertainty, but the pattern here was quite different to that observed for morality. 
Specifically, travel intentions decreased with higher levels of perceived 
communicator competence – and this was slightly stronger under conditions of high 
uncertainty. This suggests that morality does shape responses to uncertainty in ways 
that allow people to maintain engagement even in the face of high uncertainty, and 
that morality is distinct from, and perhaps more important than, competence. 
The aim of Experiment 3 was to build further on these insights. In addition to 
again separating the manipulations of communication style and uncertainty, returning 
to the design of Experiment 1, I added a third manipulation inspired by theme three 
from the qualitative data – the theme connected to the appropriate role of scientists. 
Recall that the scientists interviewed often expressed reservations about providing 
explicit advice to their audiences and saw this as potentially conflicting with their 
status as independent. However, from a communication perspective, the provision of 
advice would be an important part of effective and meaningful communication. 
Accordingly I manipulated the presentation of advice after the climate change 
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message. Again I expected that an open communication style would buffer audiences 
from the negative effects of higher uncertainty. I also expected that the provision of 
advice would facilitate audience responsiveness, and that this might be particularly 
important when audience morality-based trust was cultivated through using an open 
style.  
Contrary to expectations, analyses on the full sample revealed no significant 
main or interactive effects of any of the manipulations on any of the outcome 
variables. Unlike the previous studies, however, this study was conducted using a 
large and diverse sample of participants recruited from the general public. 
Accordingly, there was some scope to explore whether the expected results emerged 
among sub-samples that resembled the participants in my previous studies (mostly 
female, highly educated) and whether these differed among sub-samples that differed 
from the previous study participants (e.g., by being male or less educated). Indeed, 
secondary analysis did reveal effects in response to the manipulations that replicated 
previous observations, however these effect were confined to particular sub-samples.   
Specifically, the previously observed effect of open communication styles in 
facilitating engagement under high uncertainty was only seen among women: women 
were again more responsive to open language, particularly under conditions of high 
uncertainty. Men, on the other hand, displayed the opposite pattern: men were 
resistant to open language, particularly when this was combined with high 
uncertainty. A similar pattern of gender-based divergence was observed in relation to 
the advice manipulation: Women generally responded positively to the provision of 
advice, especially when combined with open language, whereas men tended to react 
against this combination of factors. These divergent responses account for the overall 
absence of significant main or interactive effects of the manipulated variables. 
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In addition to the role of gender in shaping responses to communication styles 
and uncertainty, there were effects of science training, although these effects were 
more limited and occurred only on reported engagement and trust in the organisation. 
People who were trained in science felt able to engage with high uncertainty, whereas 
people with no science training reported more engagement under low rather than high 
uncertainty. Similarly, people who were trained in science reported more trust in the 
organisation than people who had no science training experience. These effects of 
scientific training are, to a certain extent, quite predictable but they also confirm some 
of my assumptions about the uncertainty manipulation.  
In sum, the overall pattern of results in this series of experiments provides 
evidence that linguistic features and consideration of the audience are important when 
communicating information containing high uncertainty. Two studies (Pilot and 
Experiment 1) provide some indication that morality can be signalled through an open 
language style. I further showed that perceptions of communicator morality are 
particularly beneficial when uncertainty is high, though the final experiment revealed 
a gender divergence in this respect. Taken together, the package of experiments 
suggests morality is an important characteristic of the communicator, particularly 
under conditions of high uncertainty, and especially among women. There was partial 
support for the original idea that morality is something that is signalled through an 
open language style. 
 1.3 Chapter 4. Met Office Perceptions Study. A final empirical study made use 
of a survey of the general public to assess organisational perceptions of morality and 
competence in relation to a real-world scientific organisation (rather than the fictional 
organisation contained in the experiments) and to explore in more detail the basis of 
these perceptions, as well as to again assess their consequences for responsiveness 
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under uncertainty. To better understand the basis of perceptions of competence and 
morality, in this survey I asked participants to rate a known organisation on each of 
these dimensions, and after rating participants were asked to elaborate and explain 
what they were thinking about when they did so. I then qualitatively examined these 
elaborations to gain some insight into how people determine morality and 
competence. Following this, I assessed perceptions of scientific uncertainty about 
climate change, belief in climate change, and intentions to engage in climate-friendly 
actions.  
Analysis of the quantitative data produced by this survey revealed that 
perceptions of scientific uncertainty consistently undermined responsiveness to 
climate change. That is, higher levels of perceived uncertainty in the phenomenon of 
climate change were associated with lower belief in climate change, lower 
perceptions of personal risk from this phenomenon, and lower intentions to engage in 
climate-friendly travel choices. Consistent with the previous studies, perceived 
uncertainty also interacted with perceived organisational morality, at least when 
predicting belief in climate change, however the specific interactive pattern was 
different from previous observations. In this study, people who saw the Met Office as 
higher in morality were most affected by uncertainty such that if they also perceived 
the science to be uncertain they were less inclined to believe in climate change, 
whereas if they saw the science to be certain they were most believing in the 
phenomenon. Those who did not perceive the organisation as moral were not affected 
by scientific uncertainty when reporting their belief in climate change.   
The qualitative examination of the open-ended elaborations that followed 
ratings of competence and morality revealed two broad themes. Theme One 
highlighted the overlap between perceptions of competence and morality. 
 251 
Specifically, when making judgements (whether positive or ambivalent) of the 
organisation on these content dimensions, people were guided by similar criteria, 
mainly the reliability and accuracy of weather forecasting. Moreover, reasoning about 
one dimension (e.g., competence) often also informed reasoning about the other (i.e., 
morality). As such, there is considerable overlap between these dimensions of 
organisational perception, as reflected in the strong correlation between them. Theme 
Two, however, highlighted the points of divergence between these dimensions. 
Although morality and competence were often inferred from similar things, the ways 
in which these judgements were arrived at was different. Judgements of competence 
appeared to be based on concrete features – that is, things that were tangible, directly 
observable and measurable. Judgements of morality, however, seemed to be inferred 
indirectly – for example, being reasoned from competence or simply assumed based 
on other criteria (e.g., the absence of reasons to think otherwise or the apparent trust 
displayed by others). 
This final study allowed me to revisit the fundamental concepts that were 
focussed on in the experimental work, being perceptions of competence, morality and 
uncertainty. This final study highlighted the diverse nature of uncertainty – 
specifically that impact-based (probabilistic) uncertainty is not the only type of 
uncertainty in people’s minds. This survey also demonstrated again the tendency for 
perceived morality to interact with perceived uncertainty: however, these interactions 
suggest that high perceptions of morality will guide responses in accordance with the 
level of perceived ambiguity (rather than overcoming high manipulated uncertainty as 
previously seen in the experiments). I also demonstrated some qualitative features that 
might inform perceptions of competence and morality of an established organisation. 
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Taken together this gives a better understanding of how a real scientific organisation 
is perceived by the public and the possible consequences of those perceptions. 
 
2. Theoretical Implications 
This was a cross-disciplinary research programme that contributes to existing 
knowledge, spanning across theories and research.  
2.1 Science Communication. When considering public communication of 
science, two traditions have been commonly cited, namely the science dialect and the 
interactive model (Einsiedel & Thorne, 1999). The science dialect, also known as 
information deficit frame, is considered to be the dominant model of communicating 
science (Gross, 1990; Einsiedel & Thorne, 1999). This is despite increasing research 
presented from social sciences indicating the benefits of an interactive model of 
science communication such as one that highlights the importance of context, 
audience beliefs and values (e.g., Sturgis & Allum, 2004; Wynne, 1991; Davies, 
1998; Logan, 2001).  
Findings from the research presented in this thesis supports this view of the 
interactive model of communication. I demonstrated how certain subpopulations 
(specifically females and males) are more (or less) responsive to different styles of 
communication. Such differences can be explained by gendered norms in 
communication, highlighting the importance of considering the norms and values of 
the audience. In other words, communicators employing the interactive and relational 
approaches to science communication should recognise that a combination of certain 
conditions among particular audiences will influence their responsiveness to the 
communication. For instance, where low uncertainty is being communicated to males, 
a distant one-way flow of science communication may be appropriate. Although one 
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could interpret the finding of the one-way flow preference for males as an information 
deficit approach, being aware of a preferred style of communication among this sub-
population is actually a relational approach.  
2.2 Uncertainty. The works contained within this thesis can partially 
substantiate previous research around the notion of uncertainty being a discursive tool 
(e.g., Dunwoody 1999) in boundary constructions between scientists and others. 
During interviews, communicators who work alongside climate scientists articulated 
the view that uncertainty can be used to maintain some kind of distance and authority 
within the organisation itself. This is also suggested when studying the scientist 
discourse. Experimentally, I demonstrated that communication of probabilistic 
uncertainty can, but not always, reduce the belief that climate change is happening. 
2.3 Trust. In developing conclusions about the importance of trust in 
communicative settings, I indicated that perceptions of trust are (in part) the result of 
how communicators present themselves (e.g., through language use), and how they 
are seen as competent and moral.  
Within the quantitative research presented in this thesis, I measured trust 
towards an organisation via ratings of content dimensions, labelling this as perceived 
morality/ competence. As discussed in the opening chapter there are varying 
definitions of trust – though in social psychology trust is often viewed as the 
composite of morality and competence. The research contained within this thesis 
demonstrates the distinctness between competence and morality, while showing these 
are key components of trust.  
Trust has often been viewed as diffuse and complicated. The following extract 
illustrates the ways in which trust is described as a complex and multidimensional 
concept, yet still pointing to the two central components of competence and morality: 
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Special care must be taken with the evidence set out above 
concerning trust, since this word has so many meanings. "We 
trust you" may mean that we believe you can give us right 
answers and reliable information. It may mean that we 
believe that you are honest, and will tell us all that you 
know. Or it may mean that we trust your judgement, and rely 
on you for decisions which are wise, impartial, ethical and 
in the public interest. We may trust you in one of these 
ways, without trusting you in the others. In this case, if a 
pollster asks us whether we trust you, what are we to say? 
House of Lords (2000, 2.29) 
 
2.4 Uncertainty and trust. The findings within this thesis reveal that 
perceptions of morality-based trust have positive effects on audience responsiveness 
to messages containing high uncertainty about the impacts of climate change. 
Previous research has shown that probabilistic uncertainty (i.e., risk) and trust are 
intertwined. For some theorists, risk is considered a precursor to trust (e.g., Deutsch, 
1958; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Giffin, 1967), taking an associative view 
(Eiser, Miles, & Frewer, 2002). Whereas others take a causal perspective (Eiser, 
Miles, & Frewer, 2002) where in that trust is prerequisite of perceptions of risk and 
effective risk communication (e.g., Kasperson, Golding, & Tuler, 1992; Poortinga & 
Pidgeon, 2003). Results here support previous findings that perceptions of a moral 
communicator can shape responses to uncertainty (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002; van 
Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013). 
Although the language manipulation was not consistent across all of the 
experiments, the role of perceived communicator morality was repeatedly shown to 
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have positive effects on messages that contained high uncertainty. This supports the 
perspective from the uncertainty management model of justice (Van den Bos & Lind, 
2002; van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013) that posits when experiencing uncertainty 
people look for signs from the communicator/speaker/decision-maker that point 
towards their morality. Therefore, it makes sense that previous literature has indicated 
that perceptions of trustworthy sources are important features in risk communications 
(e.g., Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). 
The results presented in this thesis indicate that perceptions of morality do 
indeed interact with high uncertainty, though the effects may be different depending 
on the form of uncertainty they are interacting with. As such, this can (sometimes) 
overcome the negative effects of uncertainty (Chapter 2, Experiments 1, 2 & 3). 
Though sometimes the interactions between morality and uncertainty do not 
necessarily help overcome uncertainty, but rather guide responses in accordance with 
the level of ambiguous uncertainty perceived (Chapter 4, Survey quantitative results). 
This would suggest that communicators might benefit by being aware of the form of 
uncertainty they are communicating. 
2.5 Uncertainty: Probabilistic vs. ambiguous. As already mentioned, the 
measures of perceived uncertainty captured within the survey (Chapter 4) are different 
from those obtained within the experiments (Chapter 3). I would suggest the 
perceptions of uncertainty around climate change measured in the survey (presented 
in Chapter 4) are more associated with climate change the phenomenon (rather than 
its specific impacts). As such, it is likely this measurement is representing ambiguous 
uncertainty rather than probabilistic uncertainty (Knight, 1921). I found the 
interactions of the ambiguous uncertainty (Chapter 4) interacted differently with 
perceived morality than the probabilistic form of uncertainty (Chapter 3). 
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Specifically, not only did ambiguous uncertainty reduce belief in climate change (as 
also seen with probabilistic uncertainty, Chapter 3), but also when interacting with 
perceived morality it guided belief responses in accordance to the perceived level of 
ambiguity. As a result of this, when perceptions of morality interact with ambiguous 
uncertainty (rather than probabilistic uncertainty), the morality-based trust 
relationship continues to the point of reducing climate friendly behavioural intentions.  
Such implications are powerful in a real world sense. Let us consider the 
context in which laypersons encounter uncertainties about climate change. Absorbing 
information about climate change via the media is likely to inform people through a 
more general debate played out by politicians, non-governmental organisations and 
(conflicting) scientists; discussing its occurrence, causes and what should (not) be 
done at an individual to international level. If climate sceptics are vocal in their 
perspective around human-induced climate change, and people trust them, then 
people will be more inclined to believe what they say and act in accordance with that. 
I have shown that such perceptions of communicator morality can, in part, be fostered 
through language used. Callaghan and Augoustinos (2013) showed how sceptical 
scientists discursively employ an interactive style of communication compared to 
consensus scientists who relied on a deficit model. Though their findings did not 
necessarily relate this to trust per se, it seemed theoretically as though the process of 
communication and the stylistic features could (dis)engage audiences. 
Taken with the work presented in this thesis, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that the interactional model of communication increases engagement through 
increasing perceptions of morality-based trust. As this research suggests, different 
forms of uncertainty can lead to differing behavioural responses when interacting with 
morality. Therefore it is important to understand the parameters of uncertainty that is 
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being presented to audiences. When considering this one must also consider how the 
form of uncertainty relates to climate change communications in different settings.  
Climate change communications from scientists and scientific bodies (such as 
the IPCC and the Met Office) are likely to refer to probabilistic likelihood of impacts. 
However, research has shown that the mass media are the main source of climate 
change information and the main factor shaping people’s awareness (Carvalho & 
Burgess, 2005; Carvalho 2010). As a result it is likely that representations of 
uncertainty via the media will be ambiguous uncertainty around the nature of climate 
change rather than its probabilistic impacts. Indeed, the media conveys uncertainties 
around science without ever mentioning the word ‘uncertainty’ in stories (Dunwoody 
1999; Corbett & Durfee, 2004). Although the evidence points to a scientific 
consensus on climate change and its causes, the media tends to portray the competing 
scientific positions with equal coverage, giving the impression of a balance in expert 
opinion (Dunwoody 1999; Sharples, 2010).  
One could speculate as to whether these equal portrayals of scientific opinion 
are in the name of ‘fair and balanced’ reporting or a story containing debate and 
controversy is more appealing from a journalistic perspective. However, beyond 
journalistic practices, the media is the arena where the scientific arguments and 
(competing) positions of the different social actors build their trust and credibility 
(i.e., perceptions of competence and morality), and these are principally constructed 
by discourses in the media (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; McCright  & Dunlap, 2000). 
One should therefore be aware that all of the experimental manipulations 
within this thesis were presented as deriving from a science organisation – and the 
uncertainty presented was probabilistic. This was, in part, driven by the concern of the 
CASE partner, the Met Office, wanting to improve their climate science 
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communications to non-science audiences. In part, it also seems sensible to conduct 
the research from the position of the originators of the information also being the 
source of that information. However, because previous research suggests this is not 
how people generally absorb climate change information, I would suggest the benefits 
of examining the language and uncertainty manipulations as depicted outside of the 
organisational specific setting, but more akin to a broader message transmission that 
people are more likely to encounter (e.g., via a newspaper article). Such follow up 
research could also explore how the nature of manipulated ambiguous uncertainty 
interacts with morality (and competence). For example, rather than compare low 
versus high probabilistic uncertainty, future research could run a series of studies 
comparing the effects of ambiguous versus probabilistic uncertainty. Even though we 
can infer these differences based on the experiments (using probabilistic uncertainty) 
and the survey (using ambiguity uncertainty), it would of course be wise to examine 
these issues again within the same study. 
2.6 Person perception theory. The experimental and survey work was guided 
by the three-dimensional (competence, morality and sociability) theory of stereotype 
content (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). I showed that perceptions of 
communicator warmth were not affected by the linguistic manipulations. Perceptions 
of competence appear to have a small and inconsistent influence, in that higher levels 
of perceived competence reduced travel behaviour intentions, an effect that was 
slightly stronger under conditions of high uncertainty compared to lower uncertainty 
(Experiment 2, Chapter 3). Perceived competence also influenced organisational trust 
in study (Experiment 2, Chapter 3). My research indicates that perceptions of morality 
consistently played a more important role in guiding audience responses to 
uncertainty in climate communications, particularly when interacting with higher 
 259 
probabilistic uncertainty. Even in the qualitative part of the survey study presented in 
Chapter 4 people tended to articulate features representing competence, it was 
quantitatively demonstrated that perceptions of morality guided behavioural 
intentions as a response to uncertainty. 
As such, I would propose the findings within this body of work are consistent 
with earlier person perception research showing that perceived morality is the primary 
dimension that guides people on engaging or not with others (Brambilla, Rusconi, 
Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Chen, Jing, & Lee, 2014). 
Interestingly, and unexpectedly, perceived competence played a lesser role in 
responsiveness to information, indeed, sometimes high levels of perceived 
competence undermined responsiveness under uncertainty (Experiment 2). The 
patterns regarding advice provision were consistent with the gender divergences 
found within Experiment 3. Generally women were found to be more receptive to 
advice than men, particularly when uncertainty is high and open language is used to 
communicate the information.  
In the context of the findings presented in Chapter 2 which showed that 
scientists view competency and (accurately and fully) communicating the information 
as their primary goal. They also assume that the perception of their expertise (and 
neutrality) is their most important asset. However, the quantitative findings presented 
in this thesis indicate that perceptions of communicator morality are the important 
characteristic when guiding audience responsiveness to the information contained 
within messages (Chapter 3) and when no information is presented (Survey 
quantitative results, Chapter 4). This is in line with previous work conducted by 
Wojciszke (2005), where he suggests the competence dimension is dominant when 
perceiving oneself, but the morality dimension governs perceptions of others. This is 
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in addition to pre-existing beliefs (i.e., scepticism, perceptions of uncertainty) being a 
very strong influence on audience responsiveness (Chapter 4). 
2.7 Identity threat and scepticism. The results have shown that some aspects 
of climate change communication can lead to potential boomerang effects, resulting 
in information campaigns having unintended converse effects (Hart & Nisbet, 2013). 
Concepts such as psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966) and motivated reasoning 
(Kunda, 1990; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic, & Mertz, 2007) have been proposed as 
forces that may lead to such boomerang effects. The results from the final experiment 
presented in Chapter 3 and the snapshot survey presented in Chapter 4 points to the 
importance of considering such unintended consequences that may stem from 
perceived threats to an individual. The negative effects may be a consequence of 
motivated reasoning in order to protect potential threats to one’s identity (Kunda, 
1990; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic, & Mertz, 2007). Such rejection of information 
may be simply a mechanism for justifying continued climate-unfriendly behaviours 
(e.g., Chatterton, Musselwhite, Lyons, & Clegg, 2009; Thomas, Walker, & 
Musselwhite, 2014). 
2.8 Future work. The findings contained within this thesis are broadly 
consistent, with some deviations that cloud the overall picture. I will now suggest 
ways in which this work could be taken forward in order to strengthen our 
understanding of the relationship between language use and perceptions of morality; 
and of the consequential influence of perceived morality (and further exploration of 
this compared to competence) on behaviour when interacting with high uncertainty. 
2.8.1 Propensity to trust. Though I have shown that communicators can signal 
morality through language use, it may be worth reminding ourselves that 
communicator characteristics are arguably owned by audiences in receipt of the 
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communications. While it has been fruitful to show what influences perceptions of 
trust (i.e., competence and morality), trust involves two parties: a trusting party 
(trustor) and a party to be trusted (trustee) (Driscoll, 1978). Therefore the extent to 
which perceived competence and morality interacts with an individual’s propensity to 
trust may also provide some illumination in the whole process. In considering one’s 
propensity to trust (i.e., general willingness to trust others) rather than simply 
examining how people respond to sources as being trustworthy or not, and how the 
two interact may help further understand the dynamics of trust between trustor and 
trustee in climate change communications. 
Propensity to trust is proposed to be a stable within-party factor that will affect 
the likelihood the party will trust, potentially a trait that is stable across situations. 
Thus, future research may wish to explore whether an individual’s propensity to trust 
influences how much trust one has for a trustee prior to interactions with that person. I 
would suggest that it would be worth exploring the extent to which general propensity 
to trust connects to perceptions of trust in (uncertain) climate change 
communications. Here one can apply models of trust developed within organisational 
settings where it is suggested that to fully understand the dynamics of trust it is also 
important to consider the individual’s propensity to trust, as well as their perceptions 
of the source (Driscoll, 1978; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). For Farris, Senner, 
and Butterfield (1973) trust is defined as “a personality trait of people interacting with 
peripheral environment of an organization” (p.145). With this approach trust is 
viewed as a trait that leads to a generalised expectation about the trustworthiness of 
others. In the proposed model this trait is referred to as the propensity to trust. 
Such an approach would give an indicator to an individual’s likelihood to trust 
and to what extent this may influence perceptions of trust towards communicators of 
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climate change. With the notion that the climate change information tends to be 
interpreted in the context of existing attitudes/values/beliefs; it is plausible to take the 
view that perceptions of trustworthiness can also be played out in the context of 
existing pre-dispositions to trust. This may prove to be an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
2.8.2 Language, morality and gender. In this research I demonstrated how 
stylistic differences of language could shape moral perceptions of the communicator, 
and when doing so could affect people’s willingness or ability to engage with 
messages that contain high levels of uncertainty. I have suggested that open language 
used within the experiments is a signal of communicator morality. The lack of 
consistent effects of language on communicator perceptions may be because of the 
weak signal contained in the language manipulations. As such, I would maintain that 
the findings from this aspect of the research provide partial support for the idea that 
language features can increase perceptions of morality given certain conditions (e.g., 
among females). Furthermore, in contrast to this there was an absence of any main or 
interaction effects with uncertainty on the dependent variables when using the closed 
language – the exception being in the final experiment where men were more 
responsive to this style than the open style alternative. Indeed, the final experiment 
was rather illuminating to the demographic differences of audience responsiveness 
towards language, uncertainty and advice. Women were generally more accepting of 
open language styles, under high uncertainty. These findings would support previous 
literature that advocates for the segmentation of audience samples (e.g., Maibach, 
Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz 2009; Anable, Kelay, & Lane, 2006; Barnett & 
Mahony, 2011).  
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2.8.3 Morality and uncertainty. A broader examination of manipulating source 
characteristics (e.g., morality) beyond using an ‘open’ style would be interesting. One 
would need to further examine the influence of perceived morality, particularly when 
interacting with uncertainty, through experimental studies that contain more explicit 
manipulations of communicator features in these dimensions. For example, rather 
than varying language, stronger manipulations may be achieved through depicting the 
communicator as having certain stereotypic traits – for instance, using words 
associated with (in)competence and (im)morality when describing characteristics of 
the communicator. van Prooijen & Jostmann (2013) conducted experiments looking 
in to similar effects of morality and uncertainty on the impact of perceived morality of 
authorities on conspiracy beliefs when in conditions of uncertainty. In their two 
studies uncertainty was made salient subjectively by asking participants to think about 
a time when they felt uncertain versus neutral, such as watching TV. Manipulations of 
organisation morality were contained in fake reports presenting an institution as moral 
or immoral. 
2.8.4 Uncertainty: Probabilistic vs. ambiguous. The results in this work also 
indicate that different forms of uncertainty may lead to different behavioural 
responses when the communicator is perceived as more, rather than less, moral. As I 
suggested earlier in this Chapter (section 2.5), the impact of morality on behavioural 
intentions is in accordance with level of perceived ambiguity of the climate change 
phenomenon. In comparison, the effect of morality on behavioural intentions in 
response to probabilistic uncertainty in the form of likelihood impacts seems to 
override the informational uncertainty leading to more climate friendly behaviours. I 
have suggested ways in which the effects of ambiguous versus probabilistic 
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uncertainty on communicator perceptions and audience responses could be examined 
in future (see section 2.5).  
Given that most lay people encounter climate change information and its 
uncertainty through media outlets (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005; Carvalho 2010), I 
would be inclined to believe that ambiguous uncertainty (i.e., around the phenomenon 
of climate change) is likely to be more representative of layperson encounters with 
climate information than probabilistic uncertainty (such as likelihood impacts). 
 
3. Practical Implications 
As a cross-disciplinary research programme this contributes to practices in a 
number of ways. 
3.1 Science communication. The communication of climate (change) science, 
and science in general, has traditionally assumed publics are deficient in their 
knowledge and that any problems of understanding stem from this (Gross, 1994). This 
“deficit approach” seemed most prominent among the scientists interviewed – in that 
the effectiveness of messages was seen as being based solely on the information 
contained within them. Thus any failure of communication is viewed as down to 
problems with the content of the message, or with the audience’s inability to 
understand it properly. This approach gives little consideration to the context within 
which individuals receive information and how this can shape engagement and 
(perceived) understanding. A broader perspective calls attention to these contextual 
inputs – specifically to the relationships between communication sources and 
audience – and how these shape motivations in communication and the outcomes of 
this.  
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In the present research, I have demonstrated that communication style can 
inspire greater perceptions of morality of the communicator than traditional science 
dialects. Though the closed/ corporate language used in the experimental work may 
not necessarily equate to a traditional science dialect per se, the open style is in 
distinct contrast to traditional science dialect. Adapting one’s communication style in 
a manner advocated by professional communicators (i.e., a relational communication 
style), may, under certain conditions, nurture a long-lasting trust akin to that of 
relational trust (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). As such, it may be that 
modifying their language can help organisations shape the impression people have of 
them, and improve audience responses to the organisation’s climate change 
information.  
3.2 Uncertainty. For climate science organisations like the IPCC and the Met 
Office, it may also be useful to be aware of the categories of uncertainty that are 
prominent in the public sphere. The public’s broader experience of uncertainty (i.e., 
ambiguous uncertainty) is not the same that the IPCC and Met Office seek to 
communicate (i.e., probabilistic uncertainty). Specifically, the majority of climate 
change information that people consume comes through the media rather than from 
climate scientists or formal reports, such as IPCC assessments (Carvalho & Burgess, 
2005; Carvalho 2010). 
Therefore, given that high levels of morality (a central component of trust) 
interact with general uncertainty differently to specific presentations of probabilistic 
uncertainty, one way to increase engagement with a wider audience is to get involved 
in the discussions about the broader uncertainties around climate change in the mass 
media in a way which demonstrates high certainty around the occurrence of human-
induced climate change, whilst recognising specific impacts is variable. This is 
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something advocated by Corbett and Durfee (2004) who state that uncertainty should 
not necessarily be denied or particularly highlighted, but it is important to “place the 
uncertain finding in the proper and objective context of the scientific process” 
(p.143). 
3.3 Advice provision. Science organisations typically prioritise projecting the 
impression of neutrality and independence, and as such may take a non-advisory 
stance in issues like climate change. Indeed, the climate scientists interviewed in 
Chapter 2 felt very strongly that the provision of advice was beyond their role, and 
that doing this could potentially compromise their reputation and authority. However, 
contrary to these fears the findings from Experiment 3 showed that information 
accompanied with generic behavioural advice does not result in negative perceptions 
of the source, and does not have detrimental effects on responses to the information, 
at least not uniformly so. Of course, some (e.g., men) may prefer not to be given 
advice, but others (e.g., women) may be responsive to this.  
The variable effects of advice provision notwithstanding, it is clear that 
scientists do sometimes feel advice is appropriate and do not express the same level of 
reputation concern about this. For example, if one considers extreme weather events, 
scientific organisations involved in weather are forthcoming about warning and 
advising the public to take action. Under the guidance of the National Severe Weather 
Warnings
19
, weather warnings are colour coded: yellow (be aware), amber (be 
prepared), and red (take action). When communicating such warnings, those 
responsible would naturally assume, and indeed desire, that the public will respond 
and “take action”. This reveals a distinctly different organisational attitude when it 
                                                        
19 http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/public/weather/warnings/#?tab=map&map=Warnings&zoom=8&lon=-
3.53&lat=55.50&fcTime=1393977600 
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comes to the behavioural advice with respect to weather, in comparison to 
behavioural advice in relation to climate change.  
With this in mind, the hesitation of scientists may be more about the political 
nature of the domain rather than the provision of advice per se. The provision of 
advice about climate change invariably has political connotations. In addition, the 
spatial and temporal features of climate change may make it easier for scientists – as 
well as the public – to defer responsibility for taking action on this. However, if 
human-induced climate change is considered “extremely likely” by scientists 
themselves, and if the projected impacts of this are as reliable as projections in other 
domains (e.g., weather forecasting), then one could be entitled to question the 
inconsistent attitude about advice provision across these domains. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to address that issue, it can be said that advice 
provision may not be as detrimental as scientists fear. Moreover, from a 
communication perspective, it seems somewhat odd to convince the public of the 
urgent reality of climate change without also advising about behavioural options in 
response.  
3.4 Identity threat. Some of the findings presented in Chapters 3 and 4 can be 
interpreted in the context of identity threat and motivated reasoning. These theories 
suggest that information is attenuated to and evaluated in ways that validate pre-
existing beliefs and identity (e.g., van Prooijen & Sparks, 2014; Harris & Napper, 
2005; Steele, 1988). Communication implications from this would be to avoid 
messages that may potentially threaten existing behaviours and identity, but instead 
focus on motivational aspects within messages. A specific example drawing on 
findings within this thesis would be in considering why increased uncertainty reduced 
pro-environmental travel intentions, but not within the household (Chapter 4). 
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Interpreting this through an identity threat lens, such reluctance to change travel 
behaviour may be because due to its link to identity and freedom (e.g., Chatterton, 
Musselwhite, Lyons, & Clegg, 2009; Thomas, Walker, & Musselwhite, 2014). Thus, 
in this example it may be more effective to avoid messages that bluntly say to cut 
down car-use, but rather focus on social and economical benefits of cycling more.  
 
4. Methodological Insights 
This program of research showed how different methodologies can be 
successfully used together to arrive at a more complete understanding of climate 
change communication. Situating this research within a pragmatic epistemology and 
combining quantitative/ qualitative methodologies resulted in an insightful and 
interesting piece of research. Moreover, the iterative and flexible approach allowed 
the research presented here to develop organically.  
In starting this research with qualitative interviews (Chapter 2) I provided a 
deeper insight into the process of communication from the perspective of two key 
actors within that, this work also substantially informed the experimental studies that 
followed. The shift to experimental designs allowed me to investigate the themes that 
emerged from the qualitative data - specifically how these themes related to audience 
responses (Chapter 3). The final survey (Chapter 4) enabled me to then take the ideas 
learnt from the experimental work and apply them to a real organisation, rather than 
the hypothetical organisation used in the experimental work. Within the final survey 
(Chapter 4) there was the opportunity to probe deeper into how such perceptions were 
built, by qualitatively examining the verbatim responses. Thus, this iterative approach 
allowed me to take each piece of research further and feed into the next studies. 
Together these studies closed the circle between sources of information, 
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communication specialists, audiences, and back to the real organisations involved in 
this activity. 
In my opinion, it is restricting to commit to either one of the binary 
epistemological traditions (be it positivist or constructivist) and applying a single 
method approach design to research. Instead, I would advocate the application of a 
pragmatist epistemological framework (e.g., Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; Morgan 
& Smircich, 1980; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Maxcy, 2003; Guba & Lincoln, 
2005; Creswell, 2003) and mixed methodology (e.g., Snape & Spencer, 2003; Greene, 
Caracelli, & Graham, 1989; Yardley & Bishop, 2008; Lee, 1991). Key to the 
pragmatist approach is that the research is not fitted to the method, but rather the 
methods are flexible in approaching the research of interest. 
Within the research presented in this thesis, the flexible and iterative nature of 
a pragmatic approach and mixed methods was appropriate and fruitful in their 
application. This allowed the exploration of the perspectives of different actors within 
a communications process. For example, studying the issue of uncertainty 
qualitatively provided a better understanding of its challenges and importance to 
communication in the eyes of the scientist. During this qualitative work I also gained 
insights into how communicators perceive scientists to construct uncertainty and to 
what effect (as also implicitly seen in discourse of scientists). I then took a 
quantifiable representation of uncertainty (in the form of impacts likelihoods) to 
investigate how audiences respond to this.  
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5. Strengths and Limitations 
Although this research has produced some important insights, there are of 
course limitations that should be considered when digesting the results presented here 
and their interpretations.  
The findings from the qualitative work presented in Chapter 2 had its 
limitations in the sense of being carried out within a specific and sole organisation, 
and location. The findings may well be context focussed, highlighting specific 
organisational values and workplace nuances. Despite this, the findings from this 
piece of research can deepen understanding of communication practices.  
Notably, Experiments 1 and 2 were carried out among a student campus-based 
sample. However, there were cost, time and logistical benefits in using this 
recruitment method. Convenience-sampling methods such as this made for a good 
arena to build ideas and test theories. Experiment 3, in contrast, consisted of a large 
and non-student population that allowed me to look beyond the university campus 
community. I note that this sample was not strictly random in that, though the sample 
was broad and large (>400), these people had voluntarily joined the online loyalty 
programme to participate in surveys. That said, the data provided from this sample 
was insightful and reminded us that, while using a student sample has its uses, it 
should not be the only sample of study (often consisting of young, female, first year 
psychology students). I was able to draw conclusions from the Pilot and Experiment 1 
and 2 (student samples). When moving to a wider sample, I was able to get a better 
insight into the patterns previously seen, validating these findings. 
Drawing upon epistemological insights, certain limitations are apparent when 
considering the manipulations of climate change impacts in the experimental work. 
For instance, though these were presented in a positivist fashion (i.e., probabilities 
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indicating a logical and mathematical process behind the knowledge), and responses 
were quantifiable (i.e., measured on a scale), we as researchers tend to assume 
respondents will perceive such impacts as intended. However, as Budescu, Broomell 
and Por (2009) have shown, respondents’ judgments of probabilities vary somewhat: 
interpretations vary between participants and they vary from organisational (IPCC) 
guidelines. The final study (Chapter 4) explored responses to perceived uncertainty 
when said ‘uncertainty’ was not predefined (i.e., when not presenting climate 
impacts). In this instance the participant constructed the ‘uncertainty’, and each 
participant responded within his or her own construction of uncertainty. Both 
measures of climate change uncertainty are useful to engage in and explore, though 
each has their own strengths and limitations. Being aware of these limitations are 
important in digesting the findings. Utilising a mixture of methods approach can help 
in overcoming particular weaknesses that some methods and epistemological 
frameworks may bring. 
Relatedly, while the experimental designs could help control aspects of 
interest (such as the manipulations of language and uncertainty), we do not know 
what is salient in people’s mind when responding to the surveys exploring 
uncertainty. For example, Capstick and Pidgeon (2013) have suggested that when 
participants respond in weather and climate studies, results may inadvertently be 
framed by the cultural elements i.e., people of the UK hold a certain cultural 
significance towards the weather. Broadly speaking, it should be acknowledged that 
there may be a limited generalisability beyond the UK, as all responses will, to some 
extent, be framed within UK frames of reference. 
Another limitation of this work was discussed earlier in this chapter (section 
2.8.3). That is, although I have inferred that open language shapes perceptions of 
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morality, the actual evidence for this has been variable across the experiments. 
However, this does not mean to say that perceptions of communicator morality are 
not central to the communications process. Indeed, some of the observed effects of 
perceived morality were demonstrated on important outcome variables independent of 
the language manipulation. Specifically, in the studies where language variation was 
not used as the proxy for morality perceptions (Experiment 2 in Chapter 3, and the 
survey in Chapter 4), perceptions of morality were still a key variable that determined 
responses to uncertainty about climate change. 
The audience of focus in the quantitative parts of this thesis is limited to 
individual-based public audiences. In future research, it would be interesting to 
examine how the findings presented in this thesis would apply to a wider audience of 
climate change communication (such as policy-makers). Furthermore, it would also 
be fruitful in future to widen the behavioural responses from individual ‘private-
sphere’ actions (such as household/ travel choices) to ‘public-sphere’ actions (such as 
voting behaviour/ policy acceptance). 
As with all social science research, nothing is perfect. It is important to be 
aware of what and where weaknesses exist. Some of the limitations in this research 
were overcome in approaching the work from multiple directions i.e., using mixed 
methods and recruiting different samples. Where weaknesses could not be overcome 
during the course of the research, the best we can do is be aware of the weaknesses, 
learn from it and make changes in any future research. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
In recognising the importance of effective climate change communications in 
shaping attitudes and behaviours in response to changing climates, I studied the 
dynamics of such communications from the perspective of three key actors: scientists, 
communicators and publics. I also explored the challenges inherent in effective 
climate change communications, specifically the issue of uncertainty – including how 
uncertainty is perceived and described by scientists and communicators, and how 
audiences responded to this. I showed that varying the language peripheral to the 
probabilistic uncertainty can have effects on how people responded to the information 
contained. For example, open language styles (which sometimes signalled morality) 
seemed to encourage positive responses to uncertainty (particularly among females), 
whereas closed language seemed more neutral in its effects on audience responses to 
uncertainty (although males did seem more receptive to this style in at least one 
study). The research here also points to the importance of how different 
subpopulations may respond differently to different communication styles, the 
information content, and the provision of advice. Therefore, addressing the scientific 
uncertainties in communication of climate change may not necessarily mean altering 
the content of information itself. Rather, modifying the language peripheral to the 
information that contains uncertainty, and attending to the ways in which audiences 
perceive the sources of uncertain information, may help to engage in effective 
communication around the complex issue of climate change. 
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Invitation to take part in a discussion about your views on communicating 
climate change information 
 
Dear all, 
 
At this stage of the research we would like to speak with a small number of 
participants.  This will involve one-to-one discussions lasting up to 60 minutes 
during November/December at a time and location to suit the individual – this can 
be in a private meeting room in your workplace, at Exeter University or at your 
home if this is your preference.   
 
These discussions are an opportunity for you to share your experiences, thoughts 
and opinions on the topic of communication of climate science.  Whatever your 
role I would be interested in hearing from you. 
 
We will be treating all interviews in the strictest confidence. Your workplace as an 
organisation and individuals within it will not have knowledge of who has been 
interviewed (unless you share this information).  Each interview will be recorded 
for the purposes of analysis, but the recordings and transcripts will only be 
accessed by the research team and will be destroyed once our reporting is 
complete.  In our reporting of the set of interviews or in any other communication 
outside of our research team we shall not identify your name with any particular 
statement – everything you tell us will be anonymised. 
 
On the following page is a small set of questions to help us in identifying 
participants.  If you feel that you would like to take part, please return the 
completed form back to myself as the PhD researcher, Hebba Haddad, no later 
than ** DATE SET AT TWO WEEKS AFTER DISPATCH OF THIS LETTER**.   
 
 
Best wishes, 
Hebba Haddad 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions about this research: 
email – H.Haddad@exeter.ac.uk ; or telephone 0788-445-***. 
 
Hebba Haddad 
Psychology 
College of Life and Environmental Sciences 
University of Exeter 
Exeter EX4 4QG
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Dynamics of Communicating Climate 
Change Information 
 
Thank you for showing an interest to take part in this study.  We would like to 
establish a few background details about you. 
 
Please be assured that all information provided will be kept anonymous and 
confidential, and no personal details about who is specifically being interview will 
be passed to your employer.    
 
Please complete the questions below and return this document by email to 
H.Haddad@exeter.ac.uk 
 
1. Your name:   
2. Contact telephone number:   
3. Contact email address:   
4. Gender:   
5. Age:   
6. How long have you been working in this workplace? 
7. What is your job title/role in your workplace:   
a. If you are a scientist, what area of science do you focus on?   
b. If you are not a scientist, what area of work do you focus on?   
8. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = very junior, 5 = very senior), how would you 
describe your level of seniority?   
9. Who would you say are your primary audiences of communication (e.g. 
public, government, industry, academic, other)?   
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU. I will be in touch soon 
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Dynamics of climate change 
communication 
 
Consent form 
 
 
The interview will be recorded and transcribed.  All data will be held 
securely and not passed to any third party.  Your name will not appear on 
the transcript.  The research team may use selected quotes from the 
interview when writing research reports, and will maintain anonymity of all 
participants. 
 
 
I understand that the information will be collected and used in analysis [  ] 
 
 
It may be that we approach you at a later stage of the study 
Yes, this would be fine  [ ] 
No, I would rather not  [ ] 
   
 
I am aware and agree that my interview for the research project ‘Dynamics 
of Communicating Climate Change Information’.  This research will form 
part of the researcher’s PhD research. 
 
 
Name   _______________________ 
 
 
Signature  _______________________ 
 
 
Date  _______________________ 
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Dynamics of Communicating Climate 
Change Information 
 
Project Aims: 
The broad aim of the research conducted within this CASE studentship is to explore 
the process of communicating climate change information, with a particular focus 
on issues of trust and the management of scientific uncertainty in that process. 
 
This broad aim will be accomplished by using qualitative and quantitative research 
methodologies among various actors relevant to the communication process - 
including the public as the recipients of climate change communication and 
yourselves as the transmitters of climate change information.  
 
By triangulating the research to explore these issues from different sides of the 
communication processes, it is hoped that the research will provide a more 
complete analysis of the barriers and opportunities for communication and provide 
information/ advice that will connect to the specific concerns of all those involved 
in this activity (i.e. audiences and communicators alike). 
 
Specific Interview Objectives include: 
 
i. To get a better understanding of how climate science experts and 
communicators perceive the process of climate change communication.  
 
ii. To identify the audiences these experts are seeking to engage with and how 
they plan their communication activities in relation to different audiences. 
 
iii. To explore what communicators of climate science and their audiences 
perceive as effective communication of climate science information.  
 
iv. To explore the perceived barriers to communicating climate change 
information effectively.  
 
v. To explore issues of trust and uncertainty from the perspective of those 
who are trying to engage audiences with their message and from those who 
are the audience for these messages.  
 
 
If you would like to discuss your participation in this research further, or if you 
would like to receive a summary of the findings from this phase of the research, 
please feel free to contact me the PhD researcher, Hebba Haddad, at 
H.Haddad@exeter.ac.uk ; or telephone 0788-445-***
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Outline Topic Guide 
 
1. Introduction 
 Thanks for agreeing to take part in this discussion, No right or wrong answer – 
just want your views 
 Everything you say is confidential and anonymous – and your employer will 
not know who will be interviewed 
 The recordings will be transcribed, analysed and anonymous quotations may 
be used in a later write-up 
  Please sign this consent form, which includes I may need to approach again at 
a later date 
 
2. Build-up 
 Time spent working at your current workplace  
 Tell me a bit about your current job - your role/job here 
 
3. Perceptions of key audiences 
 Perceptions of your Audience(s)/Public: who do you see as the main 
consumers of climate change information? 
 Beliefs of public’s perceptions of risk and uncertainty: So tell me – how do 
you think the public see the uncertainty associated with climate science? 
 Trust of your audience(s): Do you trust your audience? 
 Engagement with the public: Do you think the public would appreciate 
scientists/communicators of climate science to engage with the public? 
 Beliefs of public perceptions of organisation/scientists:  How do you think the 
public might see this workplace? 
 Trust (audience trust of organisation/scientists): Do you think your audience 
trusts you? 
 Influence on audience:  Do you think you have much influence on your 
audiences compared, to say, the media? 
 
4. Perceptions of science communicators, scientists and science 
 Perceptions of scientists/science communicators: How do you imagine a 
‘typical’ scientist/science communicator to be? 
 Perceptions of science: What role do you see your science to have? 
 Uncertainty in science:  Do you think uncertainty is inherent in all sciences? 
 
5. Communication Process(es) 
 The process: So tell me – how does this work: how do you see the process of 
communicating climate change information? 
 Meaning of effective communication: How do you know if a communication 
chain was successful? 
 Balancing the scientists, audience and the media: do you see there to be 
demands from different groups when dealing with communicating uncertain 
science messages? 
 Internal perceptions of external communication: How do you think others 
within your workplace see communication process? 
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6. Barriers to effective communication of climate science 
 Perception of the communication problem: Do you think there are barriers in 
communicating climate science – and what are these? 
 Perceived barriers and increase information use:  Do you think there are 
barriers in people using the climate science information you’re 
communicating? 
 Best practice and training for communicating: Is there some guide for 
communicating to different audiences: if so, what? 
 
7. Wider Issues 
 Ideal scenario of communicating climate science: If you could change or do 
one thing to improve the communication process – what would this be and 
why? 
 Future of climate science communication: In general, how do you see the 
future of climate science communication? 
 
8. Finish 
 Is there anything else you think is important or that you would like to add? 
 Just to remind you everything you’ve said is completely anonymous and 
confidential 
 Many thanks for this discussion.  Here are my contact details should you wish 
to add anything later or want further information on the project 
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Language manipulations shown in bold 
 
In this study, we are interested in your impressions of the Hanley Centre. Because you may not 
have heard of the Hanley Centre and their work, below is a brief description. As you read this 
text, try and form an impression of the Hanley Centre, who they are and what they do. Then 
answer the questions that follow.  As you answer our questions, keep in mind that there are no 
right or wrong answers; we just want your opinion. 
 
 
 
We are / The Hanley Centre a world-leading group with expertise 
researching changes in the earth’s climate. Changes in the world’s climate 
over time is known as climate change.   
 
We / The Hanley Centre attribute(s) this change to increased amounts of 
greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide and methane) in the atmosphere, which 
leads to warming of the planet.  Using data available (such as temperature, 
clouds, sea level) we / the Hanley Centre develop(s) climate models to 
predict how the climate is likely to be in the future.  Based on our / Hanley 
Centre research, it is very likely that climate change is caused by human 
activity, such as burning fossil fuels (e.g. petrol and coal) and changing land 
use (such as chopping down forests).   
 
Our / Hanley Centre research also shows that the likely impacts of climate 
change include the earth getting warmer, more flooding, longer periods of 
drought, more storms and hurricanes, more frequent heat waves, melting of 
the ice caps and a rise in sea level.  Our / The Hanley Centre’s work 
suggests that climate change will likely lead to changes in wildlife – for 
example some species may become extinct, and some plant life may become 
eroded.   
 
Drawing on world-leading research, we / the Hanley Centre also predict 
that impacts of climate change are likely to have consequences for humans’ 
health, social and economic well-being – for example some diseases can 
become more widespread, and food and water shortages may become critical 
in some parts of the world. 
 
 
 
Appendix 3.1 Pilot Study  
 314 
Based on the above text, what do you think about the Hanley Centre summary of climate 
change?  Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
When reading the above information…                                
 Not at all    Extremely 
I felt I understood the information presented to me 
above 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt I didn’t understand this message 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I found the message easy to understand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I found the message engaging 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I was strongly motivated to take into account the 
information provided by the Hanley Centre 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I wanted to know more about the science of 
climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I wanted to know more about what to do about 
climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I tuned out 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt this message was designed to inform me 
about climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt this message was deigned to influence my 
behaviour to reduce the impacts of climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I was expecting information on what I can 
personally do about climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I was not expecting information on what I can 
personally do about climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Based on what you read, we asked you to form an impression of the Hanley Centre. Take a 
moment to think again of the impression you formed. How do you see the source of this 
message? 
      Not at all                     Extremely 
Competent                    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Moral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Distant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
United 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Knowledgeable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Objective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Influential 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Compassionate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Amateurish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Corrupt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Capable of feeling 
emotions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Efficient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Understanding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Biased 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Sincere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hindering 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Good-natured 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Inept 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Deep 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Skilful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Powerful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Immoral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Well-intentioned 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Superficial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Useless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Clinical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Untrustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Divided 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Capable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Authoritarian 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Proud 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Subjective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Credible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Prestigious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Informative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Thinking about what you have read, and your more general impressions, how would you 
describe the current state of research into climate change? Below are a number of statements. 
Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with each of these. 
           Strongly                Strongly 
           disagree        agree 
Based on my opinion, I would trust the Hanley Centre 
as a source of information about climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would not trust the Hanley Centre as a source of 
information about climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I trust climate scientists as a source of information 
about climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not trust climate scientists as a source of 
information about climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I trust climate science 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not trust climate science 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I trust climate scientists 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not trust climate scientists 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I trust scientists 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not trust scientists 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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I feel at personal risk from the consequences of 
climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel there is s global risk of the consequences of 
climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think bad consequences of climate change are likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think it is likely that climate change is happening  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think it is unlikely that climate change is happening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think it is likely that climate change is man-made 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think it is unlikely that climate change is man-made 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There is general agreement about the causes and 
consequences of climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Experts are united in their position on climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Experts in this area often disagree with each other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Different groups in this field tend to work 
cooperatively with each other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Different groups in this field are in competition with 
each other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There is still considerable uncertainty about the 
causes and consequences of climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Where there is uncertainty in climate science, it 
suggests that the scientists don't know what they are 
doing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Where there is uncertainty in climate science, it 
suggest that the scientists are following the scientific 
method 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Where there is uncertainty in climate science, it 
suggests that the scientists are protecting themselves 
in case they are wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Where there is uncertainty in climate science, it 
suggests that there is a range of possibilities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Uncertainty in climate science is a sign of 
competence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Now we would like to ask you a number of questions about yourself. 
     
1. Are you            Male Female         
 
2. How old are you?  ………… 
 
3. Would you consider yourself a scientist?  Yes No 
 
4. Are you a student?  Yes No 
 
5. My degree/background/job is …………………………………… 
 
 
 
Thanks very much! 
Appendix 3.2 Experiment 1  
 317 
 
 
 
 
This study is part of a project being conducted in collaboration with the Linford Centre 
for Climate Research (LCCR). This organisation is interested in how people perceive 
them and the issue of climate change. In the survey, you will be presented with 
information about this organisation and their work and then asked for your own 
impressions. 
 
The survey should take 15 to 20 minutes to complete.  The questions we ask you 
should not be too hard.  Most of the time, you will be able to express your attitudes and 
beliefs simply by circling a number on a scale that best corresponds to what you 
personally think.   
 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary and your responses to 
the survey will remain anonymous and confidential.  The information you provide 
will be used only for the purposes of research.  At no time will we ask you for 
information that could be used to identify who you are.  Where we do ask you for 
personal information, this will be used only for the purposes of describing the sample of 
people who completed our survey. 
 
If you have read and understood the above, and you are happy to participate in our 
research, please turn the page and begin the survey.  While you are answering our 
questions, please remember there are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers, we are only 
interested in what you personally think.   
 
Thanks for agreeing to participate in our research – we really appreciate it!!! 
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CLIMATE RESEARCH AND THE LINFORD CENTRE 
 
In this study, we are interested in your responses to research findings being produced by the 
Linford Centre. Because you may not have heard of the Linford Centre and their work, below is 
a brief description taken from their website. Read the description so that you understand a little 
bit about the Linford Centre and their work: 
 
Open language condition 
 
 
Closed language condition 
 
 
Have you previously heard about the Linford Centre and their work?  
a. Yes 
b. No 
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c. Unsure 
 
Based on their web profile, what are your immediate impressions of the Linford centre? For 
example, what kind of organisation do you think it is? And what kind of people do you think 
work there? Take a moment to think about the impression you have formed. It might be useful 
to look again at their web profile. In the space below, please list any impressions you have 
formed about this organisation based on their web profile and the description it contains.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now that you’ve had a moment to think about the Linford Centre and have formed some 
impression, we would like to ask you a few more specific questions about this. Specifically, 
please rate the extent to which you think each of the following qualities is reflected in your 
impression of this organisation. Again, it might be useful to look back at their web profile before 
you answer: 
 
  
Not at 
all           Extremely 
Professional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Serious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Corporate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Casual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Relaxed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Credible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Competent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Moral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Distant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Influential 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Efficient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sincere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Prestigious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Powerful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Capable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Proud 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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As you already know from their web-profile, the Linford Centre is involved in modelling the 
possible effects of climate change. Below is a summary of their work, also taken from their 
website. This summary contains their most recent predictions about climate change and its 
impacts. Take a moment to read through these predictions and think about what they mean 
because we will ask you some questions about it later. 
 
 
High uncertainty in the Open language condition 
 
 
 
High uncertainty in the Closed language condition 
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Low uncertainty in the Open language condition 
 
 
 
Low uncertainty in the Closed language condition 
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What is your interpretation of the findings about climate change produced by the Linford 
Centre? In the space below, please list any thoughts you had while reading the above summary 
of their research. 
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Thinking about all the things you have read, what is your overall impression of this organisation’s 
work? Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with each of the statements below. 
  
Strongly 
disagree     
Strongly 
agree 
I understand the meaning of the Linford Centre’s 
research  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not understand what this research is supposed to 
mean 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I found the summary engaging 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I was strongly motivated to take into account the 
information provided by the Linford Centre 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When reading information about this research, I wanted 
to know more about the science of climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I wanted to know more about what to do about climate 
change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I tuned out while reading about this organisation’s 
research 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt this summary was intended to inform me about 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt this summary was intended to influence my 
behaviour to reduce the impacts of climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Whilst reading the climate change information, I was 
expecting information on what I can personally do about 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I was not expecting information on what I can personally 
do about climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Based on their research, the Linford Centre seems to be 
a trustworthy source of information about climate 
change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Based on what I have read, I would find it hard to trust 
the Linford Centre as a source of information about 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would rather have information on what I can personally 
do about climate change, than the science behind it 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think it is important to know about the science of 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would rather scientists kept the science-talk of climate 
change amongst themselves 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I'm not interested in understanding the science behind 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Based on the impressions you have formed, who do you think the information from the Linford Centre is 
targeted to?                 Yes,  
 Not at all                     definitely 
The general public 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Scientists 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Policymakers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Academics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Local governments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
National government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Politicians 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Businesses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate scientists 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Someone like me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Thank you for providing your impressions of the Linford Centre and 
their work. Now we would like to know a little bit more about your 
attitudes and opinions about the more general issues related to Climate 
Change. The remainder of this survey is concerned with your more 
general opinions about these issues. 
 
First we would like to know who you consider trustworthy with the topic of climate change. 
 
 When it comes to communicating climate change 
information, I trust… 
Not at all 
        
  
Very 
much so 
The media generally 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
TV and Radio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Broadsheet newspapers (e.g. the Guardian) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tabloid newspapers (e.g. the Daily Mail) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The Internet in general 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Scientists in general 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Government scientists (such as the Met Office) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Academic scientists (working in a University) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
International scientists (such as the United Nation's 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Government sources 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Politicians 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Central Governmental (e.g. the Department for Energy 
and Climate Change - DECC) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Local governments (e.g. city and local councils) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Non-governmental organisations (e.g. Greenpeace, 
WWF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Internet blogs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Real-life interactions (such as with friends/family) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Virtual interaction (social networking Internet sites 
such as Facebook and Twitter) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Now we would like to know more about how you think and feel about the issue of climate 
change in your own life. To what extent do you disagree or agree with each of the following 
statements: 
 
  Strongly 
disagree      
Strongly 
agree 
In my opinion climate change is 
happening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In my opinion climate change is man- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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made 
Human beings are responsible for climate 
change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is a natural process 
rather than something caused by human 
activity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is something that I 
personally believe in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly 
disagree      
Strongly 
agree 
I remain somewhat sceptical about 
climate change and if it is real 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe there is global risk of the 
consequences of climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think there will be bad consequences of 
climate change for the planet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe that the global consequences of 
climate change will be severe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel personally at risk from the 
consequences of climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I personally worry about climate change 
and how it will affect me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
For me, climate change is nothing that I 
am personally concerned about 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not think that climate change affects 
my own personal life in any way 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Most people I know are concerned about 
climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is an issue I talk about 
often within my social network 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Most people who are important to me 
think that it is necessary to act against 
climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is a topic that rarely 
comes up in the conversations that I have 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel there is something I can personally 
do to act against climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel it is in my power to tackle climate 
change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel there is nothing I can do about 
climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe my actions have an influence on 
climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My actions to reduce the effects of 
climate change in my community will 
encourage others to change their actions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Generally speaking, I feel well-informed 
on the issue of climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I always consider the environmental 
consequences of my actions  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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In my own life, I do as much as I can to 
reduce the impact of climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There is nothing that I do specifically in 
response to climate change  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Things that I already do which are good 
for the environment (such as walking), I 
would be doing anyway 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Things that I do which seem pro-
environmental, I do for the environment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I go out of my way to behave pro-
environmentally 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   
Strongly 
disagree      
 
Strongly 
agree 
I am waiting for definitive scientific 
evidence on climate change before I 
change my behaviour to respond to 
climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am waiting for government to take the 
lead on climate change before changing 
my behaviour for the sake of the 
environment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Is there anything that you already do in your daily life to take action on climate change? 
 
To what extent do you do each of the 
following for environmental reasons… 
No, 
not all         
Yes, very 
much 
Walk instead of using the car 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cycle instead of using the car 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reduce my household energy use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Recycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use a car less 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use public transport instead of the car 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Limit unnecessary air travel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use less water 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reduce, reuse, recycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eat less meat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Regardless of what you are already doing, how willing would you be to engage in each of the 
following behaviours in response to climate change? 
 
To reduce climate change I would be willing 
to… 
Not at 
all 
willing         
Very 
willing 
Walk (more) instead of using the car 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cycle (more) instead of using the car 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reduce my household energy use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Recycle (more) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use a car less 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Use public transport (more) instead of the car 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Limit unnecessary air travel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use less water 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reduce, reuse, recycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eat less meat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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What is your general impression of the state of climate science and the scientists who research 
Climate Change? 
 
  
Strongly 
disagree     
 
Strongly 
agree 
There is still considerable uncertainty about the 
causes of climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There is general agreement about the causes and 
consequences of climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Experts are united in their position on climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Experts in this area often disagree with each other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Different groups in the field of climate change 
research tend to work cooperatively with each other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Different groups in the field of climate change 
research are in competition with each other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When it comes to the science of climate change, I 
would rather have a clear message, rather than one 
that includes all the uncertainties 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When it comes to climate science, I personally find 
the caveats of scientific uncertainty difficult to 
understand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I find the caveats of scientific uncertainty unhelpful 
when understanding the issue of climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think it is important to fully understand all the 
uncertainties associated with climate science 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate scientists don’t really know for certain what 
climate change will look like 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Where there is uncertainty in climate science, it 
suggests that the scientists don’t know what they are 
doing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Where there is uncertainty in climate science, it 
suggest that the scientists are following the scientific 
method 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Scientists use uncertainty in their science as a way of 
protecting themselves in case they are wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Where there is uncertainty in climate science, it 
simply suggests that there is a range of possibilities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Uncertainty in climate science is a sign of competence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Uncertainty is a normal part of scientific work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel that scientists understand the needs of the 
general public when it comes to climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
As a member of the public, I feel that scientists trust 
me to understand their work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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I feel that climate scientists are sometimes too pushy 
when communicating about climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel that scientists sometimes have a hidden agenda 
when it comes to climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
 
Strongly 
disagree      
  
Strongly 
agree 
I think that scientists are sometimes biased in their 
opinions about climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Scientists should only provide the facts about climate 
change, and should not tell me how to act in response 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would find it helpful if scientists would also tell me 
how to respond to climate change when providing the 
climate science 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If scientists told me what to do in response to climate 
change, I would lose trust in them 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not expect scientists to tell me what to do to 
respond to climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is the responsibility of scientists to advise me on 
what do to about climate change as well as the 
science behind it 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Scientists' primary role should be to inform policy on 
climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is up to governments, not scientists, to tell society 
what to do in response to climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When policies are based on science, I think it is 
important for the public to understand the science 
behind it 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I can accept a policy which is based on science, 
without fully understanding the science behind it 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In general, I am fearful of scientists 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In general, I trust scientists 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think that scientists often sit in ivory towers, 
without really understanding the real world 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Scientists are primarily interested in conveying the 
truth about what they know 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Scientists are not really interested in engaging with 
the public 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I don't feel I need to know the science of climate 
change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would like climate scientists to be more definite 
with their information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Generally I am interested in science 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When people 'talk science' it often bores me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If I don't understand the climate science it is my fault 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If I don't understand the climate science it means that 
it has not been communicated very well 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Finally, we need to know a little bit about you…. 
     
1. Are you          Male Female         
 
2. How old are you?  ………… 
 
3. How would you rate you level of previous scientific training? 
a. I have had no science training at all 
b. I have had some scientific training through my previous studies 
c. I have had quite a lot of scientific training through my previous studies 
d. Most of my previous studies have been in the area of science. As such I 
have had a lot of training 
 
4. Do you own or have access to a car?  Yes No 
 
5. Do you live in: 
a. Catered halls of residence 
b. Self-catered halls of residence 
c. Private shared accommodation 
d. Other.  Please specify…………………………… 
 
6. Please use the below box for any comments you may have… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thanks very much! That’s the end of our survey. 
If you are interested in learning more about climate change, please see the next 
page.  
If not, please return your survey to the experimenter 
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This study is part of a project being conducted in collaboration with the 
Linford Centre for Climate Research (LCCR). This organisation is interested 
in how people perceive them and the issue of climate change. In the survey, 
you will be presented with information about this organisation and their work 
and then asked for your own impressions. 
 
The survey should take no more than 10 minutes to complete.  The 
questions we ask you should not be too hard.  Most of the time, you will be 
able to express your attitudes and beliefs simply by circling a number on a 
scale that best corresponds to what you personally think.   
 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary and your 
responses to the survey will remain anonymous and confidential.  The 
information you provide will be used only for the purposes of research.  At no 
time will we ask you for information that could be used to identify who you 
are.  Where we do ask you for personal information, this will be used only for 
the purposes of describing the sample of people who completed our survey. 
 
If you have read and understood the above, and you are happy to participate 
in our research, please turn the page and begin the survey.  While you are 
answering our questions, please remember there are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ 
answers, we are only interested in what you personally think.   
 
Thanks for agreeing to participate in our research – we really appreciate it !!! 
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CLIMATE RESEARCH AND THE LINFORD CENTRE 
 
In this study, we are interested in your responses to research findings being 
produced by the Linford Centre. Because you may not have heard of the Linford 
Centre and their work, below is a brief description taken from their website. Read 
the description so that you understand a little bit about the Linford Centre and 
their work: 
 
Here is some information about the organisation (please read): 
Open language condition 
 
Closed language condition 
 
 
Have you previously heard about the Linford Centre and their work?  
d. Yes 
e. No 
f. Unsure 
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Here is some information about their work (please read): 
 
High uncertainty in the Open language condition 
 
 
 
Low uncertainty in the Open language condition 
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High uncertainty in the Closed language condition 
 
 
Low uncertainty in the Closed language condition 
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Based on their web profile, what are your immediate impressions of the Linford 
centre? For example, what kind of organisation do you think it is? And what kind of 
people do you think work there? Take a moment to think about the impression you 
have formed. It might be useful to look again at their web profile. In the space 
below, please list any impressions you have formed about this organisation based on 
their web profile and the description it contains.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Take a moment to think again of the impression you formed. To what extent are 
each of the following adjectives part of the impression of the Linford Centre? In my 
impression, the Linford Centre is... 
 
  
Not at 
all 
          Extremely 
Competent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Moral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Professional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Casual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sincere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Capable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Distant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Immoral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Efficient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Thinking about all the things you have read, what is your overall impression of this 
organisation’s work? Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with 
each of the statements below. 
 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
          
Strongly 
agree 
I found the summary description of 
the Linford Centre engaging 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I tuned out while reading about this 
organisation’s research 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When reading information about this 
organisation’s research, I wanted to 
know more about the science of 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Based on their web profile, I was 
strongly motivated to take into 
account the information provided by 
the Linford Centre 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
After read the webpages, I wanted to 
know more about what to do about 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I understand the meaning of the 
Linford Centre’s research 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not understand what this 
research is supposed to mean 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt this organisation's summary was 
intended to inform me about climate 
change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt this summary was intended to 
influence my behaviour to reduce the 
impacts of climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Based on their research, the Linford 
Centre seems to be a trustworthy 
source of information about climate 
change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Based on what I have read, I would 
find it hard to trust the Linford 
Centre as a source of information 
about climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Now we would like to know more about how you think and feel about the issue of 
climate change in your own life. To what extent do you disagree or agree with each 
of the following statements: 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
          
Strongly 
agree 
In my opinion climate change is 
happening 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In my opinion climate change is man-
made 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Human beings are responsible for 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is a natural process 
rather than something caused by 
human activity 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is something that I 
personally believe in 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I remain somewhat sceptical about 
climate change and if it is real 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe there is global risk of the 
consequences of climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think there will be bad 
consequences of climate change for 
the planet 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe that the global 
consequences of climate change will 
be severe 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel personally at risk from the 
consequences of climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I personally worry about climate 
change and how it will affect me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
For me, climate change is nothing 
that I am personally concerned about 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Regardless of what you are already doing, how willing would you be to engage in 
each of the following behaviours in response to climate change? 
To reduce the impact of climate 
change I would be willing to… 
Not at all willing       
Very 
willing 
Walk (more) instead of using the car 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cycle (more) instead of using the car 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reduce my household energy use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Recycle (more) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use a car less 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use public transport (more) instead 
of the car 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Limit unnecessary air travel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use less water 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Reduce, reuse, recycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eat less meat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Finally, we need to know a little bit about you…. 
     
1. Are you          Male Female         
 
2. How old are you?  ………… 
 
3. How would you rate you level of previous scientific training? 
e. I have had no science training at all 
f. I have had some scientific training through my previous studies 
g. I have had quite a lot of scientific training through my previous studies 
h. Most of my previous studies have been in the area of science. As such I 
have had a lot of training 
 
4. What is your course of study? ……………………………… 
 
5. What year of your course are you in? ………… 
 
6. Do you own or have access to a car?  Yes No 
 
7. Do you live in: 
e. Catered halls of residence 
f. Self-catered halls of residence 
g. Private shared accommodation 
h. Other.  Please specify…………………………… 
 
8. Please use the below box for any comments you may have… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That’s the end of our survey 
Thanks very much! 
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This study is part of a project being conducted in collaboration with the Linford Centre 
for Climate Research (LCCR). This organisation is interested in how people perceive 
them and the issue of climate change. In the survey, you will be presented with 
information about this organisation and their work and then asked for your own 
impressions. 
 
The survey should take no more than 15-20 minutes to complete.  The questions we 
ask you should not be too hard.  Most of the time, you will be able to express your 
attitudes and beliefs simply by circling a number on a scale that best corresponds to 
what you personally think.   
 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary and your responses to 
the survey will remain anonymous and confidential.  The information you provide will 
be used only for the purposes of research.  At no time will we ask you for information 
that could be used to identify who you are.  Where we do ask you for personal 
information, this will be used only for the purposes of describing the sample of people 
who completed our survey. 
 
If you have read and understood the above, and you are happy to participate in our 
research, please turn the page and begin the survey.  While you are answering our 
questions, please remember there are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers, we are only 
interested in what you personally think.   
As a token of our appreciation for participating in this survey, we would like to give you 
the chance to be entered into a prize draw for Amazon vouchers. For this you would 
need to enter your contact details below, but this information will in no way be kept 
and related to your responses. 
Thanks for agreeing to participate in our research – we really appreciate it !!! 
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CLIMATE RESEARCH AND THE LINFORD CENTRE 
 
In this study, we are interested in your responses to research findings being 
produced by the Linford Centre. Because you may not have heard of the Linford 
Centre and their work, below is a brief description taken from their website. Read 
the description so that you understand a little bit about the Linford Centre and 
their work: 
 
Here is some information about the organisation. Please read this carefully because 
we will ask you some questions later about your impressions of this organisation: 
 
Open language condition 
 
Closed language condition 
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Have you previously heard about the Linford Centre and their work?  
g. Yes 
h. No 
i. Unsure 
 
 
Based on their web profile, what are your immediate impressions of the Linford 
centre? For example, what kind of organisation do you think it is? And what kind of 
people do you think work there? Take a moment to think about the impression you 
have formed. It might be useful to look again at their web profile. In the space 
below, please list any impressions you have formed about this organisation based on 
their web profile and the description it contains.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Take a moment to think again of the impression you formed. To what extent are 
each of the following adjectives part of the impression of the Linford Centre? In my 
impression, the Linford Centre seems... 
 
  
Not at 
all 
          Extremely 
Competent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Moral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Truthful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Professional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sincere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Capable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Here is some information about the work of the Linford Centre. Again, please read 
this carefully because we will later ask for your impressions of this work. 
 
High uncertainty in the Open language condition 
 
 
 
Low uncertainty in the Open language condition 
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High uncertainty in the Closed language condition 
 
 
 
Low uncertainty in the Closed language condition 
 
 
How certain do you think the scientific community are about the impacts of climate 
change? 
Low 
certainty 
          
High 
certainty 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Thinking about all the things you have read, what is your overall impression of this 
organisation’s work? Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with 
each of the statements below. 
 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
          
Strongly 
agree 
I found the summary description of the 
Linford Centre engaging 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I tuned out while reading about this 
organisation’s research 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When reading information about this 
organisation’s research, I wanted to 
know more about the science of climate 
change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Based on their web profile, I was 
strongly motivated to take into account 
the information provided by the Linford 
Centre 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
After read the webpages, I wanted to 
know more about what to do about 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I understand the meaning of the Linford 
Centre’s research 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not understand what this research 
is supposed to mean 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt this organisation's summary was 
intended to inform me about climate 
change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt this summary was intended to 
influence my behaviour to reduce the 
impacts of climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Based on their research, the Linford 
Centre seems to be a trustworthy 
source of information about climate 
change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Based on what I have read, I would find 
it hard to trust the Linford Centre as a 
source of information about climate 
change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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The Linford Centre is committed to providing people with advice on how people can 
act as a response to climate change. Below is a screenshot of information the 
Linford Centre provides on behaviours people can do in response to climate change. 
Please read. 
 
Advice present in the Open language condition 
 
 
Advice absent in the Open language condition 
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Advice present in the Closed language condition 
 
 
 
 
Advice absent in the Closed language condition 
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Take a moment to think again of the impression you formed. To what extent are 
each of the following adjectives part of the impression of the Linford Centre? In my 
impression, the Linford Centre is... 
 
 
  
Not at 
all 
          Extremely 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Able 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Skilled 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Immoral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Efficient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
In this survey, we are also interested in what you think you can do in response to 
the topic of climate change. Below are some questions regarding the extent to how 
you feel you personally can do something in response to climate change. Please 
indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with each of the following 
statements.  
 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
          
Strongly 
agree 
I feel there is something I can 
personally do to act against climate 
change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel it is in my power to tackle 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel there is nothing I can do about 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe my actions have an 
influence on climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Regardless of what you are already doing, how willing would you be to engage in 
each of the following behaviours in response to climate change? 
 
To reduce the impact of climate 
change I would be willing to… 
Not at all willing       
Very 
willing 
Walk (more) instead of using the car 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cycle (more) instead of using the car 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reduce my household energy use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Recycle (more) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use a car less 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use public transport (more) instead 
of the car 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Limit unnecessary air travel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use less water 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reduce, reuse, recycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eat less meat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
Now we would like to know more about how you think and feel about the issue of 
climate change in your own life. To what extent do you disagree or agree with each 
of the following statements: 
 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
          
Strongly 
agree 
In my opinion climate change is 
happening 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In my opinion climate change is man-
made 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Human beings are responsible for 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is a natural process 
rather than something caused by 
human activity 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is something that I 
personally believe in 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I remain somewhat sceptical about 
climate change and if it is real 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe there is global risk of the 
consequences of climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think there will be bad 
consequences of climate change for 
the planet 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe that the global 
consequences of climate change will 
be severe 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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I feel personally at risk from the 
consequences of climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I personally worry about climate 
change and how it will affect me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
For me, climate change is something 
that I am not personally concerned 
about 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Finally, we need to know a little bit about you…. 
     
1. Are you          Male Female         
 
2. How old are you?  ………… 
 
3. Do you own or have access to a car?  Yes No 
 
 
4. How would you rate you level of previous scientific training? 
i. I have had no science training at all 
j. I have had some scientific training through my previous studies 
k. I have had quite a lot of scientific training through my previous studies 
l. Most of my previous studies have been in the area of science. As such I 
have had a lot of training 
m. I work professionally as a scientist 
 
 
5. Are you a student? Yes   No (Go to question 6) 
i) What is your course of study? ……………………………… 
ii) What year of your course are you in? ………… 
iii) Do you live in: 
i. Catered halls of residence 
j. Self-catered halls of residence 
k. Private shared accommodation 
l. Other.  Please specify…………………………… 
Go to question 8 
 
6.  What is the highest level of education you have completed/finished? 
a. O-levels/ GCSE-grade 
b. 2. A-level or equivalent 
c. 3. Higher National Diploma or equivalent 
d. 4. Degree or equivalent 
e. 5. Post-graduate qualification 
f. 6. Other (please specify) ………………… 
 
 
7. What is the monthly net income of your household (after tax, national insurance and 
other statutory deductions)?  If you are sharing a house, just answer for yourself. 
a. Less than £1,000 per calendar month 
b. Between £1,000 and £1,499 per calendar month  
c. Between £1,500 and £1,999 per calendar month 
d. Between £2,000 and £2,499 per calendar month 
e. Between £2,500 and £2,999 per calendar month 
f. Between £3,000 and £3,499 per calendar month 
g. £3,500 per calendar month or more 
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8. That’s the end of our questions! But if you think that there is something we have 
missed or if there is something else you would like to say about the issues in this 
survey, please give your comments here: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thanks very much! 
 
PLEASE CLICK HERE TO RECEIVE YOUR MAXIMILES POINTS 
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Debriefing information 
Thank you so much for completing this questionnaire and taking part in this PhD 
research – I really appreciate it! 
 
Now that you’ve kindly completed my questionnaire, I would like to tell you a bit more 
about my PhD project. 
 
Though the Linford Centre, I am working in collaboration with a science organisation 
(Met Office Hadley Centre) looking at different communication styles and levels of 
scientific uncertainty. 
 
What we have found so far is that scientists and science communicators have different 
styles when communicating with the public. Scientists prefer to communicate with 
focus on the technical and informational aspects. Whereas communicators view the 
language used to communicate as being a central feature, rather tan simply the 
informational content. The experimental studies conducted so far in this PhD research 
have shown there to be different effects of language style when communicating climate 
change information. Using an open, warm tone of communication, respondents view 
the communicator as being more trustworthy than a cold and distant communication 
style. The higher the level of uncertainty, the less people believe that climate change 
is happening. These negative effects of uncertainty can be buffered by the language 
used i.e., conveying communicator trustworthiness by using a more open tone. 
 
This current questionnaire has taken the previous work of language and uncertainty, 
and adds a further dimension, what the effect of provision of advice on what to do 
about climate change has on people’s intentions to environmentally friendly 
behavioural intentions. As I am currently collecting data for this, I cannot report these 
findings yet. 
 
If you would like to hear of the results of this particular study or further information of 
this PhD research more generally, please feel free to get in touch with myself, Hebba, 
via email – H.Haddad@exeter.ac.uk  
 
Thank you again! 
Hebba 
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Met Office Public Perceptions Survey 
 
In this survey we are interested in your perceptions of the Met Office.  
 
The Met Office (an abbreviation for Meteorological Office) is the United Kingdom's 
national weather service. The Headquarters of the Met Office are located in Exeter, 
Devon. 
 
 
Regardless of your level of knowledge of the Met Office and their work, we would like 
you to think about them – that is, your impressions of the Met Office as an 
organisation.  
 
Because we are interested in your impressions of the Met Office, please be aware that 
there are no right or wrong answers to our questions. We are genuinely interested in 
what you think, even if you have never thought about this topic before. When 
answering our questions, just try to be as open and honest as you can and tell us 
whatever you think is the right answer for you.  
 
All responses to this survey will remain anonymous and confidential. Your answers will 
only be used for the purposes of research, and any findings will be reported in summary 
form, so could not be traced back to you personally. 
 
The survey should take about 10 to 15 minutes to complete. As a token of our 
appreciation for participating in this survey, we would like to give you the chance to be 
entered into a prize draw for a chance to win one of 3 Amazon vouchers worth £20. 
For this you would need to enter your contact details following completion of this 
survey. This information will be stored separately from your responses to the survey 
and will only be used for the purposes of administering prizes. 
 
If you have read and understood the above, and you are happy to take part in this 
research, please tick the following box: 
 
 I have read the above and consent to taking part in this research 
 
 
 
Now you are ready to begin. Please click the “Next” button below.  
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First, how familiar do you think you are with the Met Office as an organisation and the 
work that they do? On the scale below, please tell us how familiar you think you are 
with the Met Office: 
 
 
 
What kind of work do you associate with the Met Office? That is, as an organisation 
what do you think the Met office is concerned with, and what kind of things do you 
think people who work at the Met Office do? In the space below, please describe to us 
any areas of work or interest you associate with the Met Office: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now that you’ve had a chance to think a little bit about who the Met Office are and 
what they do, can you tell us a little bit more about your impressions of this 
organisation? Below is a list of words that are sometimes used to describe organisations. 
For each of these words, can you tell us how much you associate that quality with the 
Met Office using the scale provided below: 
 
  
Not at all  
part of my 
impression 
      
Very much  
part of my 
impression 
Competent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Skilled 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Incompetent  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Able 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Efficient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Professional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Can you tell us a little bit more about what you were thinking of when you answered 
the questions above? When you rated the Met Office on the adjectives above, was there 
something you were thinking about that might explain the impression that you have? In 
the space below, please tell us what you were thinking about when you answered the 
above questions about your impressions of the Met Office. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all 
familiar 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very familiar 
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We have a few more questions about your impressions of the Met Office. Below is 
another list of words that might be used to describe organisations. Again, for each of 
these words, can you tell us how much you associate that quality with the Met office 
using the scale provided below:  
 
  
Not at all  
part of my 
impression 
      
Very much  
part of my 
impression 
Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Moral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sincere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Again, can you tell us a bit more about what you were thinking of when you answered 
the questions above? When you rated the Met Office on these dimensions, was there 
something you were thinking about that might explain the impression that you have? In 
the space below, please tell us what you were thinking about when you answered the 
above questions about your impressions of the Met Office. 
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Thank you for answering our questions about the Met Office. As you are probably 
aware, one of the areas the Met Office works in is Climate Change. That is, Met Office 
scientists are involved in research into the nature and possible impacts of climate 
change. Given this, we would also like to know what you think about this area of 
research and your own opinions more generally about the science of Climate Change 
and those who work in the area. 
 
In other words, what do you think scientists’ positions on climate change are, and 
how much agreement do you think there is in the scientific community? Below is a list 
of statements. Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with each of 
these statements using the scale provided. 
 
  
Strongly 
disagree     
 
Strongly 
agree 
Scientists generally agree about the causes and 
consequences of climate change  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Among scientists, there is disagreement about the 
causes and consequences of climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In the science, there is still uncertainty about how 
much climate change is really happening  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In the science, there is still uncertainty about the 
effects climate change might have.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
All things considered, the scientific community are 
very certain about the nature and extent of climate 
change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Now we would like to know what you personally think about the topic of Climate 
Change more broadly. Below are a few more statements – this time about your own 
thoughts and feelings about climate change. Again, for each statement please indicate 
how much you disagree or agree using the scale provided.  
 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
          
Strongly 
agree 
In my opinion climate change is 
happening 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In my opinion climate change is 
man-made 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Human beings are responsible for 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is a natural 
process rather than something 
caused by human activity 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is something that 
I personally believe in 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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I remain somewhat sceptical 
about climate change and if it is 
real 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe there is global risk of 
the consequences of climate 
change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think there will be bad 
consequences of climate change 
for the planet 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe that the global 
consequences of climate change 
will be severe 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel personally at risk from the 
consequences of climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I personally worry about climate 
change and how it will affect me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
For me, climate change is 
something that I am not 
personally concerned about 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Now think about your own behaviour in relation to climate change. How willing are 
you to change your own behaviour in response to this issue? Below is a list of behaviours 
that some people think are useful for reducing climate change. How willing are you to 
engage in each of these behaviours?  
 
To reduce the impact of climate 
change I would be willing to… 
Not at all willing       
Very 
willing 
Walk (more) instead of using the car 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cycle (more) instead of using the car 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reduce my household energy use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Recycle (more) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use a car less 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use public transport (more) instead 
of the car 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Limit unnecessary air travel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use less water 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reduce, reuse, recycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eat less meat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 Finally, we need to know a little bit about you…. 
     
1. Are you          Male  Female         
 
2. How old are you?  ………… 
 
3. Do you own or have access to a car?  Yes No 
 
 
4. How would you rate you level of previous scientific training? 
n. I have had no science training at all 
o. I have had some scientific training through my previous studies 
p. I have had quite a lot of scientific training through my previous studies 
q. Most of my previous studies have been in the area of science. As such I 
have had a lot of training 
r. I work professionally as a scientist 
 
 
5.  What is the highest level of education you have completed/finished? 
g. O-levels/ GCSE-grade 
h. 2. A-level or equivalent 
i. 3. Higher National Diploma or equivalent 
j. 4. Degree or equivalent 
k. 5. Post-graduate qualification 
l. 6. Other (please specify) ………………… 
 
 
6. What is the monthly net income of your household (after tax, national insurance and 
other statutory deductions)?  If you are in a house share situation with housemates, just 
answer for yourself. 
h. Less than £1,000 per calendar month 
i. Between £1,000 and £1,499 per calendar month  
j. Between £1,500 and £1,999 per calendar month 
k. Between £2,000 and £2,499 per calendar month 
l. Between £2,500 and £2,999 per calendar month 
m. Between £3,000 and £3,499 per calendar month 
n. £3,500 per calendar month or more 
 
7. That’s the end of our questions! But if you think that there is something we have 
missed or if there is something else you would like to say about the issues in this 
survey, please give your comments here: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thanks very much! 
PLEASE CLICK HERE TO RECEIVE YOUR MAXIMILES POINTS
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Debriefing information 
Thank you so much for completing this questionnaire and taking part in this PhD 
research – I really appreciate it! 
 
Now that you’ve kindly completed my survey, I would like to tell you a bit more about 
the research this is part of. This survey is part of a larger PhD project being conducted 
in collaboration with the Met Office Hadley Centre. In this project we are examining 
how various people think about climate change, the processes involved in 
communicating climate change and the various factors that affect this communication. 
 
With respect to the latter, we have been particularly focussing on how uncertainty 
affects climate change communication, and how perceptions of communicators can 
affect this. One thing we have found so far is that although uncertainty (e.g., about 
climate change predictions) can disrupt effective communication about climate change, 
perceptions of communicator trustworthiness can help to overcome this. Said simply, if 
the source of communication is perceived to be trustworthy, people can be willing to 
listen to and act on messages even if these contain high degrees of uncertainty.  
 
Because our past research shows that perceptions of trustworthiness are important for 
effective communication, the survey you just completed was interested in exploring 
where these perceptions come from. For that reason, we asked you how you perceived 
the Met Office as an organisation involved in climate change communication and we 
also asked you to reflect on why you see the Met Office the way you do. We also asked 
you about your own personal beliefs and actions in response to climate change so that 
we can explore how perceptions of trustworthiness relate to these things.  
  
If you would like to hear of the results of this particular study when complete or further 
information of this PhD research more generally, please feel free to get in touch with 
myself, Hebba, via email – H.Haddad@exeter.ac.uk  
 
Thank you again! 
Hebba 
 
 
 
 
